to the town authorities, who appointed their aldermen and suppressed them when they considered them useless or dangerous. The prosperity of Copenhagen was checked by an attack by the people of Lübeck in 1248, and by another on the part of Prince Jaromir of Rügen in 1259. In 1306 it managed to repel the Norwegians, but in 1362, and again in 1368, it was captured by the opponents of Valdemar Atterdag. In the following century a new enemy appeared in the Hanseatic league, which was jealous of its rivalry, but their invasion was frustrated by Queen Philippa. Various attempts were made by successive kings to obtain the town from the see of Roskilde, as the most suitable for the royal residence; but it was not till 1443 that the transference was finally effected and Copenhagen became the capital of the kingdom. From 1523 to 1524 it held out for Christian II. against Frederick I., who captured it at length and strengthened its defensive works; and it was only after a year’s siege that it yielded in 1536 to Christian III. From 1658 to 1660 it was unsuccessfully beleaguered by Charles Gustavus of Sweden; and in the following year it was rewarded by various privileges for its gallant defence. In 1660 it gave its name to the treaty which concluded the Swedish war of Frederick III. In 1700 it was bombarded by the united fleets of England, Holland and Sweden; in 1728 a conflagration destroyed 1640 houses and five churches; another in 1795 laid waste 943 houses, the church of St Nicolas, and the Raadhus. In 1801 the Danish fleet was destroyed in the roadstead by the English (see below, § Battle of Copenhagen); and in 1807 the city was bombarded by the British under Lord Cathcart, and saw the destruction of the university buildings, its principal church and numerous other edifices.
See O. Nielsen, Köbenhavns Historie oz Beskrivelse (Copenhagen, 1877–1892); C. Bruun and P. Munch, Köbenhavn, Skrilding af dets Historie, &c. (ibid. 1887–1901); Bering-Lüsberg, Köbenhavn i gamle Dage (ibid. 1898 et seq.). (O. J. R. H.)
Battle of Copenhagen
The formation of a league between the northern powers, Russia, Prussia, Denmark and Sweden, on the 16th of December 1800, nominally to protect neutral trade at sea from the enforcement by Great Britain of her belligerent claims, led to the despatch of a British fleet to the Baltic on the 12th of March 1801. It consisted of fifty-three sail in all, of which eighteen were of the line. Prussia possessed no fleet. The nominal strength of the Russian fleet was eighty-three sail of the line, of the Danish twenty-three, and of the Swedish eighteen. But this force was for the most part only on paper. Some of the Russian ships were at Archangel, others in the Mediterranean. Of those actually in the Baltic and fit to go to sea, twelve were at Reval shut in by the ice, and the others were at Kronstadt. The Swedes could equip only eleven of the line for sea, and Denmark only seven or eight. It is highly doubtful whether the three powers could have collected more than forty ships of the line—and they would have been hastily manned, destitute of experience, and without confidence. A rapid British attack would in any case forestall the concentration of these heterogeneous squadrons. The superior quality of the veteran British crews was more than enough to counterbalance a mere superiority in numbers. The command of the British fleet was given to Sir Hyde Parker, an amiable man of no energy and little ability. He had Nelson with him as second in command—then a junior admiral but without rival in capacity and in his hold on the confidence of the fleet. Parker’s orders were to give Denmark twenty-four hours in which to withdraw from the coalition, and on her refusal to destroy or neutralize her strength and then proceed against the Russians before the breaking up of the ice allowed the ships at Reval to join the squadron at Kronstadt.
On the 21st of March the British fleet, after a somewhat stormy passage, was at the entrance to the Sound. Nicholas Vansittart, afterwards Lord Bexley, the British diplomatic agent entrusted with the message to the Danish government, was landed, and left for Copenhagen. On the 23rd he returned with the refusal of the Danes. The British fleet then passed the Danish fort at Cronenburg, unhurt by its distant fire, and without being molested by the forts on the Swedish shore. Nelson urged immediate attack, and recommended, as an alternative, that part of the British fleet should watch the Danes while the remainder advanced up the Baltic to prevent the junction of the Russian Reval squadron with the ships in Kronstadt. Sir Hyde Parker was, however, unwilling to go up the Baltic with the Danes unsubdued behind him, or to divide his force. It was therefore resolved that an attack should be made on the Danish capital with the whole fleet in two divisions. Copenhagen lies on the east side of the island of Zealand; opposite it is the shoal known as the Middle Ground. To the east of the Middle Ground is another shoal known as Saltholm Flat, and there is a passage available for large ships between them. The main fortification of Copenhagen was the powerful Trekroner (Three Crown) battery at the northern end of the sea-front. Here the Danes had placed their strongest ships. The southern part of the city front was covered by hulks and gun-vessels or bomb-vessels. There were in all eighteen hulks or ships of the line in the Danish defence. To have made the attack from the northern end would in Nelson’s words have been “to take the bull by the horns.” He therefore proposed that he should be detached with ten sail of the line, and the frigates and small craft, to pass between the Middle Ground and Saltholm Flat, and assail the Danish line at the southern end while the remainder of the fleet engaged the Trekroner battery from the north. Sir Hyde Parker accepted his offer, and added two ships of the line to the ten asked for by Nelson.
During the nights of the 30th and 31st of March the channel between the Middle Ground and Saltholm Flat was sounded by the boats of the British fleet, the Danes making no attempt to interfere with them. On the 1st of April Nelson brought his ships through. He had transferred his flag from his own ship the “St George” (98) to the “Elephant” (74), commanded by Captain Foley, because the water was too shallow for a three-decker. On the morning of the 2nd of April the wind was fair from the south-east, and at 9.30 a.m. the British squadron weighed anchor, led by the “Amazon” frigate, commanded by Captain Riou, and began to pass along the front of the Danish line. The Danes could bring into action 375 guns in all. Their hulks and bomb-vessels were supported by batteries on Zealand; but, as the water is shallow for a long distance from the shore, these defences were too far off to render them effectual aid on the south end of their line. Nelson disposed of a greater number of guns, 1058 in all, but some did not come into action. The “Agamemnon” (64), commanded by Captain Fancourt, was unable to round the south point of the Middle Ground. The “Bellona” (74), commanded by Captain Thompson, and the “Russel” (74), commanded by Captain Cuming, ran ashore on the Middle Ground, but within range though at too great a distance for fully effective fire. Captain Thompson lost his leg in the battle. The other ships passed between the “Bellona” and “Russel” and the Danes. The leading British ship, the “Defiance” (74), carrying the flag of Rear-Admiral Graves, anchored just south of the Trekroner. As the wind was from the south-east Sir Hyde Parker was unable to make the proposed attack from the north. The place opposite the Danish fort which was to have been taken by him was occupied by Captain Riou and the frigates. The “Elephant” anchored almost in the middle of the line. Fire was opened about 10 a.m., and at 11.30 the action was at its height.
Until 1 o’clock there was no diminution of the Danish fire. Sir Hyde Parker, who saw the danger of Nelson’s position, became anxious, and sent his second, Captain Robert Waller Ottway, to him with a message authorizing him to retire if he thought fit. Before Ottway, who had to go in a row-boat, reached the “Elephant,” Sir Hyde Parker had reflected that it would be more magnanimous in him to take the responsibility of ordering the retreat. He therefore hoisted the signal of recall. It was a well-meant but ill-judged order. Nelson could only have retreated before the south-easterly wind by going past the Trekroner fort, where the passage is narrow, and the navigation
