TACKLING EXTREME RIGHT-WING TERRORISM ONLINE
261. It is clear that the plethora of online material, and the international nature of ERWT, pose significant challenges when it comes to disrupting the process of radicalisation and identifying potential attack planning. Extreme Right-Wing Terrorists tend to be tech-savvy and well aware of the security services' interest in their activities—arguably, even more so than their Islamist extremist counterparts.[1] Their conspiracy-theorist, anti-government outlook tends to reinforce the idea that their internet use is being monitored, and they are often aware of what technical security measures they need to employ to avoid detection. This can include the use of encrypted platforms, Virtual Private Networks (which obscure the identity and location of the user) and 'dark net' sites.
262. The Head of Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP) was clear that "end to end encryption is a disaster".[2] and is having a detrimental effect on their ability to detect harmful material online. With more services offering end-to-end encryption of messaging, MI5 has called on communication service providers (CSPs) to allow intelligence agencies to have "exceptional access" to encrypted messaging.[3] However, it is also important that the CSPs—the companies that host these platforms—take the necessary steps to ensure this material cannot be viewed and shared in the first place. This is proving to be something of a 'work in progress'.
263. The Committee first identified the problem of the CSPs failing to remove Extremist material from their platforms in its 2014 Report on the Intelligence Relating to the Murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby. During the course of that Inquiry, the Committee were told by Google, Facebook and Apple, among others, that they did not routinely monitor the content on their systems and therefore were unable automatically to block Extremist material. They attributed their failure to review suspicious content to the volume of material on their systems. Instead, they told the Committee, they were largely reliant on user-generated reports—from private citizens, organisations and law enforcement authorities—which would then trigger them to remove illegal or offensive content.
264. The Committee expressed its concern at this lack of accountability:
It is clear from the responses we received that the CSPs take different approaches to monitoring their networks. However, for the most part, action is only triggered when they are notified of offensive content (or content which breaches their guidelines) by others. In the case of communications between terrorists, user reporting is unlikely to happen, and therefore such content is unlikely to be discovered. This approach to reviewing content does not therefore help the intelligence and security Agencies to discover terrorist networks or plots.[4]
While the Government was broadly supportive in its response to the Committee's recommendations in the Report—stating that "we are also pushing CSPs to take stronger,
- ↑ 'UK Far Right extremism: hate spreads from the fringe', Financial Times, 8 May 2019.
- ↑ Oral evidence - CTP, 29 April 2021.
- ↑ 'MI5 Chief asks tech firms for "exceptional access" to encrypted messages', The Guardian, 25 February 2020.
- ↑ Report on the Intelligence Relating to the Murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby, HC 795, 14 November 2014.
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