Later experience proved that the practice of fixing the amount to
be spent for a period of years operated to restrict the freedom of
government to make additions, for which the necessity had not
been foreseen when the money was voted. But the act of 1889
did effect an immediate addition to the British fleet, while as was
inevitable it stimulated other powers to increased efforts.
The rivalry between Great Britain and the states composing the Dual Alliance may be said to have lasted till 1904, when the course of the war in the Far East removed Russia from the field. It must be borne in mind that during the latter part of these twenty years Russia was largely influenced by the desire to arm against the growing navy of Japan. Comparisons between the additions to the fleets made on either side, even when supported by a great display of figures, are of uncertain value. Number is no sufficient test of strength when taken apart from quality, distribution, the, command of coaling stations—which are of extreme value to a modern fleet—and other considerations. But the respective lists of battleships supply a rough and ready standard, and when taken with the number of men employed and the size of the budgets (both subject to qualifications to be mentioned) does enable us to see with some approximation to accuracy how far the rivals have attained their desired aims. In 1889, before the passing of the Naval Defence Act, the British navy contained 32 battleships of 262,340 tons. The united French and Russian fleets had 22 of 150,653 tons: of these 17 were French, 7 being vessels of wood plated with iron and therefore of no value when exposed to the fire of modern explosives. This is but one of many examples which might be given of the fallacious character of mere lists of figures. In 1894, when the Naval Defence Act had produced its effect, the comparative figures were: for Great Britain, 46 ironclads (or battleships) of 441,640 tons, and for the Dual Alliance 35 of 270,953—in which, however, the seven wooden vessels were still included. France and Russia had then large schemes of new construction—60,300 tons of ships over 10,000 tons for France, and 78,000 tons for Russia. The British figure was 70,000 tons. But the French and Russian list included mere names of vessels, of which the plans were not then drafted.
The rivalry in building went on as eagerly after 1894 as before. At the beginning of 1904 Great Britain had 67 battleships of 895,370 tons, as against 57 of 635,500 belonging to the powers of the Dual Alliance. The difference in favour of Great Britain was therefore 10 battleships, and 259,870 tons. Vessels not ready for service were included in the list, which therefore includes potential as well as actual strength. The balance in favour of Great Britain was less in 1904 than it had been in 1885 in mere numbers. During this period the naval budget of Great Britain had risen from £12,000,000 in 1885 to £34,457,500 in 1903–1904. The number of men employed had grown from 57,000 to 127,000. The figures for the Dual Alliance cannot be given with equal confidence. France had transferred the troupes de la marine or colonial troops from the navy to the army, which introduced a confusing element into the comparison, and the figures for Russian expenditure are very questionable. The total credit demanded for the French navy in 1890, the year after the passing of the British Naval Defence Act, was frs. 217,147,462. By 1903 the sum had risen to frs. 351,471,524. The Russian figures for 1890 are not attainable, but her budget for 1903 was £11,067,889 sterling. A comparison in numbers of men available is wholly misleading, since the British navy contains a large number of voluntarily enlisted men who serve for many years, and a small voluntary reserve, while France and Russia include all who are liable to be called out for compulsory service during a short period. There is no equality between them and the highly trained men of the British navy. The immense increase in its staff represents an addition to real power to which there is nothing to correspond in the case of continental states.
While this vast growth of naval power was going on in Great Britain, France and Russia, other rivals were entering into the lists with various fortunes. Italy may be said to have been the first comer. Her national navy, formed out of the existing squadrons of Sardinia, Tuscany and Naples, had stood the strain of war in 1866 very ill. The conditions in which the unity of the country had been achieved during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71, together with the obvious need for a navy in the case of a nation with a very extended sea coast, Competition of new navies: Italy. animated the Italians to great and even excessive efforts. Their policy was controlled by the knowledge that they could not hope to rival France in numbers, and they therefore aimed at obtaining individual vessels of a high level of strength. Italy may be said to have set the example of building monster ships, armed with monster guns. But she was unable to maintain her position in the race. The too hopeful finance in which she had indulged in the first enthusiasm of complete political unification led to serious embarrassment in 1894. Her naval budget sank from £4,960,000 in 1891 to £3,776,845 in 1897–1898, and only rose slowly to £5,037,642 in 1905–1906. As a candidate in the race for naval strength she necessarily held a subordinate place, though always to be ranked among the important sea powers. In 1903, when the rivalry of Great Britain and the Dual Alliance was at its height, her strength in battleships was 18, of 226,630 tons. In number, therefore, they did more than cover the balance in favour of Great Britain as against the Dual Alliance, but not in tonnage, in which the difference in favour of Great Britain was 259,870.
The history of the German navy is one of foresight, calculation, consistency and therefore steady growth. The small naval force maintained by Prussia became the navy of the North German Federation after the war of 1866, and the Imperial navy after 1871. Until 1853 it had been wholly dependent on the war office. In that year an admiralty was created Germany. in favour of Prince Albrecht, but this office was abolished in 1861, and the navy was again placed under the war office. The first ministers of the navy under the North German Federation were generals; so was the first imperial minister, General Stosch (1871). Admiral Tirpitz, appointed in 1897, was the first minister who was bred a seaman. His predecessor, General Stosch, had been an excellent organizer and had done much for the efficiency of the service. It has been the rule of the German government, both before and since the foundation of the empire, to advance by carefully framed plans, without adhering to them pedantically when circumstances called for a modification of their lines. As early as 1867 a scheme had been formed for the construction of a navy of 16 ironclads and 50 smaller vessels, at a cost of £5,395,833. It was not sufficiently advanced in execution to allow Germany to make any efforts at sea in the war of 1870–71. In 1872 a supplementary grant of £3,791,666 was made for construction in view of the increased cost of armour and armaments. In 1882 a revised scheme was made which contemplated the construction of 100 vessels, and it was completed in 1888 by another which provided for the construction of 28 vessels, of which 4 should be battleships of the largest size, within the next six years. In 1894 and for some years afterwards the Reichstag showed itself hostile to a heavy expenditure on the navy, and refused many votes asked for by the government. Under the pressure of ambition and of the real needs of a nation with an extensive and growing maritime commerce, the expenditure grew in spite of the opposition of the Reichstag. Between 1874 and 1889 it rose from £1,950,000 to £2,750,000, and was increased in the following year to £3,600,000, from which figure it advanced by 1898 to £5,756,135. Another building scheme was framed in that year, but it was swept aside in 1900, under the combined influence of the exhortations of the emperor William II., and of the anger caused in Germany through the arrest by a British cruiser of a German steamer (the “Bundesrath”) on the coast of Africa on a charge of carrying contraband of war to the Boers. The emperor was now able to obtain the consent of the Reichstag to an extended Naval Defence Act. By the terms of this measure it was proposed to spend £74,000,000 on construction, and £20,000,000 on the dockyards. With this money, by the year 1917 Germany was to be provided with a fleet of 38 battleships, together with a proportionate number of cruisers and other smaller vessels. Rapid progress was made not only with the programme itself but with the equipment of German dockyards
