and was even believed to be intriguing to retain the portfolio
of foreign affairs, which would have meant the victory of the
Russian party. On the other hand, the French party were
clamouring for the speedy conclusion of a definite alliance
with Napoleon. By an admirably clear exposé of the situation
Metternich won over the emperor Francis to that middle
course, the policy of armed abstention, which was to be the
basic principle of his diplomatic action during the crisis of the
coming years. An alliance with Russia, he argued, would
be worse than useless; Austria would at any time obtain better
terms from the tsar’s growing needs. An alliance with France
would be one with “a power whose exclusive object is the
destruction of the old order of things, which has hitherto found
its defence in Austria.” Alone of European Powers Austria
still had the possibility of choice; let her work for the preservation
of peace and at the same time remain free, should war
break out, to make her own terms. It would little serve Austria’s
interests to become the ally of Russia, merely to serve as a
barrier behind which the emperor Alexander could carry out
his designs on Turkey in safety. In an interview with Count
Shuvalov, the Russian agent, Metternich roundly declared that
the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey was for Austria the
question of supreme interest.
With the approach of the Russo-French War the situation became increasingly difficult. The partisans of a Russian alliance remained powerful and clamorous; but Metternich did not share the doubts as to the outcome of Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, which he believed would leave Austria, if she remained neutral, isolated amid a huge European confederation. To him the only safe course seemed to be to offer the French emperor substantial assistance, stipulating for some quid pro quo in the settlement to follow the war. The emperor Francis shared this view; and on the 14th of March a treaty of alliance was signed by which Austria agreed to support the French army with an army corps of 30,000 men operating from Galicia. This treaty was ratified at Vienna on the 25th of March, the day of Napoleon’s passage of the Niemen. It was characteristic of Metternich’s diplomacy that the Austrian generals in Galicia were ordered to act only on the defensive, and that the court of St Petersburg was informed that Austria would only take part in the war as a principal should Russia force her to do so.
This cautious attitude was soon justified by the astounding developments of the Moscow campaign. When the full extent of the catastrophe that had overwhelmed Napoleon’s army became known, Metternich realized the advantageous position in which Austria lay for exploiting the changed situation. His first idea was that France should commission Austria to mediate a peace in Russia and in England (Despatch of Otto, November 10); but, as affairs developed, this was replaced by the policy of temporizing until Austria should be in a position to intervene with decisive effect. Napoleon’s demand that Austria should raise her contingent from 30,000 to 100,000 men was, indeed, from Metternich’s point of view doubly opportune: for it enabled him quietly to assume that the treaty of the 14th of March, which stipulated only for an “alliance limitée,” had been abrogated by Napoleon’s own act; that Austria had reverted to a position of neutrality; and that, should she take part in the war, it would no longer be in a subordinate character but as a principal. “Le passage de la neutralité à la guerre,” said Metternich to the emperor Francis, “ne sera possible que par la médiation armée”; which meant in effect that Austria required time to complete her armaments. To gain this time was, during the weeks that followed, the object of his diplomacy. For this purpose he encouraged Napoleon to believe that Austria was prepared for a settlement on terms very favourable to the French emperor; with the result that Napoleon, though he would not hear of a “mediation,” not only consented to, but pressed for, Austrian “intervention” (entremise). But Metternich had made up his mind that the only chance of an effective restoration of the Habsburg influence in Europe lay in using this opportunity for destroying or limiting Napoleon’s power, and he had already opened negotiations with the allied courts, with a view to enforcing a common agreement as to a basis of peace, when the indecisive battle of Lützen (May 2) gave him the opportunity of making his policy of mediation effective. Count Stadion was now sent to the emperor Alexander to lay before him the terms on which Austria was prepared to mediate; he was also to “agree to the bases of an active military co-operation on our part, in the event of the non-success of our efforts on behalf of peace.” On the 20th of March Napoleon gained another indecisive victory at Bautzen, which still further strengthened Metternich’s position; for Napoleon allowed himself to be persuaded into signing the ill-omened armistice of Pleiswitz (Poischwitz), on the 4th of June, and to become entangled in the insincere negotiations of the congress of Prague. Austria thus had time to complete her armaments. Meanwhile, on the 14th and 15th of June, were signed at Reichenbach the treaties of alliance between Great Britain, Russia and Prussia, by which the signatory Powers agreed neither to negotiate nor to conclude treaty or truce with Napoleon except by common consent. In an interview with the emperor Alexander, Metternich now presented the terms which he proposed to offer to Napoleon, and on this basis a treaty between Austria, Russia and Prussia was agreed to, Austria contracting to put 150,000 men into the field, should Napoleon reject the ultimatum, and not to make peace without the consent of Russia and Prussia—which in effect involved that of Great Britain also.
Before this second treaty of Reichenbach was signed (June 27), Metternich went on Maret’s invitation to Dresden, where on the 26th he had the famous interview with Napoleon. The whole scene was on his part a masterpiece of Machiavellian diplomacy. The terms he offered to the emperor were so favourable that he has been denounced by every Prussian historian since as the enemy of Germany; while French historians have enlarged on Napoleon’s infatuation in rejecting them. In spite of the fact that the draft of the treaty of Reichenbach was in his pocket, he posed as the impartial “mediator,” with a leaning in favour of Napoleon, assuring the emperor “on his honour as a German count” that Austria was still “free from all engagements,” which was true only in so far as the treaty was not signed till the next day. Metternich’s object was, in fact, only to gain an extension of the armistice till the 10th of August, on which date Schwarzenberg had declared that he would be ready to take the offensive. As for the terms offered to Napoleon his acceptance of them need not hamper the plans of the Allies; for the consent of Great Britain would have to be obtained, and, moreover, Napoleon was sure before long to provide an excuse for a fresh breach; his rejection of them, on the other hand, would be a blow to his waning popularity in France. The interview was long and stormy; Napoleon struggled vainly in the toils; in his excitement he dropped his hat, which the imperturbable Metternich did not condescend to pick up; “Napoleon,” he records in his Memoirs, “seemed to me small.” Metternich, however, gained his immediate point; the armistice was extended to the 10th of August. At midnight on that date, Napoleon not having come to terms, Metternich gave orders for the lighting of the beacons that signalled to the Austrian army in Silesia the outbreak of the war.
Napoleon’s victory at Dresden (Aug. 26 and 27) for the moment brought discord into the counsels of the Allies and threatened the ruin of Metternich and his plans; but the successive defeats of Vandamme at Kulm (Aug. 28), of Macdonald at Katzbach (Aug. 29) and Oudinot at Grossbeeren (Aug. 30) completely altered the aspect of affairs; and on the 9th of September Metternich signed at Toplitz a treaty with Russia which committed Austria yet more closely to the policy of the Allies. Then followed the battle of Leipzig (Oct. 16–18) and the advance of the Allies into France. The diplomatic situation throughout the campaign was, from the Austrian point of view, one of extreme delicacy. The necessity of curbing the power of Napoleon and rendering him for ever incapable of again oversetting the balance of Europe was practically the only object Austria had in common with her allies. She did not
