The Italian war aroused the opposition of the Catholics. After Magenta (June 4, 1859), it was the fears of the Catholics and the messages of the empress which, even more than the threats of Prussia, checked him in his triumph and forced him into the armistice of Villafranca (July 11, 1859). But the spread of the Italian revolution and the movement for annexation forced him again to intervene. He appealed to the Left against the Catholics, by the amnesty of the 17th of April 1859. His consent to the annexation of the Central Italian states, in exchange for Savoy and Nice (Treaty of Turin, March 24, 1860) exposed him to violent attacks on the part of the ultramontanes, whose slave he had practically been since 1848. At the same time, the free-trade treaty with Great Britain (January 5, 1860) aroused a movement against him among the industrial bourgeoisie.
Thus at the end of 1860, the very time when he had hoped that his personal policy was to rally round him once for all the whole of France, and assure the future of his dynasty, he saw, on the contrary, that it was turning against him his strongest supporters. He became alarmed at the responsibilities which he saw would fall upon him, and imagined that by an appearance of reform he would be able to shift on to others the responsibility for any errors he might commit. Hence the decrees of the 24th of November 1860 (right of address, ministers without portfolio) and the letter of the 14th of November 1861 (financial reform). From this time onward, in face of a growing opposition, anxiety for the future of his régime occupied the first place in the emperor’s thoughts, and paralysed his initiative. Placed between his Italian counsellors and the empress, he was ever of two minds. His plans for remodelling Europe had a certain generosity and grandeur; but internal difficulties forced him into endless manœuvre and temporization, which led to his ruin. Thus in October 1862, after Garibaldi’s attack on Rome, the clerical côterie of the Tuileries triumphed. But the replacing of M. Thouvenel by M. Drouin de Lhuys did not satisfy the more violent Catholics, who in May 1863 joined the united opposition. Thirty-five opposers of the government were appointed, Republicans, Orleanists, Legitimists or Catholics. The emperor dismissed Persigny, and summoned moderate reformers such as Duruy and Béhic. But he was still possessed with the idea of settling his throne on a firm basis, and uniting all France in some glorious enterprise which should appeal to all parties equally, and “group them under the mantle of imperial glory.” From January to June 1863 he sought this appearance of glory in Poland, but only succeeded in embroiling himself with Russia. Then, after Syria and China, it was the “great inspiration of his reign,” the establishment of a Catholic and Latin empire in Mexico, enthusiasm for which he tried in vain from 1863 to 1867 to communicate to the French.
But while the strength of France was wasting away at Puebla or Mexico, Bismarck was founding German unity. In August 1864 the emperor, held back by French public opinion, which was favourable to Prussia, and by his idea of nationality, allowed Prussia and Austria to seize the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. After his failure in Poland and Mexico and in face of the alarming presence of Germany, only one alliance remained possible for Napoleon III., namely with Italy. He obtained this by the convention of the 15th of September 1864 (involving the withdrawal of the French troops from Rome). But the Catholic party redoubled its violence, and the pope sent out the encyclical Quanta Cura and the Syllabus, especially directed against France. In vain the emperor sought in German affairs a definitive solution of the Italian question. At Biarritz he prepared with Bismarck the Franco-Prussian alliance of April 1866; and hoped to become, to his greater glory, arbiter in the tremendous conflict which was about to begin. But suddenly, while he was trying to rouse public opinion against the treaties of 1815, the news of the battle of Königgrätz came as a bolt from the blue to ruin his hopes. French interests called for an immediate intervention. But the emperor was ill, weary and aged by the life of pleasure which he led side by side with his life of work (as is proved by the letters to Mdlle Bellanger); he was suffering from a first attack of his bladder complaint. He knew, moreover, the insufficiency of his troops. After days of terrible suffering, he resigned himself to the annexation by Prussia of northern Germany. “Now,” said M Drouin de Lhuys, “we have nothing left but to weep.”
Henceforth the brilliant dream, a moment realized, the realization of which he had thought durable, was at an end. The Empire had still an uncertain and troubled brilliancy at the Exhibition of 1867. But Berezowski’s pistol shot, which accentuated the estrangement from the tsar, and the news of the death of Maximilian at Queretaro, cast a gloom over the later fêtes. In the interior the industrial and socialist movement, born of the new industrial development, added fresh strength to the Republican and Liberal opposition. The moderate Imperialists felt that some concessions must be made to public opinion. In opposition to the absolutist “vice-emperor” Rouher, whose influence over Napoleon had become stronger and stronger since the death of Morny, Émile Ollivier grouped the Third Party. Anxious, changeable and distraught, the emperor made the Liberal concessions of the 19th of January 1867 (right of interpellation), and then, when Ollivier thought that his triumph was near, he exalted Rouher (July) and did not grant the promised laws concerning the press and public meetings till 1868. The opposition gave him no credit for these tardy concessions. There was an epidemic of violent attacks on the emperor; the publication of the Lanterne and the Baudin trial, conducted by Gambetta, were so many death-blows to the régime. The Internationale developed its propaganda. The election of May 1869 resulted in 4,438,000 votes given for the government, and 3,355,000 for the opposition, who also gained 90 representatives. The emperor, disappointed and hesitating, was slow to return to a parliamentary régime. It was not till December that he instructed Ollivier to “form a homogeneous cabinet representing the majority of the Corps Législatif” (ministry of the 2nd of January 1870). But, embarrassed between the Arcadiens, the partisans of the absolute régime, and the republicans, Ollivier was unable to guide the Empire in a constitutional course. At the Tuileries Rouher’s counsel still triumphed. It was he who inspired the ill and wearied emperor, now without confidence or energy, with the idea of resorting to the plébiscite. “To do away with the risk of a Revolution,” “to place order and liberty upon a firm footing,” “to ensure the transmission of the crown to his son,” Napoleon III. again sought the approbation of the nation. He obtained it with brilliant success, for the last time, by 7,358,786 votes against 1,571,939, and his work now seemed to be consolidated.
A few weeks later it crumbled irrevocably. Since 1866 he had been pursuing an elusive appearance of glory. Since 1866 France was calling for “revenge.” He felt that he could only rally the people to him by procuring them the satisfaction of their national pride. Hence the mishaps and imprudences of which Bismarck made such an insulting use. Hence the negotiations of Nikolsburg, the “note d'aubergiste” (innkeeper’s bill) claiming the left bank of the Rhine, which was so scornfully rejected; hence the plan for the invasion of Belgium (August 1866), the Luxemburg affair (March 1867), from which M. de Moustier’s diplomacy effected such a skilful retreat; hence the final folly which led this government into the war with Prussia (July 1870).
The war was from the first doomed to disaster. It might perhaps have been averted if France had had any allies. But Austria, a possible ally, could only join France if satisfied as regards Italy; and since Garibaldi had threatened Rome (Mentana, 1867), Napoleon III., yielding to the anger of the Catholics, had again sent troops to Rome. Negotiations had taken place in 1869. The emperor, bound by the Catholics, had refused to withdraw his troops. It was as a distant but inevitable consequence of his agreement of December 1848 with the Catholic party that in 1870 the emperor found himself without an ally.
His energy was now completely exhausted. Successive attacks of stone in the bladder had ruined his physique; while his hesitation and timidity increased with age. The influence of the empress over him became supreme. On leaving the
