who had been casually referred to as “the king of Naples”; and he made it the prime object of his policy in the weeks that followed to secure the repudiation by the powers of Murat’s title, and the restoration of the Bourbon king. The powers, indeed, were very ready to accept at least the principle of this policy. “Great Britain,” wrote Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool on the 3rd of September from Geneva, “has no objection, but the reverse, to the restoration of the Bourbons in Naples.”[1] Prussia saw in Murat the protector of the malcontents in Italy.[2] Alexander I. of Russia had no sympathy for any champion of Liberalism in Italy save himself. Austria confessed “sub sigillo” that she shared “His Most Christian Majesty’s views as to the restoration of ancient dynasties.”[3] The main difficulties in the way were Austria’s treaty obligations and the means by which the desired result was to be obtained.
Talleyrand knew well that Austria, in the long run, would break faith with Murat and prefer a docile Bourbon on the throne of Naples to this incalculable child of the Revolution; but he had his private reasons for desiring to “score off” Metternich, the continuance of whose quasidiplomatic liaison with Caroline Murat he rightly suspected. He proposed boldly that, since Austria, in view of the treaty of Jan. 11, 1814, was naturally reluctant to undertake the task, the restored Bourbon king of France should be empowered to restore the Bourbon king of Naples by French arms, thus reviving once more the ancient Habsburg-Bourbon rivalry for dominion in Italy.[4]
Metternich, with characteristic skill, took advantage of this situation at once to checkmate France and to disembarrass Austria of its obligations to Murat. While secretly assuring Louis XVIII., through his confidant Blacas, that Austria was in favour of a Bourbon restoration in Naples, he formally intimated to Talleyrand that a French invasion of Italian soil would mean war with Austria.[5] To Murat, who had appealed to the treaty of 1814, and demanded a passage northward for the troops destined to oppose those of Louis XVIII., he explained that Austria, by her ultimatum to France, had already done all that was necessary, that any movement of the Neapolitan troops outside Naples would be a useless breach of the peace of Italy, and that it would be regarded as an attack on Austria and a rupture of the alliance. Murat’s suspicions of Austrian sincerity were now confirmed;[6] he realized that there was no question now of his obtaining any extension of territory at the expense of the states of the Church, and that in the Italy as reconstructed at Vienna his own position would be intolerable. Thus the very motives which had led him to betray Napoleon now led him to break with Austria. He would secure his throne by proclaiming the cause of united Italy, chasing the Austrians from the peninsula, and establishing himself as a national king.
To contemporary observers in the best position to judge the enterprise seemed by no means hopeless. Lord William Bentinck, the commander of the English forces in Italy, wrote to Castlereagh[7] that, “having seen more of Italy,” he doubted whether the whole force of Austria would be able to expel Murat; “he has said clearly that he will raise the whole of Italy; and there is not a doubt that under the standard of Italian independence the whole of Italy will rally.” This feeling, continued Bentinck, was due to the foolish and illiberal conduct of the restored sovereigns; the inhabitants of the states occupied by the Austrian troops were “discontented to a man”; even in Tuscany “the same feeling and desire” universally prevailed. All the provinces, moreover, were full of unemployed officers and soldiers who, in spite of Murat’s treason, would rally to his standard, especially as he would certainly first put himself into communication with Napoleon in Elba; while, so far as Bentinck could hear of the disposition of the French army, it would be “dangerous to assemble it anywhere or for any purpose.” The urgency of the danger was, then, fully realized by the powers even before Napoleon’s return from Elba; for they were well aware of Murat’s correspondence with him. On the first news of Napoleon’s landing in France, the British government wrote to Wellington[8] that this event together with “the proofs of Murat’s treachery” had removed “all remaining scruples” on their part, and that they were now “prepared to enter into a concert for his removal,” adding that Murat should, in the event of his resigning peaceably, receive “a pension and all consideration.” The rapid triumph of Napoleon, however, altered this tone. “Bonaparte’s successes have altered the situation,” wrote Castlereagh to Wellington on the 24th, adding that Great Britain would enter into a treaty with Murat, if he would give guarantees “by a certain. redistribution of his forces” and the like, and that in spite of Napoleon’s success he would be “true to Europe.” In a private letter enclosed Castlereagh suggested that Murat might send an auxiliary force to France, where “his personal presence would be unseemly.”[9]
Clearly, had King Joachim played his cards well he had the game in his hands. But it was not in his nature to play them well. He should have made the most of the chastened temper of the Allies, either to secure favourable terms from them, or to hold them in play until Napoleon was ready to take the field. But his head had been turned by the flatteries of the “patriots”; he believed that all Italy would rally to his cause, and that alone he would be able to drive the “Germans” over the Alps, and thus, as king of united Italy, be in a position to treat on equal terms with Napoleon, should he prove victorious; and he determined to strike without delay. On the 23rd the news reached Metternich at Vienna that the Neapolitan troops were on the march to the frontier. The Allies at once decided to commission Austria to deal with Murat; in the event of whose defeat, Ferdinand IV. was to be restored to Naples, on promising a general amnesty and giving guarantees for a “reasonable” system of government.[10]
Meanwhile, in Naples itself there were signs enough that Murat’s popularity had disappeared. In Calabria the indiscriminate severity of General Manhés in suppressing brigandage had made the government hated; in the capital the general disaffection had led to rigorous policing, while conscripts had to be dragged in chains to join their regiments.[11] In these circumstances an outburst of national enthusiasm for King Joachim was hardly to be expected; and the campaign in effect proved a complete fiasco. Rome and Bologna were, indeed, occupied without serious opposition; but on the 12th of April Murat’s forces received a check from the advancing Austrians at Ferrara and on the 2nd of May were completely routed at Tolentino. The
- ↑ F.O. Vienna Congress, vii.
- ↑ Mem. of Hardenberg, F.O. Cong. Pruss. Arch. 20. Aug; 14–June 15.
- ↑ Metternich to Bombelles. Jan. 13, 1815, enclosed in Castlereagh to Liverpool of Jan. 25. F.O. Congr. Vienna, xi.
- ↑ Sorel, viii. 411 seq.
- ↑ Cf. a “most secret” communication to be made to M. de Blacas (in Metternich to Bombelles, Vienna, Jan. 13, 1815). Murat’s aggressive attitude and the unrest in Italy are largely due to the threatening attitude of France. . . . H.I.M. is not prepared to risk a rising of Italy under “the national flag.” How will France coerce Naples? By sending an army into Italy across our states, which would thus become infected with revolutionary views? . . . . The emperor could not allow such an expedition. When Italy is settled—and we will not allow Murat to keep the Marches . . . he will lose prestige, and then . . . will be the time for Austria to give effect to the views which, all the time, she shares with His Most Christian Majesty.” (In Castlereagh to Liverpool, “private,” Jan. 25, 1815. Vienna Congr. xi.
- ↑ That they were fully justified is clear from the following extract from a letter of Metternich to Bombelles at Paris (dated Vienna, Jan. 13, 1815). “Whether Joachim or a Bourbon reigns at Naples is for us a very subordinate question. . . . When Europe is established on solid foundations the fate of Joachim will no longer be problematical, but do not let us risk destroying Austria and France and Europe, in order to solve this question at the worst moment it would be put on the tapis. . . . This is no business of the Congress, but let the Bourbon Powers declare that they maintain their claims.” (in Castlereagh’s private letter to Lord Liverpool, Jan. 15, 1815, F.O. Vienna Congr. xi.)
- ↑ Letter dated Florence, Jan. 7, 1815. F.O. Vienna Congr. xi.
- ↑ F.O. Vienna Congr. xii., Draft to Wellington dated March 12.
- ↑ F.O. Vienna Congr. xii.
- ↑ Ibid. Wellington to Castlereagh, Vienna, March 25.
- ↑ F.O. Cong. xi.; Munster to Castlereagh, Naples, Jan. 22.
