Liberals, who complained that their leaders were pursuing a
Conservative policy, could at least console themselves by the
reflection that the chancellor of the exchequer was introducing
satisfactory budgets. The language, moreover, which Gladstone
was holding on other subjects encouraged the more advanced
Liberals to expect that he would ultimately place himself at the
head of the party of progress. This expectation was the more
remarkable because Gladstone was the representative in the
cabinet of the old Conservative party which Sir Robert Peel
had led to victory. As lately as 1858 he had reluctantly refused
to serve under Lord Derby; he was still a member of the Carlton
Club; he sat for the university of Oxford; and on many questions
he displayed a constant sympathy with Conservative
traditions. Yet, on all the chief domestic questions which came
before parliament in Lord Palmerston’s second administration,
Gladstone almost invariably took a more Liberal view than his
chief. It was understood, indeed, that the relations between the
two men were not always harmonious; that Lord Palmerston
disapproved the resolute conduct of Gladstone, and that Gladstone
deplored the Conservative tendencies of Lord Palmerston.
It was believed that Gladstone on more than one occasion
desired to escape from a position which he disliked by resigning
office, and that the resignation was only averted through a
consciousness that the ministry could not afford to lose its most
eloquent member.
While on domestic matters, other than those affecting finance, the Liberal ministry was pursuing a Conservative policy, its members were actively engaged on, and the attention of the public was keenly directed to, affairs abroad. For the period was one of foreign unrest, and the wars which were then waged have left an enduring mark on the map of the world, and have affected the position of the Anglo-Saxon race for all time. In the far East, the operations which it had been decided to undertake in China were necessarily postponed on account of the diversion of the forces, intended to exact redress at Peking, to the suppression of mutiny in India. It was only late in 1858 that Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, the French plenipotentiary (for France joined England in securing simultaneous redress of grievances of her own), were enabled to obtain suitable reparation. It was arranged that the treaty, which was then provisionally concluded at Tientsin, should be ratified at Peking in the following China war, 1859–60. year; and in June 1859 Mr (afterwards Sir Frederick) Bruce, Lord Elgin’s brother, who had been appointed plenipotentiary, attempted to proceed up the Peiho with the object of securing its ratification. The allied squadron, however, was stopped by the forts at the mouth of the Peiho, which fired on the vessels; a landing party, which was disembarked to storm the forts, met with a disastrous check, and the squadron had to retire with an acknowledged loss of three gunboats and 400 men. This reverse necessitated fresh operations, and in 1860 Lord Elgin and Baron Gros were directed to return to China, and, at the head of an adequate force, were instructed to exact an apology for the attack on the allied fleets, the ratification and execution of the treaty of Tientsin, and the payment of an indemnity for the expenses of the war. The weakness of the Chinese empire was not appreciated at that time; the unfortunate incident on the Peiho in the previous summer had created an exaggerated impression of the strength of the Chinese arms, and some natural anxiety was felt for the success of the expedition. But the allied armies met with no serious resistance. The Chinese, indeed, endeavoured to delay their progress by negotiation rather than by force; and they succeeded in treacherously arresting some distinguished persons who had been sent into the Chinese lines to negotiate. But by the middle of October the Chinese army was decisively defeated; Peking was occupied; those British and French prisoners who had not succumbed to the hardships of their confinement were liberated. Lord Elgin determined on teaching the rulers of China a lesson by the destruction of the summer palace; and the Chinese government was compelled to submit to the terms of the Allies, and to ratify the treaty of Tientsin. There is no doubt that these operations helped to open the Chinese markets to British trade; but incidentally, by regulating the emigration of Chinese coolies, they had the unforeseen effect of exposing the industrial markets of the world to the serious competition of “cheap yellow” labour. A distinguished foreign statesman observed that Lord Palmerston had made a mistake. He thought that he had opened China to Europe; instead, he had let out the Chinese. It was perhaps a happier result of the war that it tended to the continuance of the Anglo-French alliance. French and British troops had again co-operated in a joint enterprise, and had shared the dangers and successes of a campaign.
War was not confined to China. In the beginning of 1859 diplomatists were alarmed at the language addressed by the emperor of the French to the Austrian ambassador at Paris, which seemed to breathe the menace of a rupture. Notwithstanding the exertions which Great Britain made to avert hostilities, the provocation of Count Cavour induced Austria to declare war against Piedmont, and Napoleon thereupon moved to the support of his ally, promising to free Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic. As a matter of fact, the attitude of northern Germany, which was massing troops on the Rhine, and the defenceless condition of France, which was drained of soldiers for the Italian campaign, induced the emperor to halt before he had carried out his purpose, and terms of peace were hastily concerted at Villafranca, and were afterwards Unification of Italy. confirmed at Zurich, by which Lombardy was given to Piedmont, while Austria was left in possession of Venice and the Quadrilateral, and central Italy was restored to its former rulers. The refusal of the Italians to take back the Austrian grand dukes made the execution of these arrangements impracticable. Napoleon, indeed, used his influence to carry them into effect; but Lord John Russell, who was now in charge of the British foreign office, and who had Lord Palmerston and Gladstone on his side in the cabinet, gave a vigorous support to the claim of the Italians that their country should be allowed to regulate her own affairs. The French emperor had ultimately to yield to the determination of the inhabitants of central Italy, when it was backed by the arguments of the British foreign office, and Tuscany, Modena, Parma, as well as a portion of the states of the Church, were united to Piedmont. There was no doubt that through the whole of the negotiations the Italians were largely indebted to the labours of Lord John Russell. They recognized that they owed more to the moral support of England than to the armed assistance of France. The French emperor, moreover, took a step which lost him the sympathy of many Italians. Before the war he had arranged with Count Cavour that France should receive, as the price of her aid, the duchy of Savoy and the county of Nice. After Villafranca, the emperor, frankly recognizing that he had only half kept his promise, consented to waive his claim to these provinces. But, when he found himself unable to resist the annexation of central Italy to Piedmont, he reverted to the old arrangement. The formation of a strong Piedmontese kingdom, with the spoliation of the papal dominion, was unpopular in France; and he thought—perhaps naturally—that he must have something to show his people in return for sacrifices which had cost him the lives of 50,000 French soldiers, and concessions which the whole Catholic party in France resented. Count Cavour consented to pay the price which Napoleon thus exacted, and the frontier of France was accordingly extended to the Alps. But it is very doubtful whether Napoleon did not lose more than he gained by this addition to his territory. It certainly cost him the active friendship of Great Britain. The Anglo-French alliance had been already strained by the language of the French colonels in 1858 and the Franco-Austrian War of 1859; it never fully recovered from the shock which it received by the evidence, which the annexation of Savoy and Nice gave, of the ambition of the French emperor. The British people gave way to what Cobden called the last of the three panics. Lord Palmerston proposed and carried the provision of a large sum of money for the fortification of the coasts; and the volunteer movement, which had its origin in 1859, received a remarkable stimulus in 1860. In this year the course of events in Italy
