The more certain writings of Philoponus consist of commentaries on Aristotle. These include works on the Physica, the Prior and the Posterior Analytics, the Meteorologica, the De anima, the De generatione animalium, the De generatione et interitu and the Metaphysica. These have been frequently edited and are interesting in connexion with the adoption of Aristotelianism by the Christian Church. They seem to have embodied the lectures of Ammonius with additions by Philoponus, and are remarkable rather for elaborate care than for originality and insight. He wrote also an attack on Proclus (De aeternitate mundi). Two treatises on mathematics are ascribed to him: A Commentary on the Mathematics of Nicomachus, edited by Hoche (1864 and 1867), and a Treatise on the Use of the Astrolabe, published by Hase. The latter is the most ancient work on this instrument, and its authenticity is rendered almost certain by its reference to Ammonius as the master of the author.
PHILOSOPHY (Gr. φίλος, fond of, and σοφία, wisdom), a
general term whose meaning and scope have varied very considerably
according to the usage of different authors and different
ages. It can best be explained by a survey of the steps by
which philosophy differentiated itself, in the history of Greek
thought, from the idea of knowledge and culture in general.
These steps may be traced in the gradual specification of the
term. The tradition which assigns the first employment of
the Greek word φιλοσοφία to Pythagoras has hardly any claim to
be regarded as authentic; and the somewhat self-conscious
modesty to which Diogenes Laertius attributes the choice of
the designation is, in all probability, a piece of etymology
crystallized into narrative. It is true that, as a matter of fact,
the earliest uses of the word (the verb φιλοσοφεῖν occurs in
Herodotus and Thucydides) imply the idea of the pursuit of
knowledge; but the distinction between the σοφός, or wise man,
and the φιλόσοφος, or lover of wisdom, appears first in the
Platonic writings, and lends itself naturally to the so-called
Socratic irony. The same thought is to be found in Xenophon,
and is doubtless to be attributed to the historical Socrates.
But the word soon lost this special implication. What is of
real interest to us is to trace the progress from the idea of the
philosopher as occupied with any and every department of
knowledge to that which assigns him a special kind of knowledge
as his province.
A specific sense of the word first meets us in Plato, who defines the philosopher as one who apprehends the essence or reality of things in opposition to the man who dwells in appearances and the shows of sense. The philosophers, he says, “are those who are able to grasp the eternal and immutable”; they are “those who set their affections on that which in each case really exists” (Rep. 480). In Plato, however, this distinction is applied chiefly in an ethical and religious direction; and, while it defines philosophy, so far correctly, as the endeavour to express what things are in their ultimate constitution, it is not yet accompanied by a sufficient differentiation of the subsidiary inquiries by which this ultimate question may be approached. Logic, ethics and physics, psychology, theory of knowledge and metaphysics are all fused together by Plato in a semi-religious synthesis. It is not till we come to Aristotle—the encyclopaedist of the ancient world—that we find a demarcation of the different philosophic disciplines corresponding, in the main, to that still current. The earliest philosophers, or “physiologers,” had occupied themselves chiefly with what we may call cosmology; the one question which covers everything for them is that of the underlying substance of the world around them, and they essay to answer this question, so to speak, by simple inspection. In Socrates and Plato, on the other hand, the start is made from a consideration of man’s moral and intellectual activity; but knowledge and action are confused with one another, as in the Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge. To this correspond the Platonic confusion of logic and ethics and the attempt to substitute a theory of concepts for a metaphysic of reality. Aristotle’s methodic intellect led him to separate the different aspects of reality here confounded. He became the founder of logic, psychology, ethics and aesthetics as separate sciences; while he prefixed to all such (comparatively) special inquiries the investigation of the ultimate nature of existence as such, or of those first principles which are common to, and presupposed in, every narrower field of knowledge. For this investigation Aristotle’s most usual name is “first philosophy” or, as a modern might say, “first principles”; but there has since been appropriated to it, apparently by accident, the title “metaphysics.” “Philosophy,” as a term of general application, was not, indeed restricted by Aristotle or his successors to the disciplines just enumerated. Aristotle himself includes under the title, besides mathematics, all his physical inquiries. It was only in the Alexandrian period, as Zeller points out, that the special sciences attained to independent cultivation Nevertheless, as the mass of knowledge accumulated, it naturally came about that the name “-philosophy” ceased to be applied to inquiries concerned with the particulars as such. The details of physics, for example, were abandoned to the scientific specialist, and philosophy restricted itself in this department to the question of the relation of the physical universe to the ultimate ground or author of things. This inquiry which was long called “rational cosmology,” may be said to form part of the general subject of metaphysics, or at all events a pendant to it. By the gradual sifting out of the special sciences philosophy thus came to embrace primarily the inquiries grouped as “metaphysics” or “first philosophy.” These would embrace, according to the Woltiian scheme long current in philosophical textbooks, ontology proper, or the science of being as such, with its three-branch sciences of (rational) psychology, cosmology and (rational or natural) theology, dealing with the three chief forms of being-the soul, the world and God. Subsidiary to metaphysics, as the central inquiry, stand the sciences of logic and ethics, to which may be added aesthetics, constituting three normative sciences sciences, that is, which do not, primarily, describe facts, but rather prescribe ends or set forth ideals. It is evident, however, that lf logic deals with conceptions which may be considered constitutive of knowledge as such, and if ethics deals with the harmonious realization of human life, which is the highest known form of existence, both sciences must have a great deal of weight in the settling of the general question of metaphysics.
In sum, then, we may say that “philosophy” has come to be understood at least in modern times as a general term covering the various disciplines just enumerated. It has frequently tended, however, and still tends, to be used as specially convertible with the narrower term “metaphysics.” This is not unnatural, seeing that it is only so far as they bear on the one central question of the nature of existence that philosophy spreads its mantle over psychology, logic or ethics. The particular organic conditions of perception and the associative laws to which the mind, as a part of nature, is subjected, are facts in themselves indifferent to the philosopher; and therefore the development of psychology into an independent science, which took place during the latter half of the 19th century and may now be said to be complete, represents an entirely natural evolution. Similarly, logic, so far as it is an art of thought or a doctrine of fallacies, and ethics, so far as it is occupied with a natural history of impulses and moral sentiments, do neither of them belong, except by courtesy, to the philosophic province. But, although this is so, it is perhaps hardly desirable to deprive ourselves of the use of two terms instead of one. It will not be easy to infuse into so abstract and bloodless a term as “metaphysics” the fuller life (and especially the inclusion of ethical considerations) suggested by the more concrete term “philosophy.”
We shall first of all, then, attempt to differentiate philosophy from the special sciences, and afterwards proceed to take up one by one what have been called the philosophical sciences, with the view of showing how far the usual subject-matter of each is really philosophical in its bearing, and how far it belongs rather to the domain of “science” strictly so called. The order in which, for clearness of exposition, it will be most convenient to consider these disciplines will be psychology, epistemology or theory of knowledge, and metaphysics, then logic, aesthetics and ethics. Finally, the connexion of the last-mentioned with politics (or, to speak more modernly, with jurisprudence and sociology), with the philosophy of history and the philosophy of religion, will call for a few words on the relation of these sciences to general philosophy.
