fail, as it failed in the early part of the 19th century, so long as the spirit of national and racial rivalry is stronger than the consciousness of common interests; and the early years of the 20th century showed no diminution, but rather an accentuation of this rivalry. The court of arbitration established at the Hague early in 1901 may deal effectively with questions as to which both parties desire a modus vivendi, and the pacific efforts of King Edward VII., which did so much to prevent misunderstandings likely to lead to war, resulted from 1903 onwards in a series of arbitration treaties between Great Britain and other powers which guaranteed the Hague court an effective activity in such matters. But more perilous issues, involving deep-seated antagonisms, have continued to be dealt with by the methods of the old diplomacy backed by the armed force of the powers. How far the final solution of such problems has been helped or hindered by the general reluctance to draw the sword must for some time to come remain an open question. Certainly, during the early years of the 20th century, many causes of difference which a hundred years earlier would assuredly have led to war, were settled, or at least shelved, by diplomacy. Of these the questions of Crete, of Armenia, and of contested claims in Africa have already been mentioned. Other questions of general interest which might have led to war, but which found a peaceful solution, were those of the separation of Norway and Sweden, and the rivalry of the powers in the northern seas. In October 1905 Sweden formally recognized the separate existence of Norway (see Norway: History and Sweden: History). On the 23rd of April 1908 were signed the “Declarations”; the one, signed by the four Baltic littoral powers, recognized “in principle” the maintenance of the territorial status quo in that sea; the other—to which Great Britain, France, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Holland were the parties—sanctioned a similar principle in regard to the North Sea. These were followed, in June of the same year, by two agreements intended to apply the same principles to the southern European waters, signed by France and Spain and Great Britain and Spain respectively. Another agreement, that signed between Russia and Great Britain in 1907 for the delimitation of their spheres of influence in Persia and the northern borders of the Indian empire, though having no direct relation to European affairs, exercised considerable influence upon them by helping to restore the international prestige of Russia, damaged by the disasters of the war with Japan and the internal disturbances that followed. The new cordial understanding between the British and Russian governments was cemented by the meeting of King Edward VII. and the emperor Nicholas II. at Reval in June 1908.
More perilous to European peace, however, than any of these issues was the perennial unrest in Macedonia, which threatened sooner or later to open up the whole Eastern Question once more in its acutest form. The situation was due Revival of the Eastern Question. to the internecine struggle of the rival Balkan races—Greek, Bulgarian, Servian—to secure the right to the reversion of territories not yet derelict. But behind these lesser issues loomed the great secular rivalries of the powers, and beyond these again the vast unknown forces of the Mahommedan world, ominously stirring. The very vastness of the perils involved in any attempt at a definitive settlement compelled the powers to accept a compromise which, it was hoped, would restore tolerable conditions in the wretched country. But the “Mürzsteg programme,” concerted between the Austrian and Russian emperors in 1903, and imposed upon the Porte by the diplomatic pressure of the great powers, did not produce the effects hoped for. The hideous tale of massacres of helpless villagers by organized Greek bands, and of equally hideous, if less wholesale, reprisals by Bulgarian bands, grew rather than diminished, and reached its climax in the early months of 1908. The usefulness of the new gendarmerie, under European officers, which was to have co-operated with the Ottoman authorities in the restoration of order, was from the outset crippled by the passive obstruction of the Turkish government. The sultan, indeed, could hardly be blamed for watching with a certain cynical indifference the mutual slaughter of those “Christians” whose avowed ideal was the overthrow of Mahommedan rule, nor could he be expected to desire the smooth working of a system against which he had protested as a violation of his sovereign rights. In 1908 the powers were still united in bringing pressure to bear on the Porte to make the reforms effective; but the proposal of Great Britain to follow the precedent of the Lebanon and commit the administration of Macedonia to a Mussulman governor appointed by the sultan, but removable only by consent of the powers, met with little favour either at Constantinople or among the powers whose ulterior aims might have been hampered by such an arrangement.
Such was the condition of affairs when in October 1908 the revolution in Turkey altered the whole situation. The easy and apparently complete victory of the Young Turks, and the re-establishment without a struggle of the constitution Young Turkish revolution, 1908. which had been in abeyance since 1876, took the whole world by surprise, and not least those who believed themselves to be most intimately acquainted with the conditions prevailing in the Ottoman empire. The question of the Near East seemed in fair way of settlement by the action of conflicting races themselves, who in the enthusiasm of new-found freedom appeared ready to forget their ancient internecine feuds and to fraternize on the common ground of constitutional liberty (see Turkey: History). By the European powers the proclamation of the constitution was received, at least outwardly, with unanimous approval, general admiration being expressed for the singular moderation and self-restraint shown by the Turkish leaders and people. Whatever views, however, may have been openly expressed, or secretly held, as to the revolution so far as it affected the Ottoman empire itself, there could be no doubt that its effects on the general situation in European results. Europe would be profound. These effects were not slow in revealing themselves. On the 5th of October Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria proclaimed himself king (tsar) of the Bulgarians; and two days later the emperor Francis Joseph issued a rescript announcing the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Habsburg monarchy (see Bulgaria: History and Bosnia and Herzegovina: History). Whatever cogent reasons there may have been for altering the status of these countries in view of the changed conditions in Turkey, there could be no doubt that the method employed was a violation of the public law of Europe. By the declaration of London of 1871, to which Austria-Hungary herself had been a principal party, it had been laid down that “contracting powers could only rid themselves of their treaty engagements by an understanding with their co-signatories.” This solemn reaffirmation of a principle on which the whole imposing structure of international law had, during the 19th century, been laboriously built up was now cynically violated. The other powers, confronted with the fait accompli, protested; but the astute statesman who had staked his reputation as foreign minister of the Dual Monarchy on the success of this coup had well gauged the character and force of the opposition he would have to meet. European crisis provoked by Austria. Baron von Aehrenthal, himself more Slav than German, in spite of his name, had served a long apprenticeship in diplomacy at Belgrade and St Petersburg; he knew how fully he could rely upon the weakness of Russia, and that if Russian Pan-Slav sentiment could be cowed, he need fear nothing from the resentment of the Servians. He was strong, too, in the moral and—in case of need—the material support of Germany. With Germany behind her, Austria-Hungary had little to fear from the opposition of the powers of the triple entente, Great Britain, France and Russia. This diagnosis of the situation was justified by the event. For months, indeed, Europe seemed on the verge of a general war. During the autumn the nationalist excitement in Servia and Montenegro rose to fever-heat, and Austria responded by mobilizing her forces on the frontiers and arming the Catholic Bosnians as a precaution against a rising of their Orthodox countrymen. Only the winter seemed to stand between Europe and a war bound to become general, and men looked forward with apprehension to the melting of the snows. It is too early as yet to write the history of the diplomatic activities by which this disaster was avoided. Their general
