Vatican the support of German Catholics. What resistance
could Italy have offered had the German chancellor, seconded by
Austria, and assuredly supported by France, called upon Italy to
revise the Law of Guarantees in conformity with Catholic
exigencies, or had he taken the initiative of making papal independence
the subject of an international conference? Friendship
and alliance with Catholic Austria and powerful Germany
could alone lay this spectre. This was the only immediate
advantage Italy could hope to obtain by drawing nearer the
central Powers.
The political conditions of Europe favoured the realization of Italian desires. Growing rivalry between Austria and Russia in the Balkans rendered the continuance of the “League of the Three Emperors” a practical impossibility. The Austro-German alliance of 1879 formally guaranteed the territory of the contracting parties, but Austria could not count upon effectual help from Germany in case of war, since Russian attack upon Austria would certainly have been followed by French attack upon Germany. As in 1860–1870, it therefore became a matter of the highest importance for Austria to retain full disposal of all her troops by assuring herself against Italian aggression. The tsar, Alexander III., under the impression of the assassination of his father, desired, however, the renewal of the Dreikaiserbund, both as a guarantee of European peace and as a conservative league against revolutionary parties. The German emperor shared this desire, but Bismarck and the Austrian emperor wished to substitute for the imperial league some more advantageous combination. Hence a tacit understanding between Bismarck and Austria that the latter should profit by Italian resentment against France to draw Italy into the orbit of the Austro-German alliance. For the moment Germany was to hold aloof lest any active initiative on her part should displease the Vatican, of whose help Bismarck stood in need.
At the beginning of August 1881 the Austrian press mooted the idea of a visit from King Humbert to the emperor Francis Joseph. Count di Robilant, anxious that Italy should not seem to beg a smile from the central Powers, advised Mancini to receive with caution the suggestions of the Austrian press. Depretis took occasion to deny, in a form scarcely courteous, the probability of the visit. Robilant’s opposition to a precipitate acceptance of the Austrian hint was founded upon fear lest King Humbert at Vienna might be pressed to disavow Irredentist aspirations, and upon a desire to arrange for a visit of the emperor Francis Joseph to Rome in return for King Humbert’s visit to Vienna. Seeing the hesitation of the Italian government, the Austrian and German semi-official press redoubled their efforts to bring about the visit. By the end of September the idea had gained such ground in Italy that the visit was practically settled, and on the 7th of October Mancini informed Robilant (who was then in Italy) of the fact. Though he considered such precipitation impolitic, Robilant, finding that confidential information of Italian intentions had already been conveyed to the Austrian government, sought an interview with King Humbert, and on the 17th of October started for Vienna to settle the conditions of the visit. Depretis, fearing to jeopardize the impending conclusion of the Franco-Italian commercial treaty, would have preferred the visit to take the form of an act of personal courtesy between sovereigns. The Austrian government, for its part, desired that the king should be accompanied by Depretis, though not by Mancini, lest the presence of the Italian foreign minister should lend to the occasion too marked a political character. Mancini, unable to brook exclusion, insisted, however, upon accompanying the king. King Humbert with Queen Margherita reached Vienna on the morning of the 27th of October, and stayed at the Hofburg until the 31st of October. The visit was marked by the greatest cordiality, Count Robilant’s fears of inopportune pressure with regard to Irredentism proving groundless. Both in Germany and Austria the visit was construed as a preliminary to the adhesion of Italy to the Austro-German alliance. Count Hatzfeldt, on behalf of the German Foreign Office, informed the Italian ambassador in Berlin that whatever was done at Vienna would be regarded as having been done in the German capital. Nor did nascent irritation in France prevent the conclusion of the Franco-Italian commercial treaty, which was signed at Paris on the 3rd of November.
In Italy public opinion as a whole was favourable to the visit, especially as it was not considered an obstacle to the projected increase of the army and navy. Doubts, however, soon sprang up as to its effect upon the minds of Austrian statesmen, since on the 8th of November the language employed by Kállay and Count Andrássy to the Hungarian delegations on the subject of Irredentism was scarcely calculated to soothe Italian susceptibilities. But on 9th November the European situation was suddenly modified by the formation of the Gambetta cabinet, and, in view of the policy of revenge with which Gambetta was supposed to be identified, it became imperative for Bismarck to assure himself that Italy would not be enticed into a Francophil attitude by any concession Gambetta might offer. As usual when dealing with weaker nations, the German chancellor resorted to intimidation. He not only re-established the Prussian legation to the Vatican, suppressed since 1874, and omitted from the imperial message to the Reichstag (17th November 1881) all reference to King Humbert’s visit to Vienna, but took occasion on the 29th of November to refer to Italy as a country tottering on the verge of revolution, and opened in the German semi-official press a campaign in favour of an international guarantee for the independence of the papacy. These manœuvres produced their effect upon Italian public opinion. In the long and important debate upon foreign policy in the Italian Chamber of Deputies (6th to 9th December) the fear was repeatedly expressed lest Bismarck should seek to purchase the support of German Catholics by raising the Roman question. Mancini, still unwilling frankly to adhere to the Austro-German alliance, found his policy of “friendship all round” impeded by Gambetta’s uncompromising attitude in regard to Tunisia. Bismarck nevertheless continued his press campaign in favour of the temporal power until, reassured by Gambetta’s decision to send Roustan back to Tunis to complete as minister the anti-Italian programme begun as consul, he finally instructed his organs to emphasize the common interests of Germany and Italy on the occasion of the opening of the St Gothard tunnel. But the effect of the German press campaign could not be effaced in a day. At the new year’s reception of deputies King Humbert aroused enthusiasm by a significant remark that Italy intended to remain “mistress in her own house”; while Mancini addressed to Count de Launay, Italian ambassador in Berlin, a haughty despatch, repudiating the supposition that the pope might (as Bismarckian emissaries had suggested to the Vatican) obtain abroad greater spiritual liberty than in Rome, or that closer relations between Italy and Germany, such as were required by the interests and aspirations of the two countries, could be made in any way contingent upon a modification of Italian freedom of action in regard to home affairs.
The sudden fall of Gambetta (26th January 1882) having removed the fear of immediate European complications, the cabinets of Berlin and Vienna again displayed diffidence towards Italy. So great was Bismarck’s distrust of Italian parliamentary instability, his doubts of Italian capacity for offensive warfare and his fear of the Francophil tendencies of Depretis, that for many weeks the Italian ambassador at Berlin was unable to obtain audience of the chancellor. But for the Tunisian question Italy might again have been drawn into the wake of France. Mancini tried to impede the organization of French rule in the Regency by refusing to recognize the treaty of Bardo, yet so careless was Bismarck of Italian susceptibilities that he instructed the German consul at Tunis to recognize French decrees. Partly under the influence of these circumstances, and partly in response to persuasion by Baron Blanc, secretary-general for foreign affairs, Mancini instructed Count di Robilant to open negotiations for an Italo-Austrian alliance—instructions which Robilant neglected until questioned by Count Kalnóky on the subject. The first exchange of ideas between the two Governments
