guided chiefly by persons outside the House, because incapable
of re-election, Barnave, Duport and the Lameths. The Left consisted
of the Jacobins, a term which still included the party
afterwards known as the Girondins or Girondists (q.v.)—so
termed because several of their leaders came from the region of
the Gironde in southern France. They numbered about 330.
Among the extreme Left sat Cambon, Couthon, Merlin de
Thionville. The Girondins could claim the most brilliant orators,
Vergniaud, Guadet, Isnard. Inferior to these men in talent,
Brissot de Warville, a restless pamphleteer, exerted more influence
over the party which has sometimes gone by his name. The Left
as a whole was republican, although it did not care to say so.
Strong in numbers, it was reinforced by the disorderly elements
in Paris and throughout France. The remainder of the House,
about 250 deputies, scarcely belonged to any definite party,
but voted oftenest with the Left, as the Left was the most
powerful.
The Left had three objects of enmity: first, the king, the queen and the royal family; secondly, the émigrés; and thirdly, the clergy. The king could not like the new constitution, although, if left to himself, indolence and good nature might have rendered him passive. The queen throughout The court and the émigrés. had only one thought, to shake off the impotence and humiliation of the crown; and for this end she still clung to the hope of foreign succour and corresponded with Vienna. Those émigrés who had assembled in arms on the territories of the electors of Mainz and Treves (Trier) and in the Austrian Netherlands had put themselves in the position of public enemies. Their chiefs were the king’s brothers, who affected to consider Louis as a captive and his acts as therefore invalid. The count of Provence gave himself the airs of a regent and surrounded himself with a ministry. The émigrés were not, however, dangerous. They were only a few thousand strong; they had no competent leader and no money; they were unwelcome to the rulers whose hospitality they abused. The nonjuring clergy, although harassed by the local authorities, kept the respect and confidence of most Catholics. No acts of disloyalty were proved against them, and commissioners of the National Assembly reported to its successor that their flocks only desired to be let alone. But the anti-clerical bias of the Legislative Assembly was too strong for such a policy.
The king’s ministers, named by him and excluded from the Assembly, were mostly persons of little mark. Montmorin gave up the portfolio of foreign affairs on the 31st of October and was succeeded by De Lessart. Cahier de Gerville was minister of the interior; Tarbé, minister of finance; and Bertrand de Molleville, minister of marine. But the only minister who influenced the course of affairs was the comte de Narbonne, minister of war.
On the 9th of November the Assembly decreed that the émigrés
assembled on the frontiers should be liable to the penalties of
death and confiscation unless they returned to France
by the 1st of January following. Louis did not love
his brothers, and he detested their policy, which
The king and the nonjurors.
without rendering him any service made his liberty
and even his life precarious; yet, loath to condemn them to death,
he vetoed the decree. On the 29th of November the Assembly
decreed that every nonjuring clergyman must take within eight
days the civic oath, substantially the same as the oath previously
administered, on pain of losing his pension and, if any troubles
broke out, of being deported. This decree Louis vetoed as a
matter of conscience. In either case his resistance only served
to give a weapon to his enemies in the Assembly. But foreign
affairs were at this time the most critical. The armed bodies of
émigrés on the territory of the Empire afforded matter of complaint
to France. The persistence of the French in refusing more
than a money compensation to the German princes who had
claims in Alsace afforded matter of complaint to the Empire.
Foreign statesmen noticed with alarm the effect of the French
Revolution upon opinion in their own countries, and they
resented the endeavours of French revolutionists to make
converts there. Of these statesmen, the emperor Leopold was
the most intelligent. He had skilfully extricated himself from
the embarrassments at home and abroad left by his predecessor
Joseph. He was bound by family ties to Louis, and he was
obliged, as chief of the Holy Roman Empire, to protect the border
princes. On the other hand, he understood the weakness of the
Habsburg monarchy. He knew that the Austrian Netherlands,
where he had with difficulty restored his authority, were full of
friends of the Revolution and that a French army would be welcomed
by many Belgians. He despised the weakness and the
folly of the émigrés and excluded them from his councils. He
earnestly desired to avoid a war which might endanger his sister
or her husband. In August 1791 he had met Frederick William
Declaration
of Pillnitz.
II. of Prussia at Pillnitz near Dresden, and the two
monarchs had joined in a declaration that they considered
the restoration of order and of monarchy in
France an object of interest to all sovereigns. They
further declared that they would be ready to act for this purpose
in concert with the other powers. This declaration appears to
have been drawn from Leopold by pressure of circumstances.
He well knew that concerted action of the powers was impossible,
as the English government had firmly resolved not to meddle with
French affairs. After Louis had accepted the constitution,
Leopold virtually withdrew his declaration. Nevertheless it
was a grave error of judgment and contributed to the approaching
war.
In France many persons desired war for various reasons. Narbonne trusted to find in it the means of restoring a certain authority to the crown and limiting the Revolution. He contemplated a war with Austria only. The Girondins desired war in the hope that it would enable them to abolish monarchy altogether. They desired a general war because they believed that it would carry the Revolution into other countries and make it secure in France by making it universal. The extreme Left had the same objects, but it held that a war for those objects could not safely be entrusted to the king and his ministers. Victory would revive the power of the crown; defeat would be the undoing of the Revolution. Hence Robespierre and those who thought with him desired peace. The French nation generally had never approved of the Austrian alliance, and regarded the Habsburgs as traditional enemies. The king and queen, however, who looked for help from abroad and especially from Leopold, dreaded a war with Austria and had no faith in the schemes of Narbonne. Nor was France in a condition to wage a serious war. The constitution was unworkable and the governing authorities were mutually hostile. The finances remained in disorder, and assignats of the face value of 900,000,000 livres were issued by the Legislative Assembly in less than a year. The army had been thinned by desertion and was enervated by long indiscipline. The fortresses were in bad condition and short of supplies.
In October Leopold ordered the dispersion of the émigrés who had mustered in arms in the Austrian Netherlands. His example was followed by the electors of Treves and Mainz. At the same time they implored the emperor’s protection, and the Austrian chancellor Kaunitz informed Noailles the French ambassador that this protection would be given if necessary. Narbonne demanded a credit of 20,000,000 livres, which the Assembly granted. He made a tour of inspection in the north of France and reported untruly to the Assembly that all was in readiness for war. On the 14th of January 1792 the diplomatic committee reported to the Assembly that the emperor should be required to give satisfactory assurances before the 10th of February. The Assembly put off the term to the 1st of March. In February Leopold concluded a defensive treaty with Frederick William. But there was no mutual confidence between the sovereigns, who were at that very time pursuing opposite policies with regard to Poland. Leopold still hesitated and still hoped to avoid war. He died on the 1st of March, and the imperial dignity became vacant. The hereditary dominions of Austria passed to his son Francis, afterwards the emperor Francis II., a youth of small abilities and no experience. The real conduct of affairs fell, therefore, to the aged Kaunitz. In France Narbonne failed to carry the king or his colleagues along with him. The king took courage to dismiss
