million in number for each half of the body. These are living
threads of microscopic tenuity, each extending from a receptive
organ to a central nervous mass. These central nervous masses
are in vertebrates all fused into one, of which the part which
lies in the head is especially large and complex, because directly
connected with particularly important and delicate receptive
organs. The part of the central nervous organ which lies in
the head has, in consequence of its connexion with the most
important receptive organs, evolved a dominant importance in
the nervous system, and this is especially true of the higher
animal forms. This head part of the central nervous organ is
sufficiently different from the rest, even to anatomical examination,
to have received a separate name, the brain. But the fact
of its having received a separate name ought not to obscure the
singleness and solidarity of the whole central nervous organ
as one entity. The functions of the whole central nervous
organ from region to region are essentially similar throughout.
One of its essential functions is reception, via afferent nerves,
of nervous impulses generated in the receptive organs by environmental
agents as stimuli. In other words, whatever the
nature of the agent, its result on the receptive organs enters the
central nervous organ as a nervous impulse, and all segments
of the central nervous organ receive impulses so generated.
Further, it is not known that nervous impulses present qualitative
differences among themselves. It is with these impulses that
the central nervous organ whether spinal cord or brain has to
deal.
Material and Psychical Signs of Cerebral Activity.—In the central nervous organ the action resulting from entrant impulses has issue in three kinds of ways. The reaction may die out, be suppressed, and so far as discoverable lead to nothing; or the impulses may evoke effect in either or both of two forms. Just as from the receptive organs, nerves lead into the central nervous organ, so conversely from the central organ other nerves, termed efferent, lead to various organs of the body, especially glands and muscles. The reaction of the central nervous organ to impulses poured into it commonly leads to a discharge of impulses from it into glands and muscles. These centrifugal impulses are, so far as is known, qualitatively like the centripetal impulses. On reaching the glands and muscles they influence the activity of those organs. Since those organs are therefore the mechanisms in which the ultimate effect of the nervous reaction takes place, they are often termed from this point of view effector organs. A change ensuing in effector organs is often the only sign an observer has that a nervous reaction has occurred, unless the nervous system under observation be the observer’s own.
If the observer turns to his own nervous system for evidence of reaction, he meets at once in numberless instances with sensation as an outcome or sign of its reaction. This effect he cannot show to any being beside himself. He can only describe it, and in describing it he cannot strictly translate it into any term of material existence. The unbridged gulf between sensation and the changes produced in effector organs necessitates a separate handling of the functions of the nervous system according as their office under consideration is sensation or material effect. This holds especially in the case of the brain, and for the following reasons.
Psychosis and the Fore-Brain.—Hippocrates wrote, “It is through the brain that we become mad, that delirium seizes us, that fears and terrors assail us.” “We know that pleasure and joy on the one hand and pain and grief on the other are referable to the brain. It is in virtue of it that we think, understand, see, hear, know ugliness and beauty, evil and good, the agreeable and the disagreeable.” Similarly and more precisely Descartes indicated the brain, and the brain alone, as the seat of consciousness. Finally, it was Flourens who perhaps first definitely insisted on the restriction of the seat of consciousness in higher animals to that part of the brain which is the fore-brain. A functional distinction between the fore-brain and the remainder of the nervous system seems, in fact, that consciousness and physical reactions are adjunct to the fore-brain in a way in which they are not to the rest of the system. After transection of the spinal cord, or of the brain behind the fore-brain, psychical phenomena do not belong to the reactions of the nervous arcs posterior to the transection, whereas they do still accompany reactions of the nervous arcs in front and still connected with the fore-brain. A man after severance of the spinal cord does not possess in the strict sense consciousness of the limbs whose afferent nerves lie behind the place of spinal severance. He can see them with his eyes, and if the severance lie between the arms and the legs, can feel the latter with his hands. He knows them to be a part of his body. But they are detached from his consciousness. Sensations derived from them through all other channels of sense than their own do not suffice to restore them in any adequate measure to his consciousness. He must have the sensations so called “resident” in them, that is, referred to them, without need of any logical inference. These can be yielded only by the receptive organs resident in the part itself, its skin, its joints, its muscles, &c., and can only be yielded by those receptive organs so long as the nerve impulses from them have access to the fore-brain. Consciousness, therefore, does not seem to attach to any portion of the nervous system of higher animals from which the fore-brain has been cut off. In the dog it has been found that no sign of memory, let alone intelligence, has been forthcoming after removal of the greater part of the fore-brain.
In lower vertebrates it is not clear that consciousness in primitive form requires always the co-operation of the fore-brain. In them the fore-brain does not seem a conditio sine qua non for psychosis—so far as we may trust the rather hazardous inferences which study of the behaviour of fish, &c., allows. And the difference between higher and lowlier animal forms in respect of the fore-brain as a condition for psychosis becomes more marked when the Arthropoda are examined. The behaviour of some Insecta points strongly to their possessing memory, rudimentary in kind though it may be. But in them no homologue of the fore-brain of vertebrates can be indisputably made out. The head ganglia in these Invertebrates may, it is true, be analogous in function in certain ways to the brain of vertebrates. Some experiments, not plentiful, indicate that destruction of these head ganglia induces deterioration of behaviour such as follows loss of psychical functions in cases of destruction of the fore-brain in vertebrates. Though, therefore, we cannot be clear that the head ganglia of these Invertebrates are the same structure morphologically as the brain of vertebrates, they seem to hold a similar office, exercising analogous functions, including psychosis of a rudimentary kind. We can, therefore, speak of the head ganglia of Arthropods as a brain, and in doing so must remember that we define by physiological evidence rather than by morphological.
Cerebral Control over Lower Nervous Centres.—There accrues to the brain, especially to the fore-brain of higher Vertebrates, another function besides that of grafting psychical qualities upon the reactions of the nervous system. This function is exhibited as power to control in greater or less measure the pure reflexes enacted by the system. These pure reflexes have the character of fatality, in the sense that, given a particular stimulus, a particular reaction unvaryingly follows; the same group of muscles or the same gland is invariably thrown into action in the same way. Removal of the fore-brain, i.e. of that portion of the central nervous organ to which psychosis is adjunct, renders the nervous reactions of the animal more predictable and less variable. The animal, for instance, a dog, is given over more completely to simple reflexes. Its skin is touched and it scratches the spot, its jaw is stroked and it yawns, its rump is rubbed and it shakes itself, like a dog coming out of water; and these reactions occur fatally and inopportunely, for instance, when food is being offered to it, when the dog normally would allow no such insignificant skin stimuli as the above to defer his appropriate reaction. Goltz relates the behaviour of a dog from which almost the whole fore-brain had been removed. The animal lived healthily under the careful treatment accorded it. At feeding time a little quinine (bitter) added to its sop of meat and milk led to the morsels, after being taken into the
