Mediomatrica, a name from which the present form has been derived by contraction. Caesar describes it as one of the oldest and most important towns in Gaul. The Romans, recognizing its strategical importance, fortified it, and supplied it with water by an imposing aqueduct, the remains of which still exist. Under the Roman emperors Metz was connected by military roads with Toul, Langres, Lyons, Strassburg, Verdun, Reims and Trier. Christianity was introduced in the 3rd century of our era. In the middle of the 5th century the town was plundered by the Huns under Attila; subsequently it came into possession of the Franks, and was made the capital of Austrasia. On the partition of the Carolingian realms in 843 Metz fell to the share of the emperor Lothair I. as the capital of Lorraine. Its bishops, whose creation reaches back to the 4th century, now began to be very powerful. Metz acquired the privileges of a free imperial town in the 13th century, and soon attained great commercial prosperity. Having adopted the reformed doctrines in 1552 and 1553, it fell into the hands of the French through treachery, and was heroically and successfully defended against Charles V. by Francis duke of Guise. It now sank to the level of a French provincial town, and its population dwindled from 60,000 to about 22,000. At the peace of Westphalia in 1648 Metz, with Toul and Verdun, was formally ceded to France, in whose possession it remained for upwards of two centuries. The battles of August 1870, and the investment and capture of the army of Metz which followed, are described below. By the peace of Frankfort on the 10th of May 1871 Metz was again united to the German Empire.
See Westphal, Geschichte der Stadt Metz (1875–1877); Georg Lang, Metz und seine Umgebungen (1883), the Statistisch-topographisches Handbuch für Lothringen; Albers, Geschichte der Stadt Metz (Metz, 1902); G. A. Prost, Études sur l’histoire de Metz (1897); and Tauber, Die Schlachtfelder von Metz (Berlin, 1902). (See also Franco-German War: Bibliography.)
Battles around Metz, in the Franco-German War, 1870
1. Colombey-Borny (August 14).—The French army under Marshal Bazaine was in and about Metz. The German I. and II. armies, on the march from the Saar, were heading for the Moselle between Metz and Pont-à-Mousson, and on the morning of the 14th of August the German I. Army (I., VII. and VIII. Corps, under General v. Steinmetz) lay on and east of the French, with outposts well to the front, watching the French camps east of Metz, which were little more than 1 m. to the front. Steinmetz had received from headquarters overnight instructions that on the 14th of August the I. Army would maintain the positions occupied during the 13th, and merely passed on these orders to his corps commanders. In Metz, meanwhile, Bazaine had decided to retreat, and during the morning orders to that effect reached his corps commanders, who commenced preparations for their execution. The 2nd Corps (Frossard) and 6th (Canrobert) began to retire about midday, the 3rd (Lebœuf), 4th (Ladmirault) and Imperial Guard (Bourbaki) were to follow. These preparations being observed, the German outposts got under arms. General von der Goltz, in command of the VII. Corps (7 battalions, 4 squadrons, 2 batteries) hearing from a passing officer that the I. Corps on his right was preparing to attack, and noting personally signs of retreat in the enemy’s lines, determined at 3 p.m. to advance his whole command to the ridge between Colombey and Borny (which was still occupied by French outposts), in order to clear up the situation. The ridge was captured with little resistance, but the sound of the firing at once set all the neighbouring troops in motion, and fortunately so, for the French had immediately retaliated on von der Goltz’s audacious attack. Between 4 and 6 p.m. there was continuous heavy fighting on the front from Borny to Méy, as both sides brought fresh troops into the field. The convex slopes falling from the Prussian position towards Metz gave plenty of cover to the French, and the setting sun shone full in the faces of the Prussian artillerymen. Thus the Prussian infantry encountered unusually obstinate resistance and the troops engaged rapidly slipped from all superior control. The above front was held by the French 3rd Corps. Shortly before 6.30 the 4th Corps (Ladmirault) suddenly began to deploy on the high ground to the north-west beyond Méy, thus threatening the right flank of the Prussian I. Corps (General v. Manteuffel). To meet this danger Manteuffel was compelled to direct his corps artillery and reserves, which were now rapidly coming up, away from the hard-pressed centre towards the oncoming infantry masses of Ladmirault. These, with the sun now almost at their backs, were shooting better than usual, and Manteuffel was compelled to call on the VIII. Corps for assistance, which its commander, under positive orders from Steinmetz, refused to give. Meanwhile Steinmetz had been sending peremptory orders to the battlefield to stop the battle, but neither of the corps commanders was able to enforce them. Fortunately for the Prussians, Bazaine had issued similar orders to his subordinates, who, having their men better in hand, were able to obey; and as night began to close in the French broke off the action and retired under the guns of the Metz forts, convinced that at last they had “broken the spell” of German success.
Finding that, in spite of his orders, the firing at the front continued increasing in intensity, Steinmetz at length rode to the front himself. Meeting Manteuffel near the Brasserie of Noisseville, he overwhelmed him with reproaches, and at the crisis of this scene the bands struck up “Heil dir im Siegeskranz”! In this action the Germans brought 30,500 rifles and 150 guns on to the battlefield only out of more than 100,000 with 300 guns which could have been engaged before darkness. Bazaine actually deployed 50,700 rifles and 206 guns to oppose them. He might, however, had he been so minded, have struck with his whole army—nearly three times this force, and, judging from the course events actually took, we can have little doubt as to the result of such a blow. The losses on either side were in killed and wounded—French about 3600, Germans about 4800.
The chain of causation in this action is particularly worthy of attention: A young reserve officer, seeing some troops of the I. Corps standing to arms, reported to von der Goltz that the corps was standing to arms and about to attack. Von der Goltz thereupon decided to go forward and discover what was actually going on, and this action unchained the whole battle power of all the troops within call. When, on the following morning, Steinmetz reported von der Goltz and the commander of the I. Corps for disobedience, the king thanked Manteuffel warmly for the part he had played, and then turned to the young brigadier who had disobeyed orders and congratulated him on having twice distinguished himself in the first fortnight of the war.
2. The Battle of Vionville—Mars-la-Tour (August 16).—On the following day (15th) the II. German Army approached the Moselle above and below Pont-à-Mousson, with a view to overtaking and heading off Bazaine in his presumed retreat to the Meuse (see Franco-German War). So far, however, from being ahead of the Germans on the road to Verdun, the French were actually, late in the afternoon of the 15th of August, bivouacked on the plateau of Rezonville, and there their outposts were placed, not where they could see the surrounding country, but at the regulation distances of 600 to 1000 paces from the bivouacs. Friendly inhabitants kept Bazaine well informed as to the magnitude of the danger threatening him from the south, and a special telegram from Paris, the true origin of which has never been traced, led him to believe that the I. German Army was crossing the Moselle near Thionville and about to descend on him from the north. This telegram might have exercised the most prejudicial influence on the course of the battle had not Ladmirault (4th Corps), nearer to the seat of the imaginary danger, taken upon himself to disregard the warning transmitted to him by headquarters. At daybreak on the 16th, no Prussians being reported in sight by the outposts, the troops began nonchalantly to prepare for the resumption of the march.
On the Prussian side, von Alvensleben’s Corps (III.) shortly after daybreak was moving north-westward from the Moselle in two columns, on the right the 5th division, via Gorze and Flavigny on Vionville, on the left the 6th division with corps artillery by Arnaville on Mars-la-Tour, von Alvensleben himself riding
