beaver, indigo and colonial timber. His most ambitious scheme—that
for the warehousing of wine and tobacco in order to relieve
exporters—failed, in consequence of the popular belief that it
was the forerunner of a general excise. Walpole’s treatment of
the land tax, which he kept down to the lowest figure (1s.), and
his earlier funding plan deserve notice. His determination to
preserve peace assisted his fiscal reforms. Pitt’s administration
from 1783 to 1792 marks another great period of improvement.
The consolidation of the customs laws (1787), the reduction of
the tea duty to nearly one-tenth of its former amount, the conclusion
of a liberal commercial treaty with France, and the
attempted trade arrangement with Ireland, tend to show that
“Pitt would have anticipated many of the free trade measures
of later years if it had been his lot to enjoy ten more years of
peaceful administration.” One of the financial problems which
excited the interest and even the alarm of the students of public
affairs was the rapid increase of the public debt. Each war
caused a great addition to the burden; the intervals of peace
showed very little diminution in it. From sixteen millions in
1702, the debt rose to £53,000,000 at the treaty of Utrecht (1713).
In 1748 it reached £78,000,000, at the close of the Seven Years’
War it was £137,000,000, and when the American colonies had
established their independence it exceeded £238,000,000. Apprehensions
of national bankruptcy led to the adoption of the device
of a sinking fund, and in this case Pitt’s usual sagacity seems
to have failed him. The influence of R. Price’s theory induced
the policy of assigning special sums for debt reduction, without
regard to the fundamental condition of maintaining a real
surplus.
The revolutionary and Napoleonic wars mark an important stage in English finance. The national resources were strained to the utmost, and the “whip and spur” of taxation was used on all classes of the community. In the earlier years of the struggle the expedient of borrowing enabled the government to avoid the more oppressive forms of charge; but as time went on every possible expedient was brought into play. One class of taxes had been organized during peace—the “assessed taxes” on houses, carriages, servants; horses, plate, &c. These duties were raised by several steps of 10% each until, in 1798, their total charge was increased threefold (for richer persons four- or fivefold) under the plan of a “triple assessment.” The comparative failure of this scheme (which did not bring in the estimated yield of £4,500,000) prepared the way for the most important development of the tax system—the introduction of the income-tax in 1798. Though a development of the triple assessment, the income-tax was also connected with the permanent settlement of the land tax as a redeemable charge. It is possible to trace the progress of direct taxation from the scutage of Norman days through “the tenth and fifteenth,” the Tudor “subsidies,” the Commonwealth “monthly assessments,” and the 18th century land tax, to the income-tax as applied by Pitt, and, after an interval of disuse, revived by Peel (1842). The immediate yield of the income-tax was rather less than was expected (£6,000,000 out of £7,500,000); but by alteration of the mode of assessment from that of a general declaration to returns under the several schedules, the tax became, first at 5%, afterwards at 10%, the most valuable part of the revenue. In 1815 it contributed 22% of the total receipts (i.e. £14,600,000 out of £67,000,000). If employed at the beginning of the war, it would probably have obviated most of the financial difficulties of the government. The window tax, which continued all through the 18th century, had been supplemented in the American War by a tax on inhabited houses (one of Adam Smith’s many suggestions), a group to which the assessment taxes were naturally joined. During the 18th century the probate duty had been gradually raised, and in 1780 the legacy duty was introduced; but these charges were moderate in character and did not affect land. Though the direct and quasi-direct taxes had been so largely increased, their growth was eclipsed by that of the excise and customs. With each succeeding year of war new articles for duties were detected and the rates of old taxes raised. The maxim, said to have guided the financiers of another country—“Wherever you see an object, tax it”—would fairly express the guiding policy of the English system of the early 19th century. Eatables, liquors, the materials of industry, manufactures, and the transactions of commerce had in nearly all their forms to pay toll. To take examples:—salt paid 15s. per bushel; sugar 30s. per cwt.; beer 10s. per barrel (with 4s. 5d. per bushel on malt and a duty on hops); tea 96% ad valorem. Timber, cotton, raw silk, hemp and bar iron were taxed, so were leather, soap, glass, candles, paper and starch. In spite of the need of revenue, many of the customs duties were framed on the protective system and thereby gave little returns; e.g. the import duty on salt in 1815 produced £547, as against £1,616,124 from excise; pill-boxes brought in 18s. 10d., saltpetre 2d., with 1d. for the war duties. The course of the war taxation was marked by varied experiments. Duties were raised, lowered, raised again, or given some new form in the effort to find additional revenue. Some duties, e.g. that on gloves, were abandoned as unproductive; but the conclusion is irresistible that the financial system suffered from over-complication and absence of principle. In the period of his peace administration Pitt was prepared to follow the teaching of The Wealth of Nations. The strain of a gigantic war forced him and his successors to employ whatever heads of taxation were likely to bring in funds without violating popular prejudices. Along with taxation, debt increased. For the first ten years the addition to it averaged £27,000,000 per annum, bringing the total to over £500,000,000. By the close of the war period in 1815 the total reached over £875,000,000, or a somewhat smaller annual increase—a result due to the adoption of more effective tax forms, and particularly the income tax. The progress of English trade was another contributing agency towards securing higher revenue. The import of articles such as tea advanced with the growing population; so that the tea duty of 96% yielded in 1815 no less than £3,591,000. It is, however, true that by the year just mentioned the tax system had reached its limit. Further extension (except by direct confiscation of property) was hardly possible. The war closed victoriously at the moment when its prolongation seemed unendurable.
A particular aspect of the English financial system is its relation to the organization of the finance of territories connected with the English crown. The exchequer may be plausibly held to have been derived from Normandy, and wherever territory came under English rule the methods familiar at home seem to have been adopted. With the loss of the French possessions the older cases of the kind disappeared. Ireland, however, had its own exchequer, and Scotland remained a distinct kingdom. The 18th century introduced a remarkable change. One of the aims of the union with Scotland was to secure freedom of commerce throughout Great Britain, and the two revenue systems were amalgamated. Scotland was assigned a very moderate share of the land tax (under one-fortieth), and was exempted from certain stamp duties. The attempt to apply selected forms of taxation—custom duties (1764), stamp duties (1765), and finally the effort to collect the tea duty (1773)—to the American colonies are indications of a movement towards what would now be called “imperialist” finance. The complete plan of federation for the British empire, outlined by Adam Smith, is avowedly actuated by financial considerations. Notwithstanding the failure of this movement in the case of the colonies, the close of the century saw it successful in respect to Ireland, though separate financial departments were retained till after the close of the Napoleonic War and some fiscal differences still remain. By the consolidation of the English and Irish exchequers and the passage from war to peace, the years between 1815 and 1820 may be said to mark a distinct step in the financial development of the country. The connected change in the Bank of England by the resumption of specie payments supports this view. Moreover, the political conditions in their influence on finance were undergoing a revolution. The landed interest, though powerful at the moment, had henceforth to face the rivalry of the wealthy manufacturing communities of the north of England, and it may be added that the influence of theoretic
