was agreed upon by the four neutral powers, France, Great
Britain, Austria and Prussia, which it was decided to present
to Constantinople and St Petersburg. This note, the adoption of
which would have ensured peace, was accepted at St Petersburg;
at Constantinople it was, unfortunately, rejected, mainly on Lord
Stratford’s advice, and in opposition to his instructions from
home. Instead, however, of insisting on the adoption of the note
to which it had agreed, Lord Aberdeen’s ministry recommended
the tsar to accept some amendments to it suggested by Lord
Stratford, which it was disposed to regard as unimportant. It
then discovered, however, that the tsar attached a meaning to
the original note differing from that which it had itself applied
to it, and in conjunction with France it thereupon ceased to
recommend the Vienna note—as it was called—for acceptance.
This decision separated the two western powers from Austria
and Prussia, who were disposed to think that Russia had done
all that could have been required of her in accepting the note
which the four powers had agreed upon.
It was obvious that the control of the situation was passing from the hands of the cabinet at home into those of Lord Stratford at Constantinople. The ambassador, in fact, had the great advantage that he knew his own mind; the cabinet laboured under the fatal disadvantage that it had, collectively, no mind. Its chief, Lord Aberdeen, was dominated by a desire to preserve peace; but he had not the requisite force to control the stronger men who were nominally serving under him. Lord John Russell was a little sore at his own treatment by his party. He thought that he had a claim to the first place in the ministry, and he did not, in consequence, give the full support to Lord Aberdeen which the latter had a right to expect from him. Lord Palmerston, on the other hand, had no personal grudge to nurture, but he was convinced that the first duty of England was to support Turkey and to resist Russia. He represented in the cabinet the views which Lord Stratford was enforcing at Constantinople, and step by step Lord Stratford, thus supported, drove the country nearer and nearer to war.
In October the Porte, encouraged by the presence of the British fleet in the Bosporus, took the bold step of summoning the Russians to evacuate the principalities. Following up this demand the Turkish troops attacked the Russian army, and inflicted on it one or two sharp defeats. The Russians retaliated by loosing their squadron from Sevastopol, and on the 30th of November it attacked and destroyed the Turkish fleet at Sinope. The massacre of Sinope—as it was rather inaccurately called in Great Britain, for it is difficult to deny that it was a legitimate act of a belligerent power—created an almost irresistible demand for war among the British people. Yielding to popular opinion, the British ministry assented to a suggestion of the French emperor that the fleets of the allied powers should enter the Black Sea and “invite” every Russian vessel to return to Sevastopol. The decision was taken at an unfortunate hour. Crimean War. Diplomatists, pursuing their labours at Vienna, had succeeded in drawing up a fresh note which they thought might prove acceptable both at St Petersburg and at Constantinople. This note was presented almost at the moment the tsar learned that the French and British fleets had entered the Black Sea, and the Russian government, instead of considering it, withdrew its ministers from London and Paris; the French and British ambassadors were thereupon withdrawn from St Petersburg. An ultimatum was soon afterwards addressed to Russia requiring her to evacuate the principalities, and war began. In deciding on war the British government relied on the capacity of its fleet, which was entrusted to the command of Sir Charles Napier, to strike a great blow in the Baltic. The fleet was despatched with extraordinary rejoicings, and amidst loud and confident expressions of its certain triumph. As a matter of fact it did very little. In the south of Europe, however, the Turkish armies on the Danube, strengthened by the advice of British officers, were more successful. The Russians were forced to retire, and the principalities were evacuated. A prudent administration might possibly have succeeded in stopping the war at this point. But the temper of the country was by this time excited, and it was loudly demanding something more than a preliminary success. It was resolved to invade the Crimea and attack the great arsenal, Sevastopol, whence the Russian fleet had sailed to Sinope, and in September 1854 the allied armies landed in the Crimea. On the 20th the Russian army, strongly posted on the banks of the Alma, was completely defeated, and it is almost certain that, if the victory had been at once followed up, Sevastopol would have fallen. The commanders of the allied armies, however, hesitated to throw themselves against the forts erected to the north of the town, and decided on the hazardous task of marching round Sevastopol and attacking it from the south. The movement was successfully carried out, but the Allies again hesitated to attempt an immediate assault. The Russians, who were advised by Colonel Todleben, the only military man who attained a great reputation in the war, thus gained time to strengthen their position by earthworks; and the Allies found themselves forced, with scanty preparations, to undertake a regular siege against an enemy whose force was numerically superior to their own. In the early days of the siege, indeed, the allied armies were twice in great peril. A formidable attack on the 25th October on the British position at Balaklava led to a series of encounters which displayed the bravery of British troops, but did not enhance the reputation of British commanders. A still more formidable sortie on the 5th of November was with difficulty repulsed at Inkerman. And the Russians soon afterwards found, in the climate of the country, a powerful ally. The allied armies, imperfectly organized, and badly equipped for such a campaign, suffered severely from the hardships of a Crimean winter. The whole expedition seemed likely to melt away from want and disease.
The terrible condition of the army, vividly described in the letters which the war correspondents of the newspapers sent home, aroused strong feelings of indignation in Great Britain. When parliament met Roebuck gave notice that he would move for a committee of inquiry. Lord John Russell—who had already vainly urged in the cabinet that the duke of Newcastle should be superseded, and the conduct of the war entrusted to a stronger minister—resigned office. His resignation was followed by the defeat of the government, and Lord Aberdeen, thus driven from power, was succeeded by Lord Palmerston. In selecting him for the post, the queen undoubtedly placed her seal on the wish Palmerston’s ministry. of the country to carry out the war to the bitter end. But it so happened that the formation of a new ministry was accompanied by a fresh effort to make terms of peace. Before the change of administration a conference had been decided on, and Lord Palmerston entrusted its management to Lord John Russell. While the latter was on his way to Vienna an event occurred which seemed at first to facilitate his task. The tsar, worn out with disappointment, suddenly died, and was succeeded by his son Alexander. Unfortunately the conference failed, and the war went on for another year. In September 1855 the allied troops succeeded in obtaining possession of the southern side of Sevastopol, and the emperor of the French, satisfied with this partial success, or alarmed at the expense of the war, decided on withdrawing from the struggle. The attitude of Napoleon made the conclusion of peace only a question of time. In the beginning of 1856 a congress to discuss the terms was assembled at Paris; in February hostilities were suspended; and in April a treaty was concluded. The peace set back the boundaries of Russia from the Danube to the Pruth; it secured the free navigation of the first of these rivers; it opened the Black Sea to the commercial navies of the world, closing it to vessels of war, and forbidding the establishment of arsenals upon its shores. The last condition, to which Great Britain attached most importance, endured for about fourteen years. Peace without this provision could undoubtedly have been secured at Vienna, and the prolongation of the war from 1855 to 1856 only resulted in securing this arrangement for a little more than one decade.
The Crimean War left other legacies behind it. The British government had for some time regarded with anxiety the gradual encroachments of Russia in central Asia. Russian
