men had been killed and wounded in three weeks. The Russians
strengthened their works around the captured forts in such a way as
effectually to prevent farther advance, and the Japanese 3rd Army
had now to resign itself to a methodical siege. Small sorties,
partial attacks[1] and duels between the Japanese guns and the
Attacks on the north front.
generally more powerful ordnance of the fortress continued.
The siege approaches were first directed against the
Temple-Waterworks group, which was stormed on the 19th and
20th of September. Pan-Lung was connected with the
Japanese lines by covered ways, approaches were begun
towards several of the eastern forts, and on the 20th of September
180-Metre Hill was stormed, though the crest was untenable under
the fire from 203-Metre Hill. The Japanese were now beginning
to pay more attention to the western side of the fortress, and from
the 19th to the 22nd there was hard fighting around 203-Metre Hill,
the attack being eventually repulsed with the loss of 2000 men.
Operations in the west were thereupon abandoned for the time being,
and the eastern forts remained the principal objective of the attack.
Heavier howitzers had been sent for from Japan, and on the 1st of
October the first batteries of 28 centimetre (11 in.) howitzers came
into action. They fired a shell weighing 485 ℔ with a bursting
charge of 17 ℔. On the 12th, the Japanese took the trenches
between the Waterworks Redoubt and Erh-Lung, and cut the water-supply.
Saps were then pushed on against Erh-Lung, and to help in
their progress a Russian advanced work called “G” was captured
on the 16th, by a skilfully combined attack of infantry and artillery.
From this time forward there was a desperate struggle at the sapheads
on the north front.[2]
|
| Emery Walker sc. |
On the 26th of October another assault was made on Chi-Kuan Fort and Battery, and was continued at intervals, varied by Russian counter-attacks, till the 2nd of November. By this time the Japanese were becoming disheartened. They had incurred an additional loss of 13,000 men without substantial gain, except a lodgment on the counter scarp of Sung-Shu. This prepared the way for mining, which had already been begun at Erh-Lung. On the 17th of November seven mines were exploded at Sung-Shu, which b ew in the back of the counterscarp galleries. At Erh-Lung on the 20th of November three mines were exploded, which half filled the ditch, and the Japanese later on sapped across to the escarp over the débris. At Chi-Kuan, the counterscarp gallery had been breached by an ill-managed Russian mine on the 23rd of October and the Japanese got in through the breach and made a lodgment. They did not, however, get possession of the whole of the counterscarp galleries before about the middle of November. On the 22nd of November the Japanese assaulted the trench round Chi-Kuan battery. It was captured and retaken by counter-attack twice between 6 p.m. and 1 a.m. In this fight each side was using corpses as breastworks.
On the 26th of November another assault was made on the same lines as that of the 30th of October. By this time the besiegers were sapping under the escarps of the northern forts, and it would have been better to delay. But the situation was serious in the extreme. In Manchuria Kuropatkin's army had reasserted itself. From Europe Rozhestvenski's squadron was just setting sail for the Far East. Marshal Oyama sent his principal staff officers to stimulate Nogi to fresh efforts, and some exhausted units of the besieging army were replaced by fresh troops from Japan. With 100,000 men and this urgent need of immediate victory, Nogi and the marshal's staff officers felt bound to make a third general assault. The siege works had indeed made considerable progress. The ditches of Sung-Shu and Erh-Lung were partially filled. They held most of the ditch of Chi-Kuan Fort and were cutting down the escarp, and two parallels had been made only 30 yds. from the Chinese Wall at “G” and Pan-Lung.
The general attack was made at 1 p.m. At Sung-Shu the stormers got into the fort, but suffered much from the artillery on the western side of the Lun-ho valley, and were beaten out of it again in 20 minutes; 2000 men tried in vain to get up the Lun-ho valley to take Sung-Shu in rear. At Erh-Lung they could not get over the outer parapet. At “G” they took a portion of the Chinese Wall and lost
- ↑ A particular feature of these constant night-fights was the effective use of the defenders' searchlight, not only to show up the enemy but to blind him.
- ↑ Hand grenades and extemporized trench mortars were used on both sides with very great effect. The Japanese hand grenades consisted of about 1 ℔ of high explosive in a tin case; the Russian cases were of all sorts, including old Chinese shell. The Japanese employed wire-netting screens to stop the Russian grenades. Various means were tried for the destruction of entanglements. Eventually it was found that the best plan was to sap through them.
