no will of his own, who surrenders his will in implicit obedience to that of another.”
The relation thus judicially described is an immoral relation, because it sacrifices not merely the personal or political liberties, but the moral interests of one party to the other. It is a relation, therefore, which could never exist in any state of society, however rude, which was founded on morality; nor be sanctioned under any dispensation really emanating from the Author of our moral nature. But a relation of the most complete dependence may be perfectly moral. Nothing is more moral than the relation between a mother and her infant child.
Let us observe also that the relation described by the words of Judge Ruffin is perfectly definite and distinct. It is that of a slave, not that of a servant bound for a term of years or for life, or even of a hereditary bondman who retains any personal rights and is not wholly devoted to the profit and pleasure of his master. There can be no pretence for refining it away into a ‘certain condition of the labourer, accidentally denoted by a name derived from the hatred felt by other nations for the Sclavonic race.’ We may be permitted to add, that this definite relation is marked by definite characteristics, in regard to the treatment of women, of fathers and of husbands, which are well known to the whole civilized world.
On approaching the question from the side of the Old Testament, we are met by an assertion which, if it be true, sweeps the field of controversy at once. It is said that we are bound to keep the negro race
