Hence a prolonged halt arose, utilized by the troops in renewing their equipment and so forth, but ultimately the Young German party, led by Blücher and the principal fighting men of the army, triumphed, and on the 1st of January 1814 the Silesian army (50,000) began its passage of the Rhine at Kaub. They were to be supported by Schwarzenberg with 200,000 men, who was to advance by Basel and Neu Breisach to the south, and Bernadotte with the Northern army, about 120,000, was to move in support on the right flank through the Netherlands and Laon; this force was not yet ready and did not, in fact, reach the latter place till March.
To meet these forces the emperor could not collect 200,000 men in all, of whom upwards of 100,000 were held by Wellington on the Spanish frontier, and 20,000 more were required to watch the debouches from the Alps. Hence less than 80,000 remained available for the east and north-eastern frontier. If, however, he was weak in numbers, he was now again operating in a friendly country, able to find food almost everywhere and practically indifferent as to his communications.
On the 25th of January, Blücher entered Nancy, and, moving rapidly up the valley of the Moselle, was in communication with the Austrian advanced guard near La Rothière on the afternoon of the 28th. Here his headquarters were surprised and he himself nearly captured by a sudden rush of French troops, and he learnt at the same time that the emperor in person was at hand. He accordingly fell back a few miles next morning to a strong position covering the exits from the Bar-sur-Aube defile. There he was joined by the Austrian advance guard and together they decided to accept battle—indeed they had no alternative, as the roads in rear were so choked with traffic that retreat was out of the question. About noon the 2nd of February Napoleon attacked them; but the weather was terrible, and the ground so heavy that his favourite artillery, the mainstay of his whole system of warfare, was useless and in the drifts of snow which at intervals swept across the field, the columns lost their direction and many were severely handled by the Cossacks. At nightfall the fighting ceased and the emperor retired to Lesmont, and thence to Troyes, Marmont being left to observe the enemy.
55. Montmirail.—Owing to the state of the roads, more perhaps to the extraordinary lethargy which always characterized Schwarzenberg’s headquarters, no pursuit was attempted. But on the 4th of February Blücher, chafing at this inaction, obtained the permission of his own sovereign to transfer his line of operations to the valley of the Marne; Pahlen’s corps of Cossacks were assigned to him to cover his left and maintain communication with the Austrians.
Believing himself secure behind this screen, he advanced from Vitry along the roads leading down the valley of the Marne, with his columns widely separated for convenience of subsistence and shelter—the latter being almost essential in the terrible weather prevailing. Blücher himself on the night of the 7th was at Sézanne, on the exposed flank so as to be nearer to his sources of intelligence, and the rest of his army were distributed in four small corps at or near Épernay, Montmirail and Étoges; reinforcements also were on their way to join him and were then about Vitry.
In the night his headquarters were again surprised, and he learnt that Napoleon himself with his main body was in full march to fall on his scattered detachments. At the same time he heard that Pahlen’s Cossacks had been withdrawn forty-eight hours previously, thus completely exposing his flank. He himself retreated towards Étoges endeavouring to rally his scattered detachments, but Napoleon was too quick for him and in three successive days he defeated Sacken at Montmirail, York at Champ Aubert and Blücher and his main body at Étoges, pursuing the latter towards Vertus. These disasters compelled the retreat of the whole Silesian army, and Napoleon, leaving Mortier and Marmont to deal with them, hurried back to Troyes with his main body to strike the flank of Schwarzenberg’s army, which had meanwhile begun its leisurely advance, and again at Mormant on the 17th of February, Montereau the 18th and Méry the 21st, he inflicted such heavy punishment upon his adversaries that they fell back precipitately to Bar-sur-Aube.
56. Laon.—In the meantime Blücher had rallied his scattered forces and was driving Marmont and Mortier before him. Napoleon, as soon as he had disembarrassed himself of Schwarzenberg, counter-marched his main body and moving again by Sézanne, fell upon Blücher’s left and drove him back upon Soissons. This place had been held by a French garrison, but had capitulated only twenty-four hours beforehand, a fact of which Napoleon was naturally unaware. The Silesian army was thus able to escape, and marching northwards combined with Bernadotte at Laon—this reinforcement bringing the forces at Blücher’s disposal up to over 100,000 men.
On the 7th of March Napoleon fell upon the advance guard of this force at Craonne and drove it back upon Laon, where a battle took place on the 9th. Napoleon was here defeated, and with only 30,000 men at his back he was compelled to renounce all ideas of a further offensive, and he retired to rest his troops to Reims. Here he remained unmolested for a few days, for Blücher was struck down by sickness, and in his absence nothing was done. On the 14th of March, however, Schwarzenberg, becoming aware of Napoleon’s withdrawal to Reims, again began his advance and had reached Arcis-sur-Aube when the news of Napoleon’s approach again induced him to retreat to Brienne.
57. The Allies March on Paris.—Thus after six weeks fighting the allies were hardly more advanced than at the beginning. Now, however, they began to realize the weakness of their opponent, and perhaps actuated by the fear that Wellington from Toulouse might, after all, reach Paris first, they determined
