Page:E02710035-HCP-Extreme-Right-Wing-Terrorism Accessible.pdf/124

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International

is broadly recognised. However, the scope and scale of the response would be dependent on competing priorities.

301. CTP worked with Europol following the Christchurch and Halle attacks, to support the development of a Protocol for On Line Crisis Management, with an emphasis on a co-ordinated pan-Europe response to take down material from the online space, whilst recognising the importance of capturing investigative opportunities and evidential proof. The Head of CTP told the Committee in April 2021 that they had "just got voted back unanimously as a third country on to the Europol CT working group".[1]

***

302. ***.[2]

303. ***.[3]

304. ***.[4]

T. International co-operation is key to tackling Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism, however the disparity in approach and legal thresholds for defining the threat makes this particularly challenging. MI5 and Counter Terrorism Policing are committed to exploring a possible joint approach with international liaison partners, although we note that the nature of the problem varies greatly across different countries.

The impact of Brexit

305. Many of the UK's national security capabilities, including the sharing of data and intelligence, depend on a network of bilateral and multilateral partnerships with European equivalents in EU Member States. In January 2020, MI5 told the Committee that they were confident that:

UK cooperation with European partners on national security issues will remain as strong as it has ever been. Brexit should therefore have no direct impact on bilateral partnerships, or . . . non-EU based multilateral forums, such as the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG) ***.[5]

306. MI5 has, nevertheless, identified some areas that have the potential to impact relationships with European partners and therefore its ability to share data and intelligence across the spectrum of threats, including ERWT. MI5 told the Committee that these three areas are:

  • Partnerships based on the premise that national security is a Member State responsibility only (where this is made clear under EU law). Maintaining strong Member State-based national security arrangements between sovereign states, supported by a wider UK/EU security partnership, has been critical ***.

  1. Oral evidence - CTP, 29 April 2021.
  2. ***
  3. Written evidence - MI5.
  4. Oral evidence - MI5, 29 April 2021.
  5. Written evidence - MI5, CTP, GCHQ and Home Office, 31 January 2020.

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