Guards Corps had all reached Plevna by Oct. 20th, and two divisions were at once placed under Gurko's orders, raising his command to 35,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry and 48 guns. His instructions were to capture the Turkish positions along the Sofia road. He compelled the garrison of Dolni-Dubnik to retire into Plevna, and captured Gorni Dubnik and Telis with their garrisons after severe fighting on Oct. 24th and 28th. Osman's force was thereby reduced by 12 battalions. About the middle of November the opposing forces were distributed as follows: 6 divisions along the Lom, under the Cesarevich, facing Suleiman's army; 3 divisions holding the Shipka under Radetzky; 1 division at Lovcha; 2½ divisions west of the Vid under Gurko; and 12 divisions east of the Vid, investing Plevna. The XIV. Corps was in the Dobrudja, the VII. Corps about Odessa and the X. Corps in the Crimea.
On the Turkish side Suleiman advanced across the Lom, leaving small garrisons in the fortresses, and attacked at Mechka Turkish movements. on Nov. 19th, and at Mechka and Tristenik on Nov. 26th, and again on Dec. 12th, but each time without success, and he retired across the Lom. South of the Balkans Vessil Pasha had succeeded Reouf Pasha on the Shipka. He continued to contain the three Russian divisions there, but made no attempt to dislodge them, beyond small offensive demonstrations made with the object of concealing the departure of large drafts which were sent to Sofia.
At Sofia and Orkhanie, the Turks were forming an army of recruits and reservists with the object of advancing to the relief of Osman. Mehemet Ali was entrusted with the command. Osman had already asked the sultan's permission to evacuate Plevna, with a view to co-operating with Mehemet Ali, but permission was refused. It was not till the investment was completed that the sultan changed his mind, too late, and gave his sanction to the move. The Russians received information of Mehemet Ali's intended advance, and as the force round Plevna amounted to 191 battalions, 120 squadrons and 650 guns, it was decided that Gurko should move with his detachment towards Sofia. He concentrated his force at Yablonitza on Nov. 5th and succeeded in driving the Turkish advanced guard from Orkhanie. Mehemet Ali now occupied a strong position covering the Arabi Konak Pass over the Balkans, and, with a force of 43 battalions with cavalry and guns, made no attempt to relieve Osman.
Osman Pasha, his supplies having given out, eventually decided on a sortie. His troops had been short of food since 3rd Period.—Passage of the Balkans and advance to Constantinople. the beginning of November, and the number of sick had risen to 10,000. His plan was to break through to the west and make for Sofia via Berkovitz. The Russians observed the preparations made and concentrated sufficient force at the threatened point, with the result that Osman and his army of 40,000 men capitulated. The Turkish losses in the action were about 6000 and the Russians lost about 1500. The Russians now decided, notwithstanding the difficulties due to the winter season, to push on across the Balkans. The VII. and X. Corps were still left guarding the Russian coasts. The Cesarevich was left north of the Balkans with 71,000 men to guard the communications. Gurko's force was raised to 80,000. Leaving a containing force to oppose the Turks at the Arabi Konak Pass positions, he crossed by the Curiak Pass. The Turks retired unobserved, and after a feeble stand at Tashkosen retreated to Kustendil. Gurko occupied Sofia on Jan. 4th. Radetzky's force at the Shipka was raised to 66,000, with which force, having defeated Vessil Pasha, he was to join Gurko south of the Balkans. Radetzky commenced operations on Jan. 5th. Keeping one division to hold the works on the Shipka, he moved the remainder of the force in two columns under Skobelev and Prince Mirski, who were to cross one on each side and attack simultaneously from the south. Vessil Pasha held an entrenched camp at Shenovo with some 12,000 men; the remainder of his force was in position on the mountains. Owing to the difficulties of the crossing, Skobelev was delayed; Mirski attacked on Jan. 8th and was repulsed. The following day Skobelev and Mirski attacking together were successful, and Vessil Pasha capitulated with his force, some 36,000, of whom 6000 were sick and wounded. Vessil Pasha had pointed out the danger of his position on Jan. 7th, but, contrary to Suleiman's advice, the war minister, believing an armistice imminent, had ordered him to hold on to the Shipka Pass. Mehemet Ali's force, dangerously delayed owing to interference by the minister of war, eventually reached Tatar-Bazardjik, which was selected by Suleiman (now commander-in-chief) for the concentration of his forces. Having received news of the capture of the Shipka force he retired on Philippopolis, with Gurko's forces closely pursuing. But Radetzky's forces had already pushed on and practically cut Suleiman off from Adrianople. After some engagements about Philippopolis on Jan. 15th, 16th and 17th, he retreated towards the Aegean Sea through the Rhodope mountains, having lost most of his guns, and reached Enos about Jan. 28th, whence what remained of his force was conveyed by water to Constantinople.
Suleiman had again missed his opportunity. The Russians crossed the Balkans in a wide front of about 18O miles, and there was opportunity for successful action by a capable commander. There were not only the columns commanded by Gurko and Radetzky, but also a third column under General Kartzoff, which crossed by the Trojan Pass, after which it joined Gurko's force. There were the troops under Mehemet Ali about Sofia, Vessil Pasha's force about the Shipka, and the main army on the Lom, which had been withdrawn south of the Balkans after the fall of Plevna, so that Suleiman, who had been appointed c0mmander-in-chief, had an available force of 130 battalions, 120 guns and a proportion of cavalry. The fortified town of Adrianople offered a strong central position at which to concentrate his forces, and with this point as support, acting on interior lines, he could have dealt with the invading and widely separated columns in detail. But he missed his opportunity and left his scattered forces to be overwhelmed by superior numbers in each instance. The minister for war was undoubtedly responsible to a great extent for this faulty strategy, but the blame falls on the head of Suleiman as commander-in-chief. There was no object in leaving Vessil Pasha on the Shipka. All available forces should have been concentrated in a sound strategical situation.
The Servians had crossed the frontier after the fall of Plevna, and the Montenegrins were also pressing on. On Jan. 16th the Russians occupied Adrianople, and on Jan. 30th they were facing the Buyuk Tchemedji lines, with their flanks resting on the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmora. Mehemet Ali was in command of what remained of the Turkish armies behind the lines. On Jan. 31st an armistice was arranged, and on March 3rd the treaty of San Stefano was signed, the terms of which were modified later at the Berlin Conference in June and July 1878.
The Russo-Turkish War proved once for all the great value of improvised fortifications, in other words, of spade work in warfare, and the advantages of field works as regards invisibility against artillery fire. It was not only at Plevna that field entrenchments were made use of. Notable instances were the defence of Lovcha by the small Turkish garrison of 8 battalions with one battery, which from their entrenchments kept Skobelev with over 20,000 men and 90 guns at bay for three days, inflicting on him a loss of over 1500 men. Again, at Gorni Dubnik on Oct. 24th, 3500 Turks with 4 guns held their works throughout the day against 20,000 Russians with 60 guns, inflicting a loss on them of over 3300, and eventually were forced to surrender by a surprise attack under cover of darkness, when their ammunition had run short, and their numbers had been reduced by 1500 casualties. In the attack the success of Skobelev stands out, and we find that he had realized the necessity of intrenching the ground he had gained.
The war was brought to a conclusion, but the Turks had not been beaten in battle. With the exception of the fighting round Plevna and the rout of Suleiman's army at Philippopolis
