and a different celestial aether, but whatever elementary bodies natural science, starting anew from mechanics and chemistry, may determine to be the matter of all other bodies whatever. Nature does not aim at God as end, but God, thinking and willing ends, produces and acts on nature. Soul is not an immateriate essence of an organic body capable, but an immateriate conscious substance within an organic body. Sensation is not the reception of the selfsame essence of an external body, but one’s perception of one’s sentient organism as affected, and especially of its organs resisting one another, e.g. one’s lips, hands, &c., preventing one another from occupying the same place at the same moment within one’s organism. Intelligence does not differ from sense by having no bodily organ, but the nervous system is the bodily organ of both. Intelligence is not active intellect propagating universal essence in passive intellect, but only logical inference starting from sense, and both requiring nervous body and conscious soul. It is not always a true apprehension of essence, but often, especially in physical matter, such as sound or heat or light, takes superficial effects to be the essence of the thing. Aristotle did not altogether solve the question, What is, and scarcely solved at all the question, How do we know the external world?
We might continue to object. But at bottom there remains the fundamental position of Aristotelianism, that all things are substances, individuals separate though related; that some things are attributes, real only as being some individual substance somehow affected, or, as we should say, modified or determined; and that without individual substances there is nothing, and nothing universal apart from individuals. There remains too the consequence that there are different substances, separate from but related to one another; and these substances of three irreducible kinds, natural, supernatural, human. Aristotelianism has to be considered against the philosophy which preceded it and against the philosophy which has since followed it. Platonism preceded it, and was the metaphysical doctrine that all things are supernatural—forms, gods, souls. Idealism has since followed it, and is the metaphysical doctrine that all things are mind and states of mind. Aristotelianism intervenes between ancient Platonism and modern Idealism, and is the metaphysical doctrine that all things are substances, natural and supernatural and human. It is a philosophy of substantial things, standing as a via media between a philosophy of the supernatural and a philosophy of mind. There are three alternatives, which may be put as questions which every thinker must ask himself. Are the things which surround me in what I call the environment,—the men, the animals, the plants, the ground, the stones, the water, the air, the moon, the sun, the stars and God—are they shadows, unsubstantial things, as formerly Platonism made all things to be except the supernatural world of forms, gods and souls? Or are they, as modern Idealism says, mind and states of mind? Or are they really substances separate from, though related to, myself, who am also a substance? The Aristotelian answer is—“Yes, all things are substances, but not all supernatural, nor all mental; for some are natural substances, or bodies”; and by that answer Aristotelianism stands or falls.
Literature.—The Aristotelian philosophy is to be studied, first in Aristotle’s works, which are the best commentaries on one another; the best complete edition is the Berlin edition (1831–1870), by Bekker and Brandis, in which also are the fragments collected by V. Rose, the scholia collected by Brandis, and the index compiled by Bonitz. After reading the remains of the Peripatetic school, the Greek commentators should be further studied in this edition. The Latin commentators, the Arabians and the schoolmen show how Aristotle has been the chief author of modern culture; while the vindication of modern independence comes out in his critics, the greatest of whom were Roger and Francis Bacon. Since the modern discovery of the science of motion by Galileo which changed natural science, and the modern revolution of philosophy by Descartes which changed metaphysics, the study of Aristotle has become less universal; but it did not die out, and received a fresh stimulus especially from Julius Pacius, who going back through G. Zabarella to the Arabians, and himself gifted with great logical powers, always deserves study in his editions of the Organon and the Physics and in his Doctrinae Peripateticae. In more recent times, as part of the growing conviction of the essentiality of everything Greek, Aristotle has received marked attention. In France there are the works of Cousin (1835), Félix Ravaisson, who wrote on the Metaphysics (1837–1846), and Barthélemy St Hilaire, who translated the Organon and other works (1844 seq.). In Germany there has been a host of commentaries, among which we may mention the Organon edited (1844–1846) by F. Th. Waitz (not so well as by Pacius), the De Anima edited (1833) by F. A. Trendelenburg and later by A. Torstrik, the Historia Animalium by H. Aubert and F. Wimmer (1868), the Ethics by K. L. Michelet (1827), the Metaphysics by A. Schwegler (1847) and (best of all) by H. Bonitz (1848), who is the most faithful of all commentators, because to great industry and acumen he adds the rare gift of confessing when he does not understand, and when he does not know what Aristotle might have thought. With Aristotle’s works before one, with the Index Aristotelicus, and the edition and translation of the Metaphysics by Bonitz on one side, and Zeller’s Die Philosophie der Griechen, ii. 2, “Aristoteles” (trans. by Costelloe and Muirhead), on the other side, one can go a considerable way towards understanding the foundations of Aristotelianism.
In England scholars tend to take up certain parts of Aristotle’s philosophy. Grote indeed intended to write a general account of Aristotle like that of Plato; but his Aristotle went little further than the logical writings. From Cambridge we have J. W. Blakesley’s Life of Aristotle, E. M. Cope’s Rhetoric, Dr Henry Jackson’s Nicomachean Ethics, v., S. H. Butcher’s Poetics, Hicks’s De Anima, J. E. Sandys’s Athenian Constitution, Jebb’s Rhetoric (ed. Sandys). Oxford in particular, since the beginning of the 19th century, has kept alive the study of Aristotle. E. Cardwell in his edition of the Nicomachean Ethics (1828) had the wisdom to found his text on the Laurentian Manuscript (Kb); E. Poste wrote translations of the Posterior Analytics and Sophistici Elenchi; R. Congreve edited the Politics; A. Grant edited the Nicomachean Ethics; E. Wallace translated and annotated the De Anima; B. Jowett translated the Politics; W. L. Newman has edited the Politics in four volumes; Dr Ogle has translated the De Partibus Animalium, with notes; R. Shute wrote a History of the Aristotelian Writings; Professor J. A. Stewart has written Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics; Professor J. Burnet has issued an annotated edition of the Nicomachean Ethics, and W. D. Ross has translated the Metaphysics. All these are, or were, Oxford men; and it remains to mention two others: I. Bywater, who as an Aristotelian scholar has done much for the improvement of Bekker’s text, especially of the Nicomachean Ethics and the Poetics; and F. G. Kenyon, who has the proud distinction of having been the first modern editor of the Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία. (T. Ca.)
ARISTOXENUS, of Tarentum (4th century B.C.), a Greek peripatetic philosopher, and writer on music and rhythm. He was taught first by his father Spintharus, a pupil of Socrates, and later by the Pythagoreans, Lamprus of Erythrae and Xenophilus, from whom he learned the theory of music. Finally he studied under Aristotle at Athens, and was deeply annoyed, it is said, when Theophrastus was appointed head of the school on Aristotle’s death. His writings, said to have numbered four hundred and fifty-three, were in the style of Aristotle, and dealt with philosophy, ethics and music. The empirical tendency of his thought is shown in his theory that the soul is related to the body as harmony to the parts of a musical instrument. We have no evidence as to the method by which he deduced this theory (cf. T. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, Eng. trans. 1905, vol. iii. p. 43). In music he held that the notes of the scale are to be judged, not as the Pythagoreans held, by mathematical ratio, but by the ear. The only work of his that has come down to us is the three books of the Elements of Harmony (ῥυθμικὰ στοιχεῖα), an incomplete musical treatise. Grenfell and Hunt’s Oxyrhynchus Papyri (vol. i., 1898) contains a five-column fragment of a treatise on metre, probably this treatise of Aristoxenus.
The best edition is by Paul Marquard, with German translation and full commentary, Die harmonischen Fragmente des Aristoxenus (Berlin, 1868). The fragments are also given in C. W. Müller, Frag. Hist. Graec., ii. 269 sqq.; and R. Westphal, Melik und Rhythmik d. klass. Hellenenthums (2nd vol. edited by F. Saran, Leipzig, 1893). Eng. trans. by H. S. Macran (Oxford, 1902). See also W. L. Mahne, Diatribe de Aristoxeno (Amsterdam, 1793); B. Brill, Aristoxenus’ rhythmische und metrische Messungen (1871); R. Westphal, Griechische Rhythmik und Harmonik (Leipzig, 1867); L. Laloy, Aristoxène de Tarente et la musique de l’antiquité (Paris, 1904); See Peripatetics, Pythagoras (Music) and art. “Greek Music” in Grove’s Dict. of Music (1904). For the Oxyrhynchus fragment see Classical Review (January 1898), and C. van Jan in Bursian’s Jahresbericht, civ. (1901).
ARISUGAWA, the name of one of the royal families of Japan, going back to the seventh son of the mikado Go-Yozei (d. 1638). After the revolution of 1868, when the mikado Mutsu-hito was restored, his uncle, Prince Taruhito Arisugawa (1835–1895), became commander-in-chief, and in 1875 president of the senate.
