invalid. Montfort, who had remained in England to prepare for the worst, at once resumed the war, and thus exposed himself to accusations of perjury, from which he can only be defended on the hypothesis that he had been led to hope for a genuine compromise. Though merely supported by the towns and a few of the younger barons, he triumphed by superior generalship at Lewes (May 14, 1264), where the king, the Lord Edward, and Richard of Cornwall fell into his hands. Montfort used his victory to set up the government by which his reputation as a statesman stands or falls. The weak point in his scheme was the establishment of a triumvirate (consisting of himself, the young earl of Gloucester, and the bishop of Chichester) in which his colleagues were obviously figureheads. This flaw, however, is mitigated by a scheme, which he simultaneously promulgated, for establishing a thorough parliamentary control over the executive, not excepting the triumvirs. The parliament which he summoned in 1265 Was, it is true, a packed assembly; but it can hardly be supposed that the representation which he granted to the towns (see Parliament and Representation) was intended to be a temporary expedient. The reaction against his government was baronial rather than popular; and the Welsh Marchers particularly resented Montfort’s alliance with Llewellyn of North Wales. Little consideration for English interests is shown in the treaty of Pipton which sealed that alliance (June 22, 1265). It was by the forces of the Marchers and the strategy of Edward that Montfort was defeated at Evesham (Aug. 4). Divided from the main body of his supporters, whose strength lay in the east and south, the earl was outnumbered and surrounded before reinforcements could reach him. For years after his death he was revered by the commons as a martyr, and the government had no little difficulty in reducing the remnants of his baronial supporters. His character has suffered in the past from indiscriminate eulogy as much as from detractors. He was undoubtedly harsh, masterful, impatient and ambitious. But no mere adventurer could have won the friendship of such men as Marsh and Grosseteste; their verdict of approval may be the more unhesitatingly admitted since it is not untempered with criticism.
The original authorities are those for the reign of Henry III. The best biographies are those by R. Pauli (trans. C. M. Goodwin, London, 1876); G. W. Prothero (London, 1877); C. Bémont (Paris, 1884). See also the letters of Adam de Marsh in J. S. Brewer’s Monumenta franciscana, vol. i (Rolls series, 1858); H. R. Luard, Epistolae Roberti Grosseteste (Rolls, series, 1861); F. S. Stevenson, Robert Grosseteste (London, 1899); W. H. Blaauw, The Barons’ War (Cambridge, 1871). (H. W. C. D.)
MONTGAILLARD, JEAN GABRIEL MAURICE ROQUES,
Comte de (1761–1841), French political agent, was born at
Montgaillard, near Villefranche (Haute Garonne), on the 16th
of November 1761. His parents belonged to the minor nobility,
and he was educated at the military school of Sorèze, where
he attracted the notice of the comte de Provence (afterwards
Louis XVIII.). After serving for some years in the West Indies
Maurice de Roques returned to France. In 1789 he was established
in Paris as a secret diplomatic agent, and though he
emigrated to England after the 10th of August 1792, he returned
six weeks later to Paris, where his security was most probably
purchased by services to the revolutionary government. He
was again serving the Bourbon princes when he met Francis II.
of Austria at Ypres in 1794 and saw Pitt in London, where he
published his État de la France an mois de mai 1794, predicting
the fall of Robespierre. He was employed by Louis XVIII.
to secure Austrian intervention on behalf of Mme Royale
(afterwards duchess of Angouléme), still a prisoner in the Temple,
and he drew up the proposition made by the prince to Charles
Pichegru, the details of which appear in his “Mémoire sur la
trahison de Pichegru” (Moniteur, April 18, 1804). In June
1796 he made a journey to Italy in the hope of opening direct
relations with Bonaparte. On his return to the princes at
Blankenburg he was regarded with suspicion, and he departed
for Paris to await events. He is thought to have indicated
the possession by the comte d’Antraigues, agent of the princes,
of documents compromising Pichegru. In April 1798 he
surrendered to Claude Roberjot, the Hamburg minister of the
Directory, further papers relating to the matter. He followed
Roberjot to Holland, and there wrote a memorandum to prove
that the only hope for France lay in the immediate return of
Bonaparte from Egypt, followed by assumption of the supreme
power. This note reached Alexandria by way of Berlin and
Constantinople. When he ventured to return to Paris in the hope
of recognition from the First Consul he was imprisoned, and
on his release he was kept under police supervision. Napoleon,
who appreciated his real insight into European politics and
his extraordinary knowledge of European courts, attached him
to his secret cabinet in spite of his intriguing and mendacious
character. He received a salary of 14,000 francs, reduced
later to 6000, for reports on political questions for Napoleon’s
use, and for pamphlets Written to help the imperial policy. He
tried to dissuade Napoleon from the Austrian marriage and the
Russian campaign, and counselled the limitation of the empire
Within the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees. The Bourbon
restoration made no change in his position; he was maintained
as confidential adviser on foreign and home politics, and gave
shrewd advice to the new government. His career ended with
the old monarchy, and he died in obscurity at Chaillot on the
8th of February 1841.
His Souvenirs, which must be read with the utmost caution, were edited by Clément de Lacroix (3rd ed., 1895); his Mémoires diplomatiques (1805–1819) were published by the same editor in 1896. His État de la France was translated into English by Edmund Burke. His other writings include Ma conduite pendant le cours de la révolution française (London, 1795); Histoire secrète de Coblentz dans la révolution des français (London, 1795); De La France et de l’Europe sous le gouvernement de Bonaparte (Lyons, 1904); Situation de l’Angleterre en 1811 (Paris, 1811); De la restauration de la monarchie des Bourbons et du retour à l’ordre (Paris, 1814); and Histoire de France depuis 1825 jusqu’à 1830 (Paris, 1839).
MONTGELAS, MAXIMILIAN JOSEF GARNERIN, Count
von (1759–1838), Bavarian statesman, came of a noble family
in Savoy. His father John Sigmund Garnerin, Baron Montgelas,
entered the military service of Maximilian Joseph III.,
elector of Bavaria, and married the Countess Ursula von Trauner.
Maximilian Josef, their eldest son, was born on the 10th of
September 1759. He was educated successively at Nancy,
Strassburg and Ingolstadt. Being a Savoyard on his father’s
side, he naturally felt the French influence, which was then strong
in Germany, with peculiar force. To the end of his life he spoke
and wrote French more correctly and with more ease than
German. In 1779 he entered the public service in the department
of the censorship of books. The elector Charles Theodore,
who had at first favoured him, became offended on discovering
that he was associated with the Illuminati, the supports of
the anti-clerical movement called the Aufklärung. Montgelas
therefore went to Zweibrücken, where he was helped by his
brother Illuminati to find employment at the court of the duke,
the head of a branch of the Wittelsbach family. From this
refuge also he was driven by orthodox enemies of the Illuminati.
The brother of the duke of Zweibrücken—Maximilian Joseph—took
him into his service as private secretary. When his
employer succeeded to the duchy Montgelas was named minister,
and in that capacity he attended the conference of Rastadt
in 1798, where the reconstruction of Germany, which was the
consequence of the French Revolution, was in full swing. In
1799 the duke of Zweibrücken succeeded to the electorate of
Bavaria, and he kept Montgelas as his most trusted adviser.
Montgelas was the inspirer and director of the policy by which
the electorate of Bavaria was turned into a kingdom, and
was very much increased in size by the annexation of church
lands, free towns and small lordships. As this end was achieved
by undeviating servility to Napoleon, and the most cynical
disregard of the rights of Bavaria’s German neighbours, Montgelas
became the type of an unpatriotic politician in the eyes
of all Germans who revolted against the supremacy of France.
From his own conduct and his written defence of his policy it
is clear that such sentiments as theirs appeared to be merely
childish to Montgelas. He was a thorough politician of the
