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PENINSULAR WAR
91

Wellesley began to land his troops, unopposed, near Figueira da Foz at the mouth of the Mondego, and the Spanish victory of Baylen having relieved Cadiz from danger, Spencer now joined him, and, without waiting for Moore the army, under 15,000 in all (which included some Portuguese)[1] with 18 guns, advanced towards Lisbon.

Campaign in Portugal, 1808.—The first skirmish took place at Obidos on the 15th of August 1808, against Delaborde’s division (5000 men with 5 guns), which fell back to Roleia (Roriça or Roliça). A battle took place here (Aug. 17) in which Sir Arthur Wellesley attacked and drove him from two successive positions The allied loss was about 500: the French 600 and three guns.[1] On the 20th of August the Allies, strengthened by the arrival of two more brigades (4000 men), occupied some heights north of Vimiera (Vimeira or Vimeiro) where the roads branch off to Torres Vedras and Mafra. Wellesley meant to turn the defile of Torres Vedras by Mafra at once if possible; but on this night Sir Harry Burrard, his senior, arrived off Vimiera, and though he did not land, gave instructions to wait for Sir John Moore On the 21st of August the Allies were attacked by Junot at Vimiera, who, leaving a force at Lisbon, had come up to reinforce Delaborde. In this battle the Allies Battle of Vimiera, August 21, 1808. numbered about 18,000 with 18 guns, French nearly 14,000, with 20 guns. Junot, believing the allied left to be weakly held, attacked it without reconnoitring, but Wellesley’s regiments, marched thither behind the heights, sprang up in line; and under their volleys and bayonet charge, supported by artillery fire, Junot’s deep columns were driven off the direct road to Lisbon. The losses were: Allies about 800, French 2000 and 13 guns. It was now again Wellesley’s wish to advance and seize Torres Vedras; but Sir Hew Dalrymple, having at this moment assumed command, decided otherwise On the 2nd of August Junot, knowing of the approach of Moore with reinforcements, and afraid of a revolt in Lisbon, opened negotiations, which resulted in the Convention of Cintra[2] (Aug. 30, 1808), under which the French evacuated Portugal, on condition that they were sent with their artillery and arms to France Thus this campaign had been rapidly brought to a satisfactory conclusion, and Sir Arthur Wellesley had already given proof of his exceptional gifts as a leader. In England however a cry was raised that Junot should have been forced to an absolutely unconditional surrender; and Sir Arthur Wellesley, Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard[3] were brought before a court of inquiry in London. This acquitted them of blame, and Sir John Moore in the meantime after the departure of Dalrymple (Oct. 6, 1808) had assumed command of the allied army in Portugal, now about 32,000 strong.

Moor’s Campaign in Spain 1808–9.—The British government notified to Sir John Moore that some 10,000 men were to be sent to Corunna under Sir David Baird; that he, with 20,000, was to join him, and then both act in concert with the Spanish armies. As the conduct of this campaign was largely influenced by the operations of the Spanish forces, it is necessary to mention their positions, and also the fact that greater reliance had been placed, both in England and Spain, upon them than future events justified. On the 26th of October 1808, when Moore’s troops had left Lisbon to join Baird, the French still held a defensive position behind the Ebro, Bessières being in the basin of Vitoria Marshal Ney north-west of Logroño, and Moncey covering Pampeluna, and near Sanguessa. With the garrisons of Biscay, Navarre, and a reserve at Bayonne, their strength was about 75,000 men. Palafox (20,000) was near Saragossa and observing Sanguessa, Castaños with the victors of Baylen (34,000) west and south of Tudela and near Logroño; Blake (32,000) east of Reynosa, having captured Bilbao, Count de Belvedere (11,000) near Burgos, reserves (57,000) were assembling about Segovia, Talavera and Cordova; Catalonia was held by 23,000, and Madrid had been reoccupied.

Moore had to decide whether to join Baird by sea or land. To do so by sea at this season was to risk delay, while in moving by land he would have the Spanish armies between him and the French. For these reasons he marched by land; and as the roads north of the Tagus were deemed impassable for guns, while transport and supplies for a large force were also difficult to procure, he sent Sir John Hope, with the artillery, cavalry and reserve ammunition column, south of the river, through Badajoz to Almaraz, to move thence through Talavera, Madrid and the Escurial Pass, involving a considerable détour, while he himself with the infantry, marching by successive divisions, took the shorter roads north of the Tagus through Coimbra and Almeida, and also by Alcantara and Coria to Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca. Baird was to move south through Galicia to meet him, and the army was to concentrate at Valladolid, Burgos, or whatever point might seem later on to be best. But as Moore was moving forward, the whole situation in Spain changed. Napoleon’s forces, now increased to some 200,000 men present and more following, were assuming the offensive, and he himself on the 30th of October—had left Paris to place himself at their head. Before them the Spaniards were routed in every direction: Castaños was defeated near Logroño (Oct. 27); Castaños and Palafox at Tudela (Nov. 23); Blake at Zornoza (Oct. 29), Espinosa (Nov. 11) and Reynosa (Nov. 13), and Belvedere at Gamonal, near Burgos (Nov. 10). Thus when Moore reached Salamanca (Nov. 28) Baird was at Astorga; Hope at the Escurial Pass; Napoleon himself at Aranda, and French troops at Valladolid, Arevalo and Segovia; so that the French were nearer than either Baird or Hope to Moore at Salamanca. Moore was ignorant of their exact position and strength, but he knew that Valladolid had been occupied, and so his first orders were that Baird should fall back to Galicia and Hope to Portugal. But these were soon changed, and he now took the important resolution of striking a blow for Spain, and for the defenders of Madrid, by attacking Napoleon’s communications with France. Hope having joined him through Avila, and magazines having been formed at Benavente, Astorga and Lugo, in case of retreat in that direction, he moved forward, and on the 13th of December approached the Douro, at and near Rueda east of Toro. Here he learnt that Madrid had fallen to Napoleon (Dec. 3) after he had by a brilliant charge of the Polish lancers and chasseurs of the Guard forced the Somosierra Pass (Nov. 30) and in another action stormed the Retiro commanding Madrid itself (Dec. 3), that the French were pressing on towards Lisbon and Andalusia, that Napoleon was unaware of his vicinity, and that Soult’s corps, isolated on the Carrion River, had been ordered towards Benavente. He then finally decided to attack Soult (intending subsequently to fall back through Galicia) and ordered up transports from Lisbon to Corunna and Vigo, thus changing his base from Portugal to the north-west of Spain, Blake’s Spanish army, now rallying under the marquis de la Romana near Leon, was to co-operate, but was able to give little effective aid.

On the 20th of December Baird joined Moore near Mayorga, and a brilliant cavalry combat now took place at Sahagun, in which the British hussar brigade distinguished itself. But on the 23rd of December, when Moore was at Sahagun and about to attack Soult, he learnt that overwhelming French forces were hastening towards him, so withdrew across the Esla, near Benevente (Dec. 28), destroying the bridge there. Napoleon, directly he realized Moore’s proximity, had ordered Soult to Astorga to cut him off from Galicia, recalled his other troops from their march towards Lisbon and Andalusia, and, with 50,000 men and 150 guns, had left Madrid himself (Dec. 22). He traversed over 100 m. in less than five days across the snow-covered Escurial Pass, reaching Tordesillas on the Douro on the 26th of December. Hence he wrote to Soult, “If the English

  1. 1.0 1.1 In this account of the war the losses and numbers engaged in different battles are given approximately only, and the former include killed, wounded and missing. Historians differ much on these matters.
  2. It was not, however, signed at Cintra, but at Lisbon, and was mainly negotiated near Torres Vedras.
  3. The two latter were recalled from the Peninsula; Sir Arthur Wellesley had proceeded to London upon leave, and had only signed the armistice with Junot, not the convention itself.