on the 23rd of June an unexpected sortie of the Russian Port Arthur squadron paralysed the Japanese land offensive. In the squadron were seen the battleships damaged in the February attacks, and the balance of force was now against Togo, who had lost the “Yashima” and the “Hatsuse.” The squadron nevertheless tamely returned to harbour, Togo resumed the blockade and Nogi began his advance from Nanshan, but the 2nd and 4th Armies came to a standstill at once (naval escort for their sea-borne supplies being no longer available), and the 1st Army, whose turn to advance had just arrived, only pushed ahead a few miles to cover a larger supply area. On the 1st of July the Vladivostok squadron appeared in the Tsushima Straits, and then vanished to an unknown destination, and whether this intensified the anxiety of the Japanese or not, it is the fact that the 2nd Army halted for eleven days at Kaiping, bringing the next on its right, 4th Army, to a standstill likewise. Its next advance brought it to the fortified position of Tashichiao, where Kuropatkin had, by drawing heavily upon his central reserve and even on the Eastern Detachment, massed about two army corps.
On the 24th Oku attacked, but the Russian general, Zarubayev, handled his troops very skilfully, and the Japanese were repulsed Tashichiao. with a loss of 1200 men. Zarubayev who had used only about half his forces in the battle, nevertheless retired in the night, fearing to be cut off by a descent of the approaching 4th Army on Haicheng, and well content to have broken the spell of defeat. Oku renewed the attack next day, but found only a rearguard in front of him, and without following up the retiring Russians he again halted for six days before proceeding to Haicheng to effect a junction with the 4th Army (Nozu), which meantime had won a number of minor actions and forced the passage of the mountains at Fenshuiling South.[1]
The 1st Army, after its long halt at Feng-hwang-cheng, which was employed in minutely organizing the supply service—a task of exceptional difficulty in these roadless mountains—reopened the campaign on the 24th of June, but only tentatively on account of the discouraging news from Port Arthur. A tremendous rainstorm imposed further delays, for the coolies and the native transport that had been laboriously collected scattered in all directions. The Motienling pass, however, had been seized without difficulty, and Keller's power of counterattack had been reduced to nothing by the despatch of most of his forces to the concentration at Tashichiao. But Oku's 2nd Army was now at a standstill at Kaiping, and until he was further advanced the 1st Army could not press forward. The captured passes were therefore fortified (as Feng-hwang-cheng had been) for passive resistance. This, and the movements of the 4th Army, which had set its face towards Haicheng and no longer seemed to be part of a threat on Liao-Yang, led to the idea being entertained at Kuropatkin's headquarters that the centre of gravity was shifting to the south. To clear up the situation Keller's force was augmented and ordered to attack Kuroki. It was repulsed with a loss of nearly 1000 men in the action at the Motienling (17th July), but it was at least ascertained that considerable forces were still on the Japanese right, Actions on the eastern front. and upon the arrival of a fresh army corps from Europe Kuropatkin announced his intention of attacking Kuroki. And in effect he succeeded in concentrating the equivalent of an army corps, in addition to Keller's force, opposite to Kuroki's right. But having secured this advantage he stood still for five days, and Kuroki had ample time to make his arrangements. The Japanese general occupied some 20 m. of front in two halves, separated by 6 m. of impassable mountain, and knowing well the danger of a “cordon” defensive, he met the crisis in another and a bolder fashion. Calling in the brigade detached to the assistance of Nozu as well as all other available fractions of his scattered army, he himself attacked on the 31st of July, all along the line. It was little more than an assertion of his will to conquer, but it was effectual. On his left wing the attacks of the Guard and 2nd divisions (action of Yang-tzu-ling) on the Russian front and flank failed: the frontal attack because of the resolute defence, the flank attack from sheer fatigue of the troops. Count Keller was killed in the defence. Meantime on the Japanese right the 12th division attacked the large bodies of troops that Kuropatkin had massed (Yu-shu-ling) equally in vain. But one marked success was achieved by the Japanese. The Russian 35th and 36th regiments (10th European Corps) were caught between two advancing columns, and, thanks to the initiative of one of the column leaders, Okasaki, destroyed. At night, discouraged on each wing by the fall of Count Keller and the fate of the 35th and 36th, the whole Russian force retired on Anping, with a loss of 2400, to the Japanese 1000 men.
This was the only manifestation of the offensive spirit on Kuropatkin's part during the six months of marking time. It was for defence, sometimes partial and elastic, sometimes rigid and “at-all-costs,” that he had made his dispositions throughout. His policy now was to retire on Liao-Yang as slowly as possible and to defend himself in a series of concentric Russian retirement on Liao-Yang. prepared positions. In his orders for the battle around his stronghold there is no word of counter-attack, and his central mass, the special weapon of the commander-in-chief, he gave over to Bilderling and to Zarubayev to strengthen the defence in their respective sections or posted for the protection of his line of retreat. Nevertheless he had every intention, of delivering a heavy and decisive counter stroke when the right moment should come, and meantime his defensive tactics would certainly have full play on this prearranged battlefield with its elaborate redoubts, bomb proofs and obstacles, and its garrison of a strength obviously equal (and in reality superior) to that of the assailants.
The Japanese, too, had effected their object, and as they converged on their objective, the inner flanks of the three armies had connected and the supreme commander Marshal Oyama had taken command of the whole. But, as the event was to prove, the military policy of Japan had failed to produce the requisite number of men for the desired Sedan, and so, instead of boldly pushing out the 1st Army to such a distance that it could manœuvre, as Moltke did in 1866 and 1870, he attached it to the general line of battle. It was not in two or three powerful groups but in one long chain of seven deployed divisions that the advance was made.
On the 25th of August the 2nd and 4th Armies from Haicheng and the 1st Army from the Yin-tsu-ling and Yu-shu-ling began the last stage of their convergent advance. The Russian first position extended in a semicircle from Anshantien (on the Liao-Yang-Hai-cheng railway) into the hills at Anping, and thence to the Taitse river above Liao-Yang; both sides had mixed detachments farther out on the flanks. The first step in the Japanese plan was the advance of Kuroki's army to Anping. Battle of Liao-Yang. Throughout the 25th, night of 25th-26th, and 26th of August, Kuroki advanced, fighting heavily all along the line, until on the night of the 26th the defenders gave up the contested ground at Anping. Hitherto there had only been skirmishing on a large, scale on the side of Hai-cheng. Kuropatkin having already drawn in his line of defence on the south side towards Liao-Yang, the 2nd and 4th Japanese Armies delivered what was practically a blow in the air. But on the 27th there was a marked change in the Japanese plan. The right of the 1st Army, when about to continue the advance west on Liao-Yang, was diverted northward by Oyama's orders and ordered to prepare to cross the Taitszeho. The retirement of the Russian Southern Force into its entrenchments emboldened the Japanese commander in-chief to imitate Moltke's method to the full. On the 28th, however, the 1st Army made scarcely any progress. The right (12th) division reached the upper Taitszeho, but the divisions that were to come up on its left were held fast by their
- ↑ The 5th division of the 2nd Army had been sent to join the 10th as the latter approached Hsimucheng. The Guard brigade of Kuroki's army which had served with Nozu in the advance had now returned to Feng-hwang-cheng.
