(September 1881), and some progress was made towards a complete renewal of the traditional friendship. Immediately afterwards a further step was taken towards re-establishing the old state of things with regard also to Austria. On his return to St Petersburg, Alexander III. remembered that he had received some time previously a telegram of congratulation from the emperor Francis Joseph, and he now replied to it very cordially, referring to the meeting at Danzig, and describing the emperor William as “that venerable friend with whom we are united in the common bonds of a profound affection.” The words foreshadowed a revival of the Three Emperors’ League, which actually took place three years later.
The removal of all immediate danger of a Franco-Russian
alliance did not prevent Bismarck from strengthening in other
ways the diplomatic position of Germany, and the
result of his efforts soon became apparent in the alliance
of Italy with the two central powers. Ever since the
Growth of the
Triple Alliance.
Franco-German War of 1870–71, and more especially
since the congress of Berlin in 1878, the Italian government had
shown itself restless and undecided in its foreign policy. As it
was to France that Italy owed her emancipation from Austrian
rule, it seemed natural that the two countries should remain
allies, but anything like cordial co-operation was prevented by
conflicting interests and hostile feeling. The French did not
consider the acquisition of Savoy and Nice a sufficient compensation
for the assistance they had given to the cause of Italian
unity, and they did not know, or did not care to remember, that
their own government was greatly to blame for the passive
attitude of Italy in the hour of their great national misfortunes.
On the other hand, a considerable amount of bitterness against
France had been gradually accumulating in the hearts of the
Italians. As far back as the end of the war of 1859, popular
opinion had been freely expressed against Napoleon III., because
he had failed to keep his promise of liberating Italy “from the
Alps to the Adriatic.” The feeling was revived and intensified
when it became known that he was opposing the annexation of
central and southern Italy, and that he obtained Savoy and Nice
as the price of partly withdrawing his opposition. Subsequently,
in the war of 1866, he was supposed to have insulted Italy by
making her conclude peace with Austria, on the basis of the
cession of Venetia, before she could wipe out the humiliation
of her defeats at Custozza and Lissa. Then came the French
protection of the pope’s temporal power as a constant source of
irritation, producing occasional explosions of violent hostility,
as when the new Chassepot rifles were announced to have
“worked wonders” among the Garibaldians at Mentana. When
the Second Empire was replaced by the Republic, the relations
did not improve. French statesmen of the Thiers school had
always condemned the imperial policy of permitting and even
encouraging the creation of large, powerful states on the French
frontiers, and Thiers himself publicly attributed to this policy
the misfortunes of his country. With regard to Italy, he said
openly that he regretted what had been done, though he had no
intention of undoing it. The first part of this statement was
carefully noted in Italy, and the latter part was accepted with
scepticism. In any case his hand might perhaps be forced,
for in the first republican chamber the monarchical and clerical
element was very strong, and it persistently attempted to get
something done in favour of the temporal power. Even when the
party of the Left undertook the direction of affairs in 1876, the
government did not become anti-clerical in its foreign policy,
and Italian statesmen resigned themselves to a position of political
isolation. The position had its advantages. Events in the
Balkan Peninsula foreshadowed a great European war, and it
seemed that in the event of Europe’s being divided into two
hostile camps, Italy might have the honour and the advantage
of regulating the balance of power. By maintaining good relations
with all her neighbours and carefully avoiding all inconvenient
entanglements, she might come forward at the critical
moment and dictate her own terms to either of the contending
parties, or offer her services to the highest bidder. This Machiavellian
policy did not give the expected results. Being friends
with everybody in a general way may be the best course for an
old, conservative country which desires merely the maintenance
of the status quo, but it does not secure the energetic diplomatic
support required by a young enterprising state which wishes to
increase its territory and influence. At the congress of Berlin,
when several of the powers got territorial acquisitions, Italy
got nothing. The Italians, who were in the habit of assuming,
almost as a matter of principle, that from all European complications
they had a right to obtain some tangible advantage,
were naturally disappointed, and they attributed their misfortune
to their political isolation. The policy of the free hand consequently
fell into disrepute, and the desire for a close, efficient
alliance revived. But with what power or powers should an
alliance be made? The remnants of the old party of action,
who still carried the Italia Irredenta banner, had an answer
ready. They recommended that alliances should be concluded
with a view to wresting from Austria the Trentino and Trieste,
with Dalmatia, perhaps, into the bargain. On the other hand,
the Conservatives and the Moderates considered that the question
of the Trentino and Trieste was much less important than that of
political influence in the Mediterranean. A strong Austria was
required, it was said, to bar the way of Russia to the Adriatic,
and France must not be allowed to pursue unchecked her policy
of transforming the Mediterranean into a French lake. Considerations
of this kind led naturally to the conclusion that Italy
should draw closer to the powers of central Europe. So the
question appeared from the standpoint of “la haute politique.”
From the less elevated standpoint of immediate political interests,
it presented conflicting considerations. A rapprochement
with the central powers might prevent the conclusion of a
commercial treaty with France, and thereby increase the financial
and economic difficulties with which the young kingdom was
struggling, whereas a rapprochement with France would certainly
excite the hostility of Bismarck, who was retiring from the
Kulturkampf and journeying towards Canossa, and who might
possibly conciliate the pope by helping him to recover his temporal
sovereignty at the expense of Italy. Altogether the problem
was a very complicated one. The conflicting currents so nearly
balanced each other, that the question as to which way the ship
would drift might be decided by a little squall of popular sentiment.
A very big squall was brewing.
During the congress of Berlin the French government was very indignant when it discovered that Lord Beaconsfield had recently made a secret convention with the sultan for the British occupation of Cyprus, and in order to calm its resentment Lord Salisbury gave M. Waddington France and Tunis. to understand that, so far as England was concerned, France would be allowed a free hand in the Regency of Tunis, which she had long coveted. Though the conversations on the subject and a subsequent exchange of notes were kept strictly secret, the Italian government soon got wind of the affair, and it was at first much alarmed. It considered, in common with Italians generally, that Tunis, on the ground of historic right and of national interests, should be reserved for Italy, and that an extension of French territory in that direction would destroy, to the detriment of Italy, the balance of power in the Mediterranean. These apprehensions were calmed for a time by assurances given to the Italian ambassador in Paris. M. Gambetta assured General Cialdini that he had no intention of making Italy an irreconcilable enemy of France, and M. Waddington declared, on his word of honour, that so long as he remained minister of foreign affairs nothing of the sort would be done by France without a previous understanding with the cabinet of Rome. M. Waddington honourably kept his word, but his successor did not consider himself bound by the assurance; and when it was found that the Italians were trying systematically to establish their influence in the Regency at the expense of France, the French authorities, on the ground that a Tunisian tribe called the Kroumirs had committed depredations in Algeria, sent an armed force into the Regency, and imposed on the bey the Bardo treaty, which transformed Tunis into a French protectorate.
The establishment of a French protectorate over a country
