into the Trentino; but the government, seeing the danger of such
an attempt, arrested several Garibaldians at Sarnico (near
Brescia), and in the émeute which followed several persons were
shot. Garibaldi now became an opponent of the ministry, and
Garibaldi and Rome. Affair of Aspromonte, 1862.
Minghetti Ministry.
in June went to Sicily, where, after taking counsel
with his former followers, he decided on an immediate
raid on Rome. He summoned his legionaries, and in
August crossed over to Calabria with 1000 men. His
intentions in the main were still loyal, for he desired
to capture Rome for the kingdom; and he did his
best to avoid the regulars tardily sent against him. On the
29th of August 1862, however, he encountered a force under
Pallavicini at Aspromonte, and, although Garibaldi ordered his
men not to fire, some of the raw Sicilian volunteers discharged a
few volleys which were returned by the regulars. Garibaldi
himself was seriously wounded and taken prisoner. He was shut
up in the fortress of Varignano, and after endless discussions as to
whether he should be tried or not, the question was settled by an
amnesty. The affair made the ministry so unpopular
that it was forced to resign. Farini, who succeeded,
retired almost at once on account of ill-health, and
Minghetti became premier, with Visconti-Venosta as minister
for foreign affairs. The financial situation continued to be
seriously embarrassing; deficit was piled on deficit, loan upon
loan, and the service of the debt rose from 90,000,000 lire in
1860 to 220,000,000 in 1864.
Negotiations were resumed with Napoleon for the evacuation of Rome by the French troops; but the emperor, though he saw that the temporal power could not for ever be supported by French bayonets, desired some guarantee that the evacuation should not be followed, at all events France, Italy and the Roman question. immediately, by an Italian occupation, lest Catholic opinion should lay the blame for this upon France. Ultimately the two governments concluded a convention on the 15th of September 1864, whereby France agreed to withdraw her troops from Rome so soon as the papal army should be reorganized, or at the outside within two years, Italy undertaking not to attack it nor permit others to do so, and to transfer the capital from Turin to some other city within six months.[1] The change of capital would have the appearance of a definite abandonment of the Roma capitale programme, although in reality it was to be merely a tappa (stage) on the way. The convention was kept secret, but the last clause leaked out and caused the bitterest Capital transferred to Florence, 1865. feeling among the people of Turin, who would have been resigned to losing the capital provided it were transferred to Rome, but resented the fact that it was to be established in any other city, and that the convention was made without consulting parliament. Demonstrations were held which were repressed with unnecessary violence, and although the change of capital was not unpopular in the rest of Italy, where the Piemontesismo of the new régime was beginning to arouse jealousy, the secrecy with which the affair was arranged and the shooting down of the people in Turin raised such a storm of disapproval that the king for the first time used his privilege of dismissing the ministry. Under La Marmora’s administration the September convention was ratified, La Marmora Ministry. and the capital was transferred to Florence the following year. This affair resulted in an important political change, for the Piedmontese deputies, hitherto the bulwarks of moderate conservatism, now shifted to the Left or constitutional opposition.
Meanwhile, the Venetian question was becoming more and
more acute. Every Italian felt the presence of the Austrians in
the lagoons as a national humiliation, and between
1859 and 1866 countless plots were hatched for their
expulsion. But, in spite of the sympathy of the king,
Venetian question.
the attempt to raise armed bands in Venetia had no success, and
it became clear that the foreigner could only be driven from the
peninsula by regular war. To wage this alone Italy was still too
weak, and it was necessary to look round for an ally. Napoleon
was sympathetic; he desired to see the Austrians expelled, and
the Syllabus of Pius IX., which had stirred up the more aggressive
elements among the French clergy against his government, had
brought him once more into harmony with the views of Victor
Emmanuel; but he dared not brave French public opinion by
another war with Austria, nor did Italy desire an alliance
which would only have been bought at the price of further
cessions. There remained Prussia, which, now that the Danish
campaign of 1864 was over, was completing her preparations
for the final struggle with Austria for the hegemony
of Germany; and Napoleon, who saw in the furthering of
Bismarck’s plans the surest means of securing his own influence
in a divided Europe, willingly lent his aid in negotiating a Prusso-Italian
alliance. In the summer of 1865 Bismarck made formal
proposals to La Marmora; but the pourparlers were interrupted by
the conclusion of the convention of Gastein (August 14), to which
Austria agreed partly under pressure of the Prusso-Italian entente.
Prusso-Italian Alliance
of 1866.
To Italy the convention seemed like a betrayal; to
Napoleon it was a set-back which he tried to retrieve by
suggesting to Austria the peaceful cession of Venetia to
the Italian kingdom, in order to prevent any danger of
its alliance with Prussia. This proposal broke on the refusal of the
emperor Francis Joseph to cede Austrian territory except as the
result of a struggle; and Napoleon, won over by Bismarck at
the famous interview at Biarritz, once more took up the idea of
a Prusso-Italian offensive and defensive alliance. This was
actually concluded on the 8th of April 1866. Its terms, dictated
by a natural suspicion on the part of the Italian government,
stipulated that it should only become effective in the event of
Prussia declaring war on Austria within three months. Peace
was not to be concluded until Italy should have received Venetia,
and Prussia an equivalent territory in Germany.
The outbreak of war was postponed by further diplomatic complications. On the 12th of June Napoleon, whose policy throughout had been obscure and contradictory, signed a secret treaty with Austria, under which Venice was to be handed over to him, to be given to Italy in the event of her making a separate peace. La Marmora, however, who believed himself bound in honour to Prussia, refused to enter into a separate arrangement. On the 16th the Prussians began hostilities, and on the 20th Italy declared war.
Victor Emmanuel took the supreme command of the Italian army, and La Marmora resigned the premiership (which was assumed by Ricasoli), to become chief of the staff. La Marmora had three army corps (130,000 men) under his immediate command, to operate on the Ricasoli Ministry. Mincio, while Cialdini with 80,000 men was to operate on the Po. The Austrian southern army consisting of 95,000 men was commanded by the archduke Albert, with General von John as chief of the staff. On the 23rd of June La Marmora crossed the Mincio, and on the 24th a battle was fought at Custozza, under circumstances highly disadvantageous to the Italians, which after a stubborn contest ended in a crushing Austrian victory. Bad generalship, bad organization and the jealousy between La Marmora and Della Rocca were responsible for this defeat. Custozza might have been afterwards retrieved, for the Italians had plenty of fresh troops besides Cialdini’s army; but nothing was done, as both the king and La Marmora believed the situation to be much worse than it actually was. On the Battle of Königgrätz. 3rd of July the Prussians completely defeated the Austrians at Königgrätz, and on the 5th Austria ceded Venetia to Napoleon, accepting his mediation in favour of peace. The Italian iron-clad fleet commanded by the incapable Persano, after wasting much time at Taranto and Ancona, made an unsuccessful attack on the Dalmatian island of Lissa on the 18th of July, and on the 20th was completely defeated by the Austrian squadron, consisting of wooden ships, but commanded by the capable Admiral Tegethoff.
On the 22nd Prussia, without consulting Italy, made an armistice with Austria, while Italy obtained an eight days’ truce on condition of evacuating the Trentino, which had almost entirely
- ↑ The counterblast of Pius IX. to this convention was the encyclical Quanta Cura of Dec. 8, 1864, followed by the famous Syllabus.
