to independence with, those on whom they are necessarily dependent, would be an abuse, or at least a very barren use, of words. That to which every moral being has an indefeasible right, besides life, is the “pursuit of happiness.” In other words, he has a right to have his moral interests considered and respected, and not to be treated as a being having no moral interests of his own,—a mere “living tool,” as the slave is called by Aristotle, or a “chattel personal,” as he is called by the American law. Every moral being has a right, in other words, to be treated by the community as a person, and not as a thing. And in every state of society which is sound, however primitive it may be, and however remote from our advanced ideas of political and personal liberty, these conditions of respecting the moral interests of each member, and of treating each member as a person, not as a thing, are fulfilled. One man may be dependent upon another to any extent, in certain circumstances he may be absolutely dependent, without prejudice to the morality of the relations between them. But morality is at once violated when the interest of one man is sacrificed to that of another, and a state of things then commences noxious to the moral being of both parties, and more noxious to the moral being of him who commits, than to that of him who endures the wrong. Judge Ruffin of North Carolina, in giving judgment on the extent of the master’s dominion over the slave in that country, said, “The question before the Court has indeed been assimilated at the bar to the other domestic relations; and arguments drawn from the well-established principles which
