behind the subject's representation of it. Hence come the different varieties of a so-called phenomenal ism. The upholders of such a theory would, in general, deride the term ' metaphysics ” or “ ontology ”; but it is evident, none the less, that their position itself imphes a certain theory of the universe and of our own place in it, and the establishment of this theory constitutes their metaphysics.
Without prejudice, then, to the claim of epistemology to constitute the central philosophic discipline, we may simply note its liability to be pressed too far. The exclusive preoccupation of men's minds with the question of knowledge during the neo-Kantian revival in the 'seventies of the last century drew from Lotze the caustic criticism that “ the continual sharpening of the knife becomes tiresome, if after all, we have nothing to cut with it.” Stillingfleet's complaint against Locke was that he was “one of the gentlemen of this new way of reasoning that have almost discarded substance out of the reasonable part of the world ” The same may be said with greater truth of the devotees of the theory of knowledge; they seem to have no need of so old-fashioned a commodity as reality. Yet, after all, Fichte's dictum holds good that knowledge as knowledge- e so long as it is looked at as knowledge-is, ipso facto, not reality. The result of the foregoing, however, is to show that, as soon as epistemology draws its conclusion, it becomes metaphysics, the theory of knowledge passes into a theory of being. The ontological conclusion, moreover, is not to be regarded as something added by an external process; it is an immediate implication The meta physic is the epistemology from another point of view-regarded as completing itself, and explaining in the course of its exposition that relative or practical separation of the individual knower from the knowable world, which it is a sheer assumption to take as absolute. This, not the so-called assumption of the implicit unity of being and thought, is the really unwarrantable postulate; for it is an assumption which we are obliged to retract bit by bit, while the other offers the whole doctrine of knowledge as its voucher.
Logic, Aesthetics and Ethics.-If the theory of knowledge thus passes insensibly into metaphysics it becomes somewhat difficult to assign a distinct sphere to logic (q.'v.). Ueberweg's definition of it as “ the science of the regulative laws of thought ” (or “ the normative science of thought ”) comes near enough to the traditional sense to enable us to compare profitably the usual subject-matter of the science with the definition and end of philosophy. The introduction of the term “regulative” or “ normative ” is intended to differentiate the science from psychology as the science of mental processes or events. In this reference logic does not tell us how our intellect ions connect themselves as mental phenomena, but how we ought to connect our thoughts if they are to realize truth (either as consistency with what we thought before or as agreement with observed facts) Logic, therefore, agrees with epistemology (and differs from psychology) in treating thought not as mental fact but as knowledge, as idea, as having meaning in relation to an objective world. To this extent it must inevitably form a part of the theory of knowledge. But, if we desire to keep by older landmarks and maintain a distinction between the two disciplines, a ground for doing so may be found in the fact that all the main definitions of logic point to the investigation of the laws of thought in a subjective reference-with a view, that is, by an analysis of the operation, to ensure its more correct performance. According to the old phrase, logic is the art of correct thinking. Moreover we commonly ind the logician assuming that the process of thought has advanced a certain length before his examination of it begins; he takes his material full»formed from perception, without, as a rule, inquiring into the nature of the conceptions which are involved in our perceptive experience. Occupying a position, therefore, within the wider sphere of the general theory of knowledge, ordinary logic consists in an analysis of the nature of general statement, and of the conditions under which we pass validly from one general statement to another. But the logic of the schools is eked out by contributions from a variety of sources (e g from grammar on one side and from psychology on another), and cannot claim the unity of an independent science.
Aesthetics (q.1/.) may be treated as a department of psychology or physiology, and in England this is the mode of treatment that has been most general. To what peculiar excitation of our bodily or mental organism, it is asked, are the emotions due which make us declare an object beautiful or sublime? And, the question being put in this form, the attempt has been made in some cases to explain away any peculiarity in the emotions by analysing them into simpler elements, such as primitive organic pleasures and prolonged associations of usefuhiess or fitness. But, just as psychology in general cannot do duty for a theory of knowledge, so it holds true of this particular application reference of these emotions to the
of psychology that a mere
mechanism and interactive play of our faculties cannot be regarded as an account of the nature of the beautiful. Perhaps by talking of “ emotions ” we
colour to the investigation;
tend to give an unduly subjective
it would be better to speak of the
perception of the beautiful. Pleasure in itself is unqualified, and affords no differentia. In the case of a beautiful object the resultant pleasure borrows its specific quality from the presence of determinations essentially objective in their nature, though not reducible to the categories of science. Unless, indeed, we conceive our faculties to be constructed on some arbitrary plan which puts them out of relation to the facts with which they have to deal, we have a prima facie right to treat beauty as an objective determination of things. The question of aesthetics would then be formulated-What is it in things that makes them beautiful, and what is the relation of this aspect of the universe to its ultimate nature, as that is expounded in metaphysics? The answer constitutes the substance of aesthetics, considered as a branch of philosophy. But it is not given simply in abstract terms: the philosophical treatment of aesthetics includes also an exposition of the concrete phases of art, as these have appeared in the history of the world, relating themselves to different phases of human culture.
Of ethics (q.'v.) it may also be said that many of the topics commonly embraced under that title are not strictly philosophical in their nature. They are subjects for a scientific psychology employing the historical method with the conceptions of heredity and development, and calling to its aid, as such a psychology will do, the investigations of all the sociological sciences. To such a psychology must be relegated all questions as to the origin and development of moral ideas. Similarly, the question debated at such length by English moralists as to the nature of the moral faculty (moral sense, conscience, &c.) and the controversy concerning the freedom of the will belong entirely to psychology. If we exclude such questions in the interest of systematic correctness, and seek to determine for ethics a definite subject-matter, the science may be said to fall into two departments. The first of these deals udth the notion of duty, and endeavours to dehne the good or the ultimate end of action; the second lays out the scheme of concrete duties which are deducible from, or which, at least, are covered by, this abstractly stated principle. The second of these departments is really the proper subject-matter of ethics considered as a separate science; but it is often conspicuous by its absence from ethical treatises. However moralists may differ on first principles, there seems to be remarkably little practical divergence when they come to lay down the particular laws of morality. It may be added that, where a systematic account of duties is actually given, the connexion of the particular duties with the universal formula is in general more formal than real. It is only under the head of casuistry (q.v.) that ethics has been much cultivated as a separate science. The irst department of ethics, on the other hand, is the branch of the subject in virtue of which ethics forms part of philosophy. As described above, it ought rather to be called, in Ka.nt's phrase, the meta physic of ethics. A theory of obligation is ultimately found to be inseparable from a meta physic of personality. The connexion of ethics with metaphysics will be patent as a matter of fact, if it be remembered how Plato's philosophy is summed up in the idea of the good, and how
