laity in Bohemia and in various parts of Germany, but the hearty support which he gave the Jesuits shows that he had no sympathy with Protestantism, and was only anxious to restore union in the Church. In November 1562 he obtained the election of his son Maximilian as king of the Romans, and having arranged a partition of his lands among his three surviving sons, died in Vienna on the 25th of July 1564. His family had consisted of six sons and nine daughters.
In spite of constant and harassing engagements Ferdinand was fairly successful both as king and emperor. He sought to consolidate his Austrian lands, reformed the monetary system in Germany, and reorganized the Aulic council (Reichshofrat). Less masterful but more popular than his brother, whose character overshadows his own, he was just and tolerant, a good Catholic and a conscientious ruler.
See the article on Charles V. and the bibliography appended thereto. Also, A. Ulloa, Vita del potentissimo e christianissimo imperatore Ferdinando primo (Venice, 1565); S. Schard, Epitome rerum in variis orbis partibus a confirmatione Ferdinandi I. (Basel, 1574); F. B. von Bucholtz, Geschichte der Regierung Ferdinands des Ersten (Vienna, 1831–1838); K. Oberleitner, Österreichs Finanzen und Kriegswesen unter Ferdinand I. (Vienna, 1859); A. Rezek, Geschichte der Regierung Ferdinands I. in Böhmen (Prague, 1878); E. Rosenthal, Die Behördenorganisation Kaiser Ferdinands I. (Vienna, 1887); and W. Bauer, Die Anfänge Ferdinands I. (Vienna, 1907).
FERDINAND II. (1578–1637), Roman emperor, was the eldest
son of Charles, archduke of Styria (d. 1590), and his wife Maria,
daughter of Albert IV., duke of Bavaria and a grandson of the
emperor Ferdinand I. Born at Gratz on the 9th of July 1578, he
was trained by the Jesuits, finishing his education at the university
of Ingolstadt, and became the pattern prince of the counter-reformation.
In 1596 he undertook the government of Styria,
Carinthia and Carniola, and after a visit to Italy began an
organized attack on Protestantism which under his father’s rule
had made great progress in these archduchies; and although
hampered by the inroads of the Turks, he showed his indifference
to the material welfare of his dominions by compelling many of
his Protestant subjects to choose between exile and conversion,
and by entirely suppressing Protestant worship. He was not,
however, unmindful of the larger interest of his family, or of the
Empire which the Habsburgs regarded as belonging to them by
hereditary right. In 1606 he joined his kinsmen in recognizing
his cousin Matthias as the head of the family in place of the
lethargic Rudolph II.; but he shrank from any proceedings
which might lead to the deposition of the emperor, whom he
represented at the diet of Regensburg in 1608; and his conduct
was somewhat ambiguous during the subsequent quarrel between
Rudolph and Matthias.
In the first decade of the 17th century the house of Habsburg seemed overtaken by senile decay, and the great inheritance of Charles V. and Ferdinand I. to be threatened with disintegration and collapse. The reigning emperor, Rudolph II., was inert and childless; his surviving brothers, the archduke Matthias (afterwards emperor), Maximilian (1558–1618) and Albert (1559–1621), all men of mature age, were also without direct heirs; the racial differences among its subjects were increased by their religious animosities; and it appeared probable that the numerous enemies of the Habsburgs had only to wait a few years and then to divide the spoil. In spite of the recent murder of Henry IV. of France, this issue seemed still more likely when Matthias succeeded Rudolph as emperor in 1612. The Habsburgs, however, were not indifferent to the danger, and about 1615 it was agreed that Ferdinand, who already had two sons by his marriage with his cousin Maria Anna (d. 1616), daughter of William V., duke of Bavaria, should be the next emperor, and should succeed Matthias in the elective kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia. The obstacles which impeded the progress of the scheme were gradually overcome by the energy of the archduke Maximilian. The elder archdukes renounced their rights in the succession; the claims of Philip III. and the Spanish Habsburgs were bought off by a promise of Alsace; and the emperor consented to his supercession in Hungary and Bohemia. In 1617 Ferdinand, who was just concluding a war with Venice, was chosen king of Bohemia, and in 1618 king of Hungary; but his election as German king, or king of the Romans, delayed owing to the anxiety of Melchior Klesl (q.v.) to conciliate the protestant princes, had not been accomplished when Matthias died in March 1619. Before this event, however, an important movement had begun in Bohemia. Having been surprised into choosing a devoted Roman Catholic as their king, the Bohemian Protestants suddenly realized that their religious, and possibly their civil liberties, were seriously menaced, and deeds of aggression on the part of Ferdinand’s representatives showed that this was no idle fear. Gaining the upper hand they declared Ferdinand deposed, and elected the elector palatine of the Rhine, Frederick V., in his stead; and the struggle between the rivals was the beginning of the Thirty Years’ War. At the same time other difficulties confronted Ferdinand, who had not yet secured the imperial throne. Bethlen Gabor, prince of Transylvania, invaded Hungary, while the Austrians rose and joined the Bohemians; but having seen his foes retreat from Vienna, Ferdinand hurried to Frankfort, where he was chosen emperor on the 28th of August 1619.
To deal with the elector palatine and his allies the new emperor allied himself with Maximilian I., duke of Bavaria, and the Catholic League, who drove Frederick from Bohemia in 1620, while Ferdinand’s Spanish allies devastated the Palatinate. Peace having been made with Bethlen Gabor in December 1621, the first period of the war ended in a satisfactory fashion for the emperor, and he could turn his attention to completing the work of crushing the Protestants, which had already begun in his archduchies and in Bohemia. In 1623 the Protestant clergy were expelled from Bohemia; in 1624 all worship save that of the Roman Catholic church was forbidden; and in 1627 an order of banishment against all Protestants was issued. A new constitution made the kingdom hereditary in the house of Habsburg, gave larger powers to the sovereign, and aimed at destroying the nationality of the Bohemians. Similar measures in Austria led to a fresh rising which was put down by the aid of the Bavarians in 1627, and Ferdinand could fairly claim that in his hereditary lands at least he had rendered Protestantism innocuous.
The renewal of the Thirty Years’ War in 1625 was caused mainly by the emperor’s vigorous championship of the cause of the counter-reformation in northern and north-eastern Germany. Again the imperial forces were victorious, chiefly owing to the genius of Wallenstein, who raised and led an army in this service, although the great scheme of securing the southern coast of the Baltic for the Habsburgs was foiled partly by the resistance of Stralsund. In March 1629 Ferdinand and his advisers felt themselves strong enough to take the important step towards which their policy in the Empire had been steadily tending. Issuing the famous edict of restitution, the emperor ordered that all lands which had been secularized since 1552, the date of the peace of Passau, should be restored to the church, and prompt measures were taken to enforce this decree. Many and powerful interests were vitally affected by this proceeding, and the result was the outbreak of the third period of the war, which was less favourable to the imperial arms than the preceding ones. This comparative failure was due, in the initial stages of the campaign, to Ferdinand’s weakness in assenting in 1630 to the demand of Maximilian of Bavaria that Wallenstein should be deprived of his command, and also to the genius of Gustavus Adolphus; and in its later stages to his insistence on the second removal of Wallenstein, and to his complicity in the assassination of the general. This deed was followed by the peace of Prague, concluded in 1635, primarily with John George I., elector of Saxony, but soon assented to by other princes; and this treaty, which made extensive concessions to the Protestants, marks the definite failure of Ferdinand to crush Protestantism in the Empire, as he had already done in Austria and Bohemia. It is noteworthy, however, that the emperor refused to allow the inhabitants of his hereditary dominions to share in the benefits of the peace. During these years Ferdinand had also been menaced by the secret or open hostility of France. A dispute over the duchies of Mantua and Monferrato was
