which divided Africa Minor between them—the Marinides at Fez, the Abd-el-Wahid at Tlemçen, and the Hafsides at Tunis—were without strength and without authority. Two nations, then at the height of their power, Spain and Turkey, disputed the empire of the Mediterranean. The Struggle
with
Spain.Spaniards took Mers-el-Kebir (1505), Oran (1509), and Bougie and Tripoli (1510). Two Turkish corsairs, Arouj and his brother, Khair-ed-Din (otherwise known as Barbarossa), at first established in the island of Jerba and afterwards at Jijelli, disputed with the Spaniards the dominion of the country. Arouj seized Algiers (1516); Khair-ed-Din, succeeding him in 1518, did homage for his conquest to the sultan at Constantinople, who named him beylerbey and sent him soldiers (1519). Then began the struggle of the Turks with Spain. In 1541 the emperor Charles V. undertook a great expedition against Algiers. He succeeded in landing, and proceeded to attack the town. But during the night of the 26th of October a violent storm destroyed a great part of his fleet. His provisions and his ammunition were lost, his army was compelled to retreat with considerable loss, and the emperor had to re-embark with the remnant of his troops. This check completely discouraged the Spaniards and assured success to the Turks. The Spanish garrisons established in the coast towns, badly paid and left without reinforcements, had difficulty in defending themselves. In the end, the only towns the Spaniards retained on the Algerian coast were Oran and Mers-el-Kebir. These two towns, taken by the Turks in 1708 and retaken by the Spaniards in 1732, were finally abandoned in 1791.
Under the Turkish dominion Algeria had originally at its head a beylerbey resident at Algiers. He controlled three beys:—the bey of Titeri in the south, the bey of the east at Constantine, and the bey of the west who resided at Mascara and afterwards at Oran. These three beys existed till 1830. The beylerbeys were replaced in 1587 by pashas Barbary corsairs.sent triennially by the Porte. But the authority of these pashas, strangers to the country, was always precarious. They found themselves, in fact, in conflict with two forces, which in principle were in their service, but which in reality held the power—the taïffe des reis, otherwise called the corporation of the corsairs (see Barbary Pirates), and the janissaries, a kind of military democracy in which each member was promoted according to seniority. In 1669 the corsairs drove out the pasha, and put into his place a dey elected by themselves. After some fruitless attempts Turkey ceased to send pashas to Algiers—where they were not allowed even to land—and thus recognized the de facto independence of this singular republic. The authority of the deys, moreover, was scarcely more solid than that of the pashas. They trembled before the janissaries, who from the 18th century elected and deposed them at their pleasure.
The relations which the European powers were able to maintain with northern Africa were at that time difficult and uncertain. Ships trading in the Mediterranean were seized by the corsairs, who pillaged the coasts of Europe, carried off their captives to Algiers, and destroyed the fishing and commercial settlements founded by the Marseillais on the shores of Africa. The Christian governments either uttered useless and impotent complaints at Constantinople, or endeavoured to negotiate directly with Algiers, as in the case of the negotiations of Sanson Napollon during the ministry of Richelieu. More rarely their patience became exhausted, and ships were sent to bombard this nest of pirates. Two naval demonstrations were made by France during the reign of Louis XIV., one by Abraham Duquesne in 1682, and the other by Marshal Jean d’Estrees in 1688, but these repressive measures were too intermittent to produce a durable effect.
In 1815 at the congress of Vienna, and in 1818 at the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, the powers endeavoured to concert measures to put an end to the Barbary piracy. Nevertheless the naval demonstrations made by Lord Exmouth in 1816, and by a combined English and French squadron in 1819, remained equally fruitless. But the result which the European powers in concert had been unable to achieve, was brought about by the accidental circumstances which led France to undertake alone an expedition against Algiers.
Some difficulties had arisen between France and the dey of Algiers with reference to the debts contracted to Bacri and Busnach, two Algerine Jews who had supplied corn to the French government under the Directory. This question of interest would not have been sufficient in itself to bring about a rupture, but the situation became French intervention.acute when the dey, Hussein, struck the French consul, Deval, on the face with his fly-flap (April 30, 1827). Thereupon the port of Algiers was blockaded. The minister of war, the duc de Clermont-Tonnerre, would have gone further, but the president of the council, the comte de Villèle, opposed the sending of an expedition, while in the Martignac ministry M. de la Ferronays, minister of foreign affairs, was bent upon negotiating. It needed a second insult—the firing on “La Provence,” a vessel carrying a flag of truce, in the harbour of Algiers (August 3, 1829)—to spur the French government to further action than an ineffectual blockade. An expedition against Algiers was then decided upon, and Marshal de Bourmont, the minister of war, himself took the command. On the 14th of June 1830 the French troops landed at Sidi-Ferruch. On the 19th of June they beat the enemy at Staoueli. On the 4th of July the fort de l’Empereur was blown up. On the 5th of July Algiers capitulated. Some days later the dey was deported, as well as the greater part of the janissaries. Those who were not married were conveyed immediately to Asia Minor; the rest had permission to remain, but in fact they left the country soon afterwards.
Meanwhile the revolution of July 1830 had broken out in France. The new government found itself very much embarrassed by the situation bequeathed by the Restoration. The more serious section in parliament were frankly opposed to the idea of conquering or of colonizing Algeria; on the other hand, popular sentiment was hostile to evacuation. The French government—fearing to displease the other powers by following up its conquest, and hampered in particular by its engagements towards England, yet conscious that the only means of putting an end to the piracy was to remain—decided provisionally in favour of that intermediate system, called restricted occupation, which consisted in occupying merely the principal seaports and awaiting events. The Algerians extricated the government from its difficulty by attacking the French troops, who were obliged to defend themselves. The natives gained some successes, and it became necessary to avenge the honour of the flag. In this gradual manner were the French led to conquer Algeria.
General Bertrand Clausel, who succeeded Marshal de Bourmont, was one of the few men who at that period dreamed of conquering and colonizing Algeria. His enthusiastic confidence knew no obstacles. If the dey had left, the three beys remained. With the feeble resources at his disposal Clausel undertook an expedition against Bu-Meyrag, the bey of Titeri, took from him Blida and Medea, dismissed him, replaced him by a successor devoted to France, and returned to Algiers after having left a garrison in Medea. Then, not having the means of directly extending the rule of France to the east or west, Clausel devised a system of protectorates. He negotiated directly with the bey of Tunis with a view to installing as beys at Oran and Constantine Tunisian princes who recognized the authority of France. But the events which were taking place in Europe made it imperative to send home a part of the army of Africa, and Medea had to be evacuated. At the same time the negotiations set on foot with the bey of Tunis were censured by the government, and General Clausel was recalled (February 1831).
The period of uncertainty was prolonged under his successors, General Pierre Berthezène (February to December 1831); A. J. M. R. Savary, duc de Rovigo (December 1831 to March 1833), General Avizard (March to April 1833), and General Voirol (April 1833 to September 1834). The French, not yet certain whether or not they would retain Algeria, remained on the defensive. At the time they occupied only the three towns of Algiers, Bona and Oran, with their suburbs, where their situation was moreover singularly precarious. The Arabs would pillage
