101. DI told the Committee that its Counter Intelligence (CI) unit[1] had set up an Insider Threat team in 2018, which works to understand and counter the threats to Ministry of Defence (MoD) establishments and current or former MoD personnel:
This includes insider threats from personnel who may engage in [E]RWT. The team conducts searches for indicators of insider activity, and cases where significant indicators of risk are detected will be referred for investigative action DI CI works continuously with Five Eyes partners to *** ***. DI CI also participates in joint training activities with ***, to refine techniques, tactics and procedures, and ensure working to common standards. MOD Prevent referrals for 2019 totalled 14, of which 13 were for [Extreme] right-wing concern. Referrals for 2020 to date total 7 of which 6 are for [Extreme] Right-Wing concern. The [Extreme] Right-Wing referrals relate to the views expressed by a small number of individuals, none of whom were members of proscribed right-wing organisations or involved in [E]RWT activity.[2]
G. The fact that the Armed Forces do not provide clear direction to service personnel regarding membership of any organisation—let alone an extremist one—would appear to be something of an anomaly. It could be argued that this is a somewhat risky approach, given the sensitive roles of many service personnel.
The police
102. There is a similar risk from the ‘insider threat’ in relation to the police. The risk of radicalisation in general (and not just by the Far Right) was highlighted in a 2020 report published by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services on the contribution being made by the police to the Prevent programme. The report noted that "few staff we interviewed had considered the possibility that their staff could be vulnerable to radicalisation".[3]
103. However, Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP) told the Committee during this Inquiry that the police are aware of the potential for those within policing to be exposed to, and influenced by, Right-Wing Extremist ideologies, and that this risk could stem from officers and staff being exposed to influencing factors in their routine lives, or from enhanced exposure to extremist content due to their specialist roles. CTP notes that there are a number of measures in place to address these potential vulnerabilities:
- Across policing there are mechanisms for officers and staff to discreetly report concerns about colleagues which would then be subject to further investigation;
- If employees become the subject of an ERWT investigation, it is expected that their employment would be identified through the course of the investigation. In such cases, CTP and MI5 would develop the intelligence, and where appropriate disrupt the threat; and
- ↑ The DI CI Insider Threat team works with MI5, SIS, GCHQ and the National Crime Agency.
- ↑ Written evidence – DI, 30 November 2020.
- ↑ Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, Counter Terrorism Policing—An inspection of the police’s contribution to the government's Prevent programme, March 2020.
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