November, being followed by the V., IV. and Guard corps during the succeeding fortnight, whilst the VI. and VII. were echeloned to their left, and the VIII. (Mortier) and IX. (Jerome Napoleon) and X. (Lefebvre), all new formations since the outbreak of the war, followed some marches in the rear. Jerome’s corps was composed of the Bavarians, Württembergers and Badensers.
Behind these all Prussia was overrun by newly formed units, (3rd and 4th battalions) raised from depot companies, conscripts for 1807, and old soldiers rejoining after sickness or wounds. Napoleon caused these to be despatched to the front immediately after their formation. He had much territory to occupy, and in the long march of on an average 85 days, he considered that they could be organized, equipped and drilled en route.
23. Pultusk.—The Russians meanwhile had been moving slowly forward in two bodies, one under Bennigsen (50,000), the other under Buxhowden (25,000), and the French being at this time in Warsaw, they took up threatening positions about Pultusk, Plock and Prassnitz. From this triangle they harried the French communications with Berlin, and to secure a winter’s rest for his men Napoleon determined to bring them to action. On the 23rd of December operations were commenced, but the difficulties of securing information and maintaining communication between the respective columns, so unlike what any of the French had previously encountered, led to a very partial success. The idea had been to induce the Russians to concentrate about Pultusk and, turning their position from its left, ultimately to cut them off from Russia, and if possible to surround them. But in this new and difficult country the emperor found it impossible to time his marches. The troops arrived late at their appointed positions, and after a stubborn rearguard action at Pultusk itself and undecisive fighting elsewhere (Soldau-Golymin) the Russians succeeded in retreating beyond the jaws of the French attack, and Napoleon for the first time found that he had exceeded the limit of endurance of his men. Indeed, the rank and file bluntly told him as much as he rode with the marching columns. Yielding to the inevitable, but not forgetting to announce a brilliant victory in a bulletin, he sent his troops into winter quarters along the Passarge and down the Baltic, enjoining on his corps commanders most strictly to do nothing to disturb their adversary.
24. Campaign of Eylau.—Bennigsen, now commanding the whole Russian army which with Lestocq’s Prussians amounted to 100,000, also moved into winter quarters in the triangle Deutsch-Eylau-Osterode-Allenstein, and had every intention of remaining there, for a fresh army was already gathering in Russia, the 1st corps of which had reached Nur about 50 m. distant from the French right.
Unfortunately, Ney with his VI. corps about Gilgenberg had received the most poverty-stricken district in the whole region, and to secure some alleviation for the sufferings of his men he incautiously extended his cantonments till they came in contact with the Russian outposts. Apparently seeing in this movement a recommencement of hostilities, Bennigsen concentrated his troops towards his right and commenced an advance westwards towards Danzig, which was still in Prussian hands. Before his advance both Ney and Bernadotte (the latter, between Ney and the Baltic, covering the siege of Danzig) were compelled to fall back. It then became necessary to disturb the repose of the whole army to counter the enemy’s intentions. The latter by this movement, however, uncovered his own communication with Russia, and the emperor was quick to seize his opportunity. He received the information on the 28th of January. His orders were at once issued and complied with with such celerity that by the 31st he stood prepared to advance with the corps of Soult, Ney, Davout and Augereau, the Guard and the reserve cavalry (80,000 men on a front of 60 m.) from Myszienec through Wollenberg to Gilgenberg; whilst Lannes on his right towards Ostrolenka and Lefebvre (X.) at Thorn covered his outer flanks.
Bernadotte, however, was missing, and this time through no fault of his own. His orders and the despatch conveying Napoleon’s instructions fell into the hands of the Cossacks, and just in time Bennigsen’s eyes were opened. Rapidly renouncing his previous intentions, he issued orders to concentrate on Allenstein; but this point was chosen too far in advance and he was anticipated by Murat and Soult at that place on the 2nd of February. He then determined to unite his forces at Joukendorf, but again he was too late. Soult and Murat attacked his rearguard on the 3rd, and learning from his Cossacks that the French corps were being directed so as to swing round and enclose him, he withdrew by a night march and ultimately succeeded in getting his whole army, with the exception of von Lestocq’s Prussians, together in the strong position along the Alle, the centre of which is marked by Preussisch-Eylau. The opportunity for this concentration he owed to the time gained for him by his rearguard at Joukendorf, for this had stood just long enough to induce the French columns to swing in to surround him, and the next day was thus lost to the emperor as his corps had to extend again to their manœuvring intervals. The truth is that the days were too short and the roads too bad for Napoleon to carry out the full purpose his “general advanced guard” was intended to fulfil. It was designed to hold the enemy in position by the vigour of its attack, thus neutralizing his independent will power and compelling him to expend his reserves in the effort to rescue the troops engaged. But in forests and snowdrifts the French made such slow progress that no sufficient deployment could be made until darkness put a stop to the fighting. Thus, when late on the 7th of February 1807 Murat and Soult overtook the enemy near Eylau (q.v.) the fighting was severe but not prolonged. This time, however, Bennigsen, with over 60,000 men in position and 15,000 Prussians expected to arrive next morning, had no desire to avoid a battle, and deployed for action, his front protected by great batteries of guns, many of them of heavy calibre, numbering some 200 in all.
During the night Augereau and the Guards had arrived, and Ney and Davout were expected on either flank in the forenoon. This time the emperor was determined his enemy should not escape him, and about 8 a.m., ordered Soult and Augereau on the left and right respectively to assail the enemy, Murat and the Guards remaining in the centre as reserve. Napoleon’s own forces thus became the “general advanced guard” for Ney and Davout, who were to close in on either side and deliver the decisive stroke. But here too the weather and the state of the roads operated adversely, for Ney came up too late, while Davout, in the full tide of his victorious advance, was checked by the arrival of Lestocq, whose corps Ney had failed to intercept,
