general situation of the enemy’s masses will, in western Europe, always be sufficiently fixed by the trend of his railway communications, checked by reports of spies, newspapers, &c., for, with neutral frontiers everywhere within a few hours’ ride for a motor cyclist, anything approaching the secrecy of the Japanese in Manchuria is quite unattainable, and, once the great masses begin to move, the only “shadowing” which holds out any hope of usefulness is that undertaken by very small selected parties of officers, perfectly mounted, daring riders, and accustomed to cover distances of 100 m. and upwards. These will be supported by motor cars and advanced feelers from the field telegraphs, though probably the motor car would carry the eye-witness to his destination in less time than it would take to draft and signal a complete report.
Tactical scouting, now as always, is invaluable for securing the safety of the marching and sleeping troops, and brigade, divisional and corps commanders will remain dependent upon their own squadrons for the solution of the immediate tactical problem before them; but, since both sides will employ mounted men to screen their operations, intelligence will generally only be won by fighting, and the side which can locally develop a marked fire superiority will be the more likely to obtain the information it requires. In this direction the introduction of the motor car and of cyclists is likely to exercise a most important influence, but, whatever may be the conveyance, it must be looked upon as a means of advance only, never of retreat. The troops thus conveyed must be used to seize villages or defiles about which the cavalry and guns can manœuvre.
Formations and Drill.—Cavalry, when mounted, act exclusively by “shock” or more precisely by “the threat of their shock,” for the immediate result of collision is actually decided some instants before this collision takes place. Experience has shown that the best guarantee for success in this shock is afforded by a two-deep line, the men riding knee to knee within each squadron at least. Perfect cavalry can charge in larger bodies without intervals between the squadrons, but, ordinarily, intervals of about 10 yds. between adjacent squadrons are kept to localize any partial unsteadiness due to difficulties of ground, casualties, &c. The obvious drawbacks of a two-deep line are that it halves the possible extent of front, and that if a front-rank horse falls the rear-rank horse generally tumbles over it also. To minimize the latter evil, the charge in two successive lines, 150 to 200 yds. apart, has often been advocated, but this has never stood the test of serious cavalry fighting; first, because when squadrons are galloping fast and always striving to keep the touch to the centre, if a horse falls the adjacent horses close in with such force that their sidelong collision may throw down more and always creates violent oscillation; and secondly, because owing to the dust raised by the first rank the following one can never maintain its true direction. It is primarily to avoid the danger and difficulty arising from the dust that the ranks in manœuvre are closed to within one horse’s length, as, when moving at speed, the rear rank is past before the dust has time to rise.
Of all formations, the line is the most difficult to handle, and, particularly, to conceal—hence various formations in column are necessary for the preliminary manœuvres requisite to place the squadrons in position for the final deployment previous to the charge. Many forms of these columns have been tried, but, setting aside the columns intended exclusively for marching along roads, of which “sections” (four men abreast) is most usual in England, only these survive:—
Squadron column. |
In squadron column, the troops of the squadron formed are in line one behind the other at a distance equal to the front of the troop in line. The ideal squadron consists of 128 men formed in two ranks giving 64 files, and divided into four troops of 16 files—a larger number of troops makes the drill too complicated, a smaller number makes each troop slow and unhandy. When the squadron is weak, therefore, the troop should still be maintained as near 16 files as possible, the number of troops being if necessary reduced. Thus with only 32 files, two troops of 16 files would be better than four of only 8 files.
All other formations of the regiment or brigade are fundamentally derived from the squadron column, only varying with the order in which the squadrons are grouped, and the intervals which separate them. Thus the regiment may move in line of squadron columns at close interval, i.e. 11 paces apart or in double column as in the diagram. To form line for the charge, the squadrons open out, still in column, to full interval, i.e. the width they occupy when in line; and then on the command “Line to the front,” each troop moves up to its place in line as shown in the diagram. When in line a large body of cavalry can no longer vary its direction without sacrificing its appearance of order, and as above pointed out, it is this appearance of order which really decides the result of the charge before the actual collision. Since, however, the enemy’s movements may compel a change, an intermediate formation is provided, known as the “half column.” When this formation is ordered, the troops within each squadron wheel half right or left, and each squadron is then able to form into column or line to the front as circumstances demand, or the whole line can be formed into column of troops by continuing the wheel and in this formation gallop out into a fresh direction, re-forming line by a simple wheel in the shortest possible time.
Bibliography.—G. H. Elliot, Cavalry Literature (1893); v. Bismarck, Uses and Application of Cavalry in War (1818, English translation by Lieut.-Col. Beamish, 1855); G. T. Denison, A History of Cavalry (1877); Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Letters on Cavalry and Conversations on Cavalry (English translations, 1880 and 1892); Colonel Mitchell, Considerations on Tactics (1854) and Thoughts on Tactics and Organization (1838); E. Nolan, Cavalry, its History and Tactics (1855); Roemer, Cavalry, its History, Management and Uses (New York, 1863); Maitland, Notes on Cavalry (1878); F. N. Maude, Cavalry versus Infantry and Cavalry, its Past and Future; C. von Schmidt, Instructions for the Training, Employment and Leading of Cavalry (English translation, 1881); V. Verdy du Vernois, The Cavalry Division (1873); Maj.-Gen. Walker, The Organization and Tactics of the Cavalry Division (1876); C. W. Bowdler Bell, Notes on the German Cavalry Regulations of 1886; F. de Brack, Light Cavalry Outposts (English translation); Dwyer, Seats and Saddles (1869); J. Jacob, Views and Opinions (1857); F. Hoenig, Die Kavallerie als Schlachtenkörper (1884); Sir Evelyn Wood, Achievements of Cavalry (1893); H. T. Siborne, Waterloo Letters; Desbrière and Sautai, La Cavalerie de 1740 à 1789 (1806); Warnery, Remarques sur la cavalerie (1781); v. Canitz, Histoire des exploits et des vicissitudes de la cavalerie prussienne dans les campagnes de Frédéric II (1849); Cherfils, Cavalerie en campagne (1888),
