BOOK III. II. 2-6
with cases of choice and of refusal, and, in general, with duty, that he may act in an orderly fashion, upon good reasons, and not carelessly; the third with the avoidance of error and rashness in judgement, and, in general, about cases of assent. Among these the most important and especially pressing is that which has to do with the stronger emotions; for a strong emotion does not arise except a desire fails to attain its object, or an aversion falls into what it would avoid.[1] This is the field of study which introduces to us confusions, tumults, misfortunes and calamities; and sorrows, lamentations, envies;[2][† 1] and makes[3] us envious and jealous—passions which make it impossible for us even to listen to reason. The second field of study deals with duty; for I ought not to be unfeeling like a statue, but should maintain my relations, both natural and acquired, as a religious man, as a son, a brother, a father, a citizen.
5The third belongs only to those who are already making progress; it has to do with the element of certainty in the matters which have just been mentioned, so that even in dreams, or drunkenness, or a state of melancholy-madness, a man may not be taken unawares by the appearance of an untested sense-impression.—This, says someone, is beyond us.—But philosophers nowadays pass by the first and second fields of study, and concentrate upon the third, upon arguments which involve equivocal premisses, which derive syllogisms by the process of interrogation, which involve hypothetical premisses,[4]
- ↑ A briefer definition is given in I. 27, 10.
- ↑ See critical note.
- ↑ The expression is not logical, for the field of study obviously can do nothing of the kind, but the fault is probably not in the MS. tradition.
- ↑ See I. 7, 1, and note for these first three.
- ↑ φόβους ("fears") conjectured by Reiske, very plausibly.
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