evolution of morality from the stage of purely animal and
unconscious action to specifically human action,—i.e. action
directed by self-conscious and purposive intelligence
to an end conceived as good,—that the polemic of
T. H. Green.
T. H. Green and his idealistic followers fastened. And it is
perhaps unfortunate that metaphysical doctrines enunciated
chiefly for the purposes of criticism not in themselves vitally
necessary to the theory of morality propounded should have been
regarded as the main contribution to ethical theory of idealist
writers, and as such treated severely by hostile critics. Green’s
principal objection to evolutionary moral philosophy is contained
in the argument that no merely “natural” explanation of the
facts of morality is conceivable. The knowing consciousness,—i.e.
so far as conduct is concerned the moral consciousness,—can
never become an object of knowledge in the sense in which
natural phenomena are objects of scientific knowledge. For such
knowledge implies the existence of a knowing consciousness as
a relating and uniting intelligence capable of distinguishing itself
from the objects to which it relates. And more particularly the
existence of the moral consciousness implies “the transition from
mere want to consciousness of wanted object, from impulse to
satisfy the want to effort for the realization of the wanted
objects, implies the presence of the want to a subject which
distinguishes itself from it.” Consequently the facts of moral
development imply with the emergence of human consciousness
the appearance of something qualitatively different from the
facts with which physiology for instance deals, imply a stratum
as it were in development which no examination of animal
tissues, no calculation of consequences with regard to the preservation
of the species can ever satisfactorily explain. However
far back we go in the history of humanity, if the presence of
consciousness be admitted at all, it will be necessary to admit
also the presence to consciousness of an ideal which can be
accepted or rejected, of a power of looking before and after, and
aiming at a future which is not yet fully realized. But unfortunately
the temporary exigencies of criticism made it
necessary for Green to emphasize the metaphysic of the self,
i.e. to insist upon the necessity of a critical examination of the
pre-requisites of any form of self-consciousness and especially
of the knowing consciousness, to such an extent that critics
have lost sight of the real dependence of his metaphysic upon the
direct evidence of the moral consciousness. The philosophic
value, the sincerity, the breadth and depth of his treatment
of moral facts and institutions have been fully recognized. What
has not been adequately realized is that the metaphysical basis
of his system of ethics—the argument, for example, contained
in the introduction to the Prolegomena—is unfairly treated if
divorced from his treatment of morals as a whole, and that it
can be justly estimated only if interpreted as much as the conclusion
as the starting-point of moral theory. The doctrine
of the eternity of the self, for instance, against which much
criticism (e.g. Taylor, The Problem of Conduct, chap. ii.) has
been directed, though it is chiefly expressed in the language of
epistemology, has its roots nevertheless in the direct testimony
of moral experience. For morality implies a power in the
individual of rising above the interests of his own narrower self
and identifying himself in the pursuit of a universal good with
the true interests of all other selves. Similarly the conception
of the self as a moral unity arises naturally out of the impossibility
of finding the summum bonum in a succession of transient states
of consciousness such as hedonism for example postulates. Good
as a true universal can only be realized by a true self, and both
imply a principle of unity not wholly expressible in terms of the
particulars which it unifies. But whether the idealistic interpretation
of the nature of universal good be the true one, i.e.
whether we are justified in identifying that self-consciousness
which is capable of grasping the principle of unity with the
principle of unity which it grasps is a metaphysical and theistic
problem comparatively irrelevant to Green’s moral theory.
It would be quite possible to accept his criticisms of naturalism
and hedonism while rejecting many of the metaphysical inferences
which he draws. A somewhat similar answer might be returned
to those critics who find Green’s use of the term “self-realization”
or “self-development” as characteristic of the moral ideal unsatisfactory.
It is quite easy to exhibit the futility of such a
conception if understood formally for the practical purposes
of moral philosophy. If the phrase be understood to mean the
realization of some capacities of the self it does not appear to
discriminate sufficiently between the good and bad capacities;
while the realization under present conditions of all the capacities
of a self is impossible. And to aim so far as is possible at all-round
development would again ignore the distinction between
vice and virtue. But used in the sense in which Green habitually
uses it self-realization implies, as he puts it, the fulfilment by the
good man of his rational capacity or the idea of a best that is in
time, i.e. the distinction between the good and the bad self is
never ignored, but is the fundamental assumption of his theory.
And if it be urged that the expression is in any case tautological,
i.e. that the good is defined in terms of self-realization and self-realization
in terms of the good, it may be doubted whether any
rational system of ethics can avoid a similar imputation. Green
would admit that in a certain sense the conception of “good”
is indefinable, i.e. that it can only be recognized in the particulars
of conduct of which it is the universal form. Only, therefore,
to those philosophers who believe in the existence of a criterion
of morality, i.e. a universal test such as that of pleasure, happiness
and the like, by which we can judge of the worth of actions, will
Green’s position seem absurd; since, on the contrary, such conceptions
as those of “self-development” or “self-realization” seem
to have a definite and positive value if they call attention to the
metaphysical implications of morality and accurately characterize
the moral facts. What ambiguity they possess arises from the
ambiguity of morality itself. For moral progress consists in the
actualization of what is already potentially in existence. The
striking merit of Green’s moral philosophy is that the idealism
which he advocates is rooted and grounded in moral habits and
institutions: and the metaphysic in which it culminates is
based upon principles already implicitly recognized by the moral
consciousness of the ordinary man. Nothing could be farther
from Green’s teaching than the belief that constructive metaphysics
could, unaided by the intuitions of the moral consciousness,
discover laws for the regulation of conduct.
But although Green’s loyalty to the primary facts of the moral consciousness prevented him from constructing a rationalistic system of morals based solely upon the conclusions of metaphysics, it was perhaps inevitable that the revival of interest in metaphysics so prominent in his own speculations should lead to a more daring criticism of ethical first principles in other writers. Bradley’s Ethical Studies had presented with great brilliancy an idealist theory of morality not very far removed from that of Green’s Prolegomena. But the publication of Appearance and Reality by the same author marked a great advance in philosophical criticism of ethical postulates, and a growing dissatisfaction with current reconciliations between moral first principles and the conclusions of metaphysics. Appearance and Reality was not primarily concerned with morals, yet it inevitably led to certain conclusions affecting conduct, and it was no very long time before these conclusions were elaborated Taylor. in detail. Professor A. E. Taylor’s Problem of Conduct (1901) is one of the most noteworthy and independent contributions to Moral Philosophy published in recent years. But it nevertheless follows in the main Bradley’s line of criticism and may therefore be regarded as representative of his school. There are two principal positions in Professor Taylor’s work:—(1) a refusal to base ethics upon metaphysics, and (2) the discovery of an irreconcilable dualism in the nature of morality which takes many shapes, but may be summarized roughly as consisting in an ultimate opposition between egoism and altruism. With regard to the first of these Taylor says (op. cit. p. 4) that his object is to show that “ethics is as independent of metaphysical speculation for its principles and methods as any of the so-called ‘natural sciences’; that its real basis must be sought not in philosophical theories about the nature of the Absolute or the ultimate constitution of the Universe,
