yet in a state for the movement of artillery and wagons, and it was to gain time that he now ventured upon a bold offensive stroke—a night attack upon a strong point in the Federal right called Fort Stedman—the success of which might cause Grant to call in the detachments on his left and so facilitate the proposed movement of the Confederates towards Danville. General Gordon was selected to conduct the operation and his corps was strongly reinforced for the occasion. The opposing lines east of Petersburg were only 150 yds., and the sentries of each side 50 yds. apart. Gordon’s men dashed across the intervening space at 4:30 a.m. on the 25th March, surprised the garrison and occupied Fort Stedman, but when daylight broke and the Federal guns could be brought to bear the fort was found to be untenable. Parke’s corps (IX.) recaptured the work at a cost of 1000 men, and Gordon fell back, leaving nearly 2000 men in the hands of the Federals. The encounter would have proved a more desperate one if reinforcements on both sides had arrived in time, but Gordon had cut the telegraph which connected Fort Stedman with Grant’s headquarters at City Point, and the Confederate train service broke down and delayed the arrival from Richmond of reinforcements for Gordon. Meanwhile, 6 m. westward, Humphreys’ corps (II.) attacked A. P. Hill’s defences and gained some local success, seizing the Confederate picket line between the Weldon railroad and the Boydton Plank road, which was at once occupied and strengthened by the Federals. The Federals lost 2000 men and the Confederates perhaps twice as many on the 25th of March.
At this time Sherman visited Grant at City Point and proposed to move at the end of ten days on Burkesville Junction and so cut off Lee from Danville and Lynchburg, it was while Sherman was preparing for this operation that Grant finished the campaign. Secure behind his formidable entrenchments, Grant had no fear for his base on the James river, and transferred large bodies of troops to his left without Lee’s knowledge. Sheridan was instructed on the 29th of March to gain the enemy’s right and rear, moving by Dinwiddie Court-House and across Hatcher’s Run. But the Confederates were on the alert; A. P. Hill extended his right, and Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry was brought to Sutherland Station. Sheridan had already encountered the cavalry divisions of W. H. F. Lee and Rosser on the south side of Stony Creek. Warren’s corps, moving up the Quaker road, met a force under R. H. Anderson and drove it back to its works on White Oak road. Sheridan got into a flat country of dense forest, tangled undergrowth, streams and swamps, and the soil of clay and sand was impassable for wagons and guns until he had corduroyed the route. On the 29th of March General Lee perceived that the object of Grant was to seize the routes south of the Appomattox river, by which a movement south-west could be made to unite with Johnston’s army, and he endeavoured to cover these roads, including the South Side railway, without losing his hold upon his works about Richmond and Petersburg, but in such a contest it was evident that numbers must prevail.
Sheridan’s cavalry had reached Five Forks on the White Oak road on the 31st of March, and on his right Humphreys and Warren (II. and V.) held the Confederates to their works along Hatcher's Run astride the Boydton Plank road; yet General Lee was able to concentrate his three cavalry divisions, and supported them by Pickett’s five infantry brigades. Sheridan was attacked and driven south as far as Dinwiddie Court-House; but Humphreys and Warren held their ground (action of White Oak Ridge) at a cost of 2000 men. Pickett and the cavalry fell back to Five Forks during the night and hastily entrenched, for he had been ordered by General Lee to defend this position, since the Boydton Plank road could no longer be held, the possession of White Oak road and the South Side railway became necessary for the flank movement which Lee had resolved to attempt. Grant meanwhile had ordered Warren to support Sheridan in an attack on Pickett at daybreak. Sheridan advanced on the 1st of April and at 3 p.m. issued his orders for attack, explaining verbally a diagram he had prepared for the use of divisional commanders. Pickett held a front of 2 m. with a division of cavalry on either flank and Rosser’s cavalry guarding the baggage behind Hatcher’s Run, and when attacked at 4 p.m. he was with Rosser 112 m. in rear. Before Pickett was made aware of a battle being in progress his left was destroyed. General Lee seems to have made no arrangements to support Pickett in this direction. Pickett’s right was defended by W. H. F. Lee against the attack of Custer’s cavalry division. The position was finally carried by Sheridan’s cavalry under Devin dismounting and storming the entrenchments frontally, taking three guns and 100 prisoners. Warren’s corps claimed to have captured a battery and 3244 prisoners. Yet Sheridan was dissatisfied with Warren’s conduct of the battle and deprived him of his command. Pickett’s routed brigades were rallied at the South Side railroad and incorporated with General Anderson’s command. But the Confederates had lost White Oak road, and unless General Lee was capable of a vigorous counterstroke on his extreme right it was evident he must also lose the South Side railroad. Grant, fearing such an enterprise, at once reinforced Sheridan and ordered Humphreys’ corps (II.) to attack in his front if necessary to prevent Lee moving troops westward, but Lee made no effort, and so Sheridan was free to operate farther in the direction of the enemy’s right and rear, while Humphreys held the enemy in his front. Sheridan remained inactive for a few days, and Lee hoped still to gain time for the roads to dry before evacuating his lines and removing his stores and ammunition by wagons towards Lynchburg.
But a crisis was approaching. Sheridan’s success at Five Forks induced Grant to deliver a general assault on the 2nd of April. The Confederate lines were bombarded all night, and on the 2nd of April with Wright’s corps (VI.), Grant attacked the weakest part of Lee’s line and broke through, losing 1100 men in fifteen minutes. A. P. Hill was killed and his corps broke and was cut off from Petersburg. At the same time Parke’s corps (IX.), on the right of the VI., attacked the eastern front near Fort Stedman but was repulsed by General Gordon; then Humphreys’ corps (II.) on the left attacked a Confederate division under General Cook and forced it to retreat to the South Side railroad, where at Sutherland Station a final attack dispersed it. Wright, supported by General Ord (commanding the army of the James), afterwards won the strong redoubts called Fort Whitworth and Fort Gregg, and thus in a day the Confederate right had been destroyed from Five Forks to a point some two or three miles west of the Weldon railroad, 10 m. of works had been abandoned, and if Grant had been able to press his advantage at once the campaign must have ended. But Grant was not aware of the enemy’s plight, and so resolved to wait until the morrow before completing his victory.
Meanwhile Lee perceived that the hour had come at last when Richmond must fall, and at 3 p.m. he had issued orders for the march of the remains of his army to Lynchburg via Amelia Court-House, a march which evidently must partake of the character of a forlorn hope, hastily planned, ill prepared and undertaken by troops whom the disasters and hardships of the past six months had weakened physically and morally. Yet if General Lee had negotiated a peace on the 2nd of April military history would have lost one of the finest examples of the strategic pursuit. Lee’s proposed movement involved the transfer of the army and its baggage 100 m. on bad roads across the front of an enemy, and nothing but mischance could prevent the Federals intercepting Lee’s columns by a shorter route and seizing the South Side railroad, on which supplies
