are haunted by the tiger, panther, bear, wolf and wild boar in considerable numbers. Of the domestic animals, all remarkable for their small size, the chief are the black, humped cattle somewhat resembling the Indian variety, and sheep and goats.
Kinneir, Fraser and other observers speak unfavourably of the Mazandarani people, whom they describe as very ignorant and bigoted, arrogant, rudely inquisitive and almost insolent towards strangers. The peasantry, however, are far from dull, and betray much shrewdness where their interests are concerned. In the healthy districts they are stout and well made, and are considered a warlike race, furnishing some cavalry (800 men) and eight battalions of infantry (5600 men) to government. They speak a marked Persian dialect, but a Tūrki idiom closely akin to the Turkoman is still current amongst the tribes, although they have mostly already passed from the nomad to the settled state. Of these tribes the most numerous are the Modaunlū, Khojehvand and Abdul Maleki, originally of Lek or Kurd stock, besides branches of the royal Afshār and Kājār tribes of Tūrki descent. All these are exempt from taxes in consideration of their military service.
The export trade is chiefly with Russia from Meshed-i-Sar, the principal port of the province, to Baku, where European goods are taken in exchange for the white and coloured calicoes, caviare, rice, fruits and raw cotton of Mazandarān. Great quantities of rice are also exported to the interior of Persia, principally to Teheran and Kazvin. Owing to the almost impenetrable character of the country there are scarcely any roads accessible to wheeled carriages, and the great causeway of Shah Abbas along the coast has in many places even disappeared under the jungle. Two routes, however, lead to Teheran, one by Firuz Kuh, 180 m. long, the other by Larijan, 144 m. long, both in tolerably good repair. Except where crossed by these routes the Elburz forms an almost impassable barrier to the south.
The administration is in the hands of a governor, who appoints the sub-governors of the nine districts of Amol, Barfarush, Meshed-i-Sar, Sari, Ashref, Farah-abad, Tunakabun, Kelarrustak and Kujur into which the province is divided. There is fair security for life and property; and, although otherwise indifferently administered, the country is quite free from marauders; but local disturbances have latterly been frequent in the two last-named districts. The revenue is about £30,000, of which little goes to the state treasury, most being required for the governors, troops and pensions. The capital is Sari, the other chief towns being Barfarush, Meshed-i-Sar, Ashref and Farah-abad. (A. H.-S.)
MAZARIN, JULES (1602–1661), French cardinal and statesman,
elder son of a Sicilian, Pietro Mazarini, the intendant of
the household of Philip Colonna, and of his wife Ortensia
Buffalini, a connexion of the Colonnas, was born at Piscina in
the Abruzzi on the 14th of July 1602. He was educated by the
Jesuits at Rome till his seventeenth year, when he accompanied
Jerome Colonna as chamberlain to the university of Alcala in
Spain. There he distinguished himself more by his love of
gambling and his gallant adventures than by study, but made
himself a thorough master, not only of the Spanish language
and character, but also of that romantic fashion of Spanish
love-making which was to help him greatly in after life, when he
became the servant of a Spanish queen. On his return to Rome,
about 1622, he took his degree as Doctor utriusque juris, and
then became captain of infantry in the regiment of Colonna,
which took part in the war in the Valtelline. During this war
he gave proofs of much diplomatic ability, and Pope Urban VIII.
entrusted him, in 1629, with the difficult task of putting an end
to the war of the Mantuan succession. His success marked him
out for further distinction. He was presented to two canonries
in the churches of St John Lateran and Sta Maria Maggiore,
although he had only taken the minor orders, and had never
been consecrated priest; he negotiated the treaty of Turin between
France and Savoy in 1632, became vice-legate at Avignon
in 1634, and nuncio at the court of France from 1634 to 1636.
But he began to wish for a wider sphere than papal negotiations,
and, seeing that he had no chance of becoming a cardinal except
by the aid of some great power, he accepted Richelieu’s offer of
entering the service of the king of France, and in 1639 became a
naturalized Frenchman.
In 1640 Richelieu sent him to Savoy, where the regency of Christine, the duchess of Savoy, and sister of Louis XIII., was disputed by her brothers-in-law, the princes Maurice and Thomas of Savoy, and he succeeded not only in firmly establishing Christine but in winning over the princes to France. This great service was rewarded by his promotion to the rank of cardinal on the presentation of the king of France in December 1641. On the 4th of December 1642 Cardinal Richelieu died, and on the very next day the king sent a circular letter to all officials ordering them to send in their reports to Cardinal Mazarin, as they had formerly done to Cardinal Richelieu. Mazarin was thus acknowledged supreme minister, but he still had a difficult part to play. The king evidently could not live long, and to preserve power he must make himself necessary to the queen, who would then be regent, and do this without arousing the suspicions of the king or the distrust of the queen. His measures were ably taken, and when the king died, on the 14th of May 1643, to everyone’s surprise her husband’s minister remained the queen’s. The king had by a royal edict cumbered the queen-regent with a council and other restrictions, and it was necessary to get the parlement of Paris to overrule the edict and make the queen absolute regent, which was done with the greatest complaisance. Now that the queen was all-powerful, it was expected she would at once dismiss Mazarin and summon her own friends to power. One of them, Potier, bishop of Beauvais, already gave himself airs as prime minister, but Mazarin had had the address to touch both the queen’s heart by his Spanish gallantry and her desire for her son’s glory by his skilful policy abroad, and he found himself able easily to overthrow the clique of Importants, as they were called. That skilful policy was shown in every arena on which the great Thirty Years’ War was being fought out. Mazarin had inherited the policy of France during the Thirty Years’ War from Richelieu. He had inherited his desire for the humiliation of the house of Austria in both its branches, his desire to push the French frontier to the Rhine and maintain a counterpoise of German states against Austria, his alliances with the Netherlands and with Sweden, and his four theatres of war—on the Rhine, in Flanders, in Italy and in Catalonia.
During the last five years of the great war it was Mazarin alone who directed the French diplomacy of the period. He it was who made the peace of Brömsebro between the Danes and the Swedes, and turned the latter once again against the empire; he it was who sent Lionne to make the peace of Castro, and combine the princes of North Italy against the Spaniards, and who made the peace of Ulm between France and Bavaria, thus detaching the emperor’s best ally. He made one fatal mistake—he dreamt of the French frontier being the Rhine and the Scheldt, and that a Spanish princess might bring the Spanish Netherlands as dowry to Louis XIV. This roused the jealousy of the United Provinces, and they made a separate peace with Spain in January 1648; but the valour of the French generals made the skill of the Spanish diplomatists of no avail, for Turenne’s victory at Zusmarshausen, and Condé’s at Lens, caused the peace of Westphalia to be definitely signed in October 1648. This celebrated treaty belongs rather to the history of Germany than to a life of Mazarin; but two questions have been often asked, whether Mazarin did not delay the peace as long as possible in order to more completely ruin Germany, and whether Richelieu would have made a similar peace. To the first question Mazarin’s letters, published by M. Chéruel, prove a complete negative, for in them appears the zeal of Mazarin for the peace. On the second point, Richelieu’s letters in many places indicate that his treatment of the great question of frontier would have been more thorough, but then he would not have been hampered in France itself.
At home Mazarin’s policy lacked the strength of Richelieu’s. The Frondes were largely due to his own fault. The arrest of Broussel threw the people on the side of the parlement. His avarice and unscrupulous plundering of the revenues of the realm, the enormous fortune which he thus amassed, his supple ways, his nepotism, and the general lack of public interest in the great foreign policy of Richelieu, made Mazarin the especial object of hatred both by bourgeois and nobles. The irritation of the latter was greatly Mazarin’s own fault; he had tried consistently to play off the king’s brother Gaston of Orleans against Condé, and their respective followers against each other, and had also, as his carnets prove, jealously kept any courtier from getting into the good graces of the queen-regent except by his means, so
