of the I., to Prince Frederick Charles as commander-in-chief of the army of investment.[1] This brought the strength of his command up to eight corps, numbering some 220,000 men; an enormous mass to feed in a district swept bare of supplies by the operations of the preceding week, and with only one railway line, terminating at Courcelles, to depend upon.
For the moment the chief care of the Prince was to guard against an attempt of the French army to break out to the westward. The I. Army Corps with Kummer’s Landwehr division (which arrived during the night of the 19th–20th of August) were to occupy a position to cover the rail head at Courcelles-Rémilly, and the remainder were disposed in the following order: The X. Corps was on the north, with a bridge head at Hauconcourt-sur-Moselle, the II., VIII. and VII. along the eastern slopes overlooking the Moselle valley, the latter having also a fortified bridge head at Ars-sur-Moselle, The III. and IX. were cantoned almost on the battlefield of the 18th, between Caulre Farm and Roncourt, ready to move off to the left and support the X. Corps in the event of an attempt on the part of the French to break out towards Thionville.
The positions were fortified with a light outpost line, behind which was drawn a main position on which every art of the engineer was expended. Ample arrangements were made for obtaining and circulating intelligence, and all lateral communications were improved and supplemented to the utmost. A light field-railway from Rémilly to Pont à Mousson (14 m.) was also put in hand, but progress on this was very slow. The water-supply of the town was promptly interrupted, but the river water was quite drinkable.
Meanwhile, the French in Metz had been diligently at work. There was no real deficiency of ammunition and stores in the fortress, and provisions for forty days were reported in hand. Bazaine was still in communication with the outside world, though return messages came in sparingly. On the afternoon of the 25th he decided to break out to the northward by the right bank of the river, and orders to this effect were duly issued. Many delays arose in their execution, and it was not till 2 p.m. on the 26th that the troops were formed up ready for action. But at the last moment the marshal wavered. Calling a council of war on the heights of Fort St Julien, he asked the opinion of his subordinates, who were unanimously against the proposed sortie, principally because the artillery “had only ammunition enough for a single battle!” Besides, the Germans had long since become aware of the movement in progress, and all chance of surprise was past. It was also raining very heavily. Accordingly the scheme was abandoned.
On the 29th of August Bazaine received a despatch, dated the 27th, from MacMahon, according to which his army should have been at Stenay on the Meuse and farther to the south by the 30th. The marshal accordingly determined to renew the attempt of the 26th, and orders—almost a repetition of those of the previous occasion—were issued.
At this moment (Aug. 31) the positions of von Manteuffel’s command (I. Corps and 3rd Landwehr division) were most dangerously extended, and a surprise at daybreak might have had far-reaching results. But the habit of excessive bugling and band-playing betrayed the French design even before daybreak. Not until 1.30 p.m. was the concentration completed, and Bazaine again assembled his commanding officers to give them their final instructions. This time he adhered to his decision, and about 4 p.m. the attack opened (battle of Servigny or Noisseville); but his opportunity had been allowed to slip, and though his first onset overwhelmed the German outposts, their main line held good, and masses of guns unlimbering over a front of some 4 m. rendered all further attempts to break the German cordon abortive. Firing only ceased as darkness fell, and next morning the fighting was again renewed. But the whole French army was disheartened. It was obvious that what they had failed to do by surprise was hopeless now that twenty-four hours had been given in which the Germans could make counter-preparations. Therefore about noon a general retirement under the guns of the forts took place, and the last serious hope of the French army had vanished. Some 120,000 men with 528 guns had been engaged against 60,000 Germans with 222 guns, and had been beaten off with a loss of 3500 men. The Germans had lost about 3000.
The investment now resumed its regular course. The Germans, secure in the strength of their position on the left bank of the Moselle, drew more troops over to the right, and added to their defences and communications. The idea was even mooted of damming up the river near Hauconcourt, and thus flooding out the whole of the civil population of Metz; but expert civil engineers, who were sent for from Germany, reported against the proposal.
As time wore on the conditions in Metz and the surrounding camps became deplorable. The hospitals and private houses had been crowded with wounded from the first, and now, owing to the persistent wet weather, smallpox and dysentery became epidemic. Towards the close of September rations had to be reduced, and the troops began slaughtering the cavalry horses for food. Probably to cheer the men by a semblance of activity, Marshal Bazaine attempted a sortie on a large scale on the 1st of October in the direction of Ladorchamps, and fighting continued into the 2nd, but without prospect of success, and the profound depression following on defeat sent up the sick list rapidly. One other sortie towards Noisseville followed on the 7th, the alleged reason for which was the hope of obtaining provisions in the neighbouring villages. But it was beaten off with the utmost ease by the investing troops, who were well fed and cared for; and as by this time even the gun-teams had followed the cavalry horses to the slaughter-house, the French army as an army—i.e. a combination of the three arms—had ceased to exist. On the recognition of this fact negotiations for the capitulation of Metz were begun on the 13th of October, and on the 14th the Army of the Rhine surrendered. Had it held out even forty-eight hours longer events before Paris and Orleans might have taken a different turn.
The investment of Metz had lasted 54 days, and the death-roll of the civil population had risen to 3587 against 1200 in the corresponding period of a normal year. The army itself had only lost from sickness 2600 men, or barely 2% of its full effective. (F. N. M.)
MEUDON, a town of northern France, in the department of Seine-et-Oise, 6 m. E. of Versailles by rail and about 212 m. S.W. of Paris. Pop. (1906), 9597. The remains of a castle (17th century) burned during the siege of Paris in 1871 have since been adapted as an observatory. Its terrace commands a fine view of Paris. The handsome Galliera Institutions, on the hill of Fleury, were founded by the duchess of Galliera for the reception of aged persons and orphans. The buildings were completed in 1885, at a cost of £560,000 The town has a monument of Rabelais, who was curé there in 1553, and manufactures munitions of war for the artillery, and in the neighbouring park of Chalais is the Government military ballooning establishment. In the 16th century the cardinal, Charles of Lorraine, built at Meudon a magnificent château, which was destroyed in 1803. The present remains belong to a building erected by the dauphin, son of Louis XIV. The wood of Meudon lies for the most part to the west of the town.
MEULEN, ANTONY FRANCIS VAN DER (1634–1690), Flemish painter, born in Brussels, was called to Paris about 1666 by Colbert, at the instance of Le Brun, to fill the post of battle painter to Louis XIV. His paintings during the campaigns of Flanders (1667) so delighted Louis that from that date Van der Meulen was ordered to accompany him in all his expeditions. In 1673 he was received into the French Academy, attained the grade of councillor in 1681, and died full of honours in Paris in 1690. He is best represented by the series of twenty-three paintings, mostly executed for Louis XIV., now in the Louvre. They show that he always retained his Flemish predilections in point of colour, although his style was modified by that of the French school.
- ↑ Steinmetz was shortly afterwards relieved of his command and returned to Germany.
