Gibraltar was made in 1733, and a serious war was only averted
by the resolute peace policy of Sir Robert Walpole. But in
1739 trade difficulties, which had arisen out of the Asiento in
America, led to a great war with England, which became merged
in the War of the Austrian Succession (q.v.). The king, who had
become almost entirely mad at the end of his life, died on the
9th of July 1746. His successor, Ferdinand VI., the second son
of his first marriage, whose reign lasted till the 10th of August
Ferdinand VI.,
1746–1759.
1759, was a retiring and modest man, who adopted
a policy of peace with England. His ministers, of
whom the most notable were Zenon de Somadevila,
marquis of Ensenada, and Richard Wall, an Irish Jacobite,
carried on the work of financial and administrative reform.
The advance of the country in material prosperity was considerable.
Foreign influences in thought and literature began to
modify the opinions of Spaniards profoundly. The party known
as the Rcgalistas, the lawyers who wished to vindicate the
regalities, or rights of the Crown, against the encroachments of
the pope and the Inquisition, gained the upper hand.
The new sovereign was one of the most sincere, and the most
successful, of the “enlightened despots” of the 18th century.
He had had a long apprenticeship in Naples, and was
a man of forty-three when he came to Spain in 1759.
Until his death on the 14th of December 1788 he was
Charles III.,
1759–1788.
engaged in internal politics, in endeavouring to advance the
material prosperity of Spain. His foreign policy was less wise.
He had a deep dislike of England, and a strong desire to recover
Minorca and Gibraltar, which she held. He had also a strong
family feeling, which induced him to enter into the “Family Compact”
with his French cousins. He made war on England in 1761,
with disastrous results to Spain, which for the time lost both
Havana and Manila. In 1770 he came to the verge of war
with England over the Falkland Islands. In 1778 he joined
France in supporting the insurgent English colonists in America.
The most statesmanlike of his foreign enterprises, the attempt
to take the piratical city of Algiers in 1775 (see Barbary Pirates),
was made with insufficient forces, was ill executed,
and ended in defeat. Yet he was able to recover Minorca and
Florida in the War of American Independence, and he finally
extorted a treaty with Algiers which put a stop to piratical raids
on the Spanish coast. The worst result for Spain of his
foreign policy was that the example set by the United States
excited a desire for independence in the Spanish colonies, and
was the direct incitement to the rebellions at the beginning of
the 19th century. The king’s domestic policy, on the contrary,
was almost wholly fruitful of good. Under his direction many
useful public works were carried out—roads, bridges and large
schemes of drainage. The first reforms undertaken had provoked
a disturbance in Madrid directed against the king’s favourite
minister, the Sicilian marquis of Squillacci. Charles, who
believed that the Jesuits had promoted the outbreak, and also
that they had organized a murder plot against him, allowed his
minister Aranda (q.v.), the correspondent of Voltaire, to expel the
order in 1766, and he exerted his whole influence to secure its
entire suppression. The new spirit was otherwise shown by the
restrictions imposed on the numbers of the religious orders and
on the Inquisition, which was reduced to practical subjection
to the lay courts of law. Many of the king’s industrial enterprises,
such as the Bavarian colony, established by him on the
southern slope of the Sierra Morena, passed away without leaving
much trace. On the other hand the shipping and the industry
of Spain increased greatly. The population made a considerable
advance, and the dense cloud of sloth and ignorance which
had settled on the country in the 17th century was lifted. In
this work Charles III. was assisted, in addition to Squillacci
and Aranda, by Campomanes (q.v.), who succeeded Aranda as
minister of finance in 1787, and by Floridablanca (q.v.), who
ruled the country in the spirit of enlightened bureaucracy.
Charles III. was succeeded in 1788 by his son Charles IV. The father, though “enlightened,” had been a thorough despot; the son was sluggish and stupid to the verge of imbecility, but the despotism remained. The new king was much under the influence of his wife, Maria Louisa of Parma, a coarse, passionate and narrow-minded woman; but he continued to repose confidence in his father’s ministers. Floridablanca was, however, unable to continue his earlier policy, in view of the contemporaneous outbreak of the Revolution in France. The revival of Spain depended on the restoration of her colonial and naval ascendancy at the expense of Great Britain, and for this the support of France was needed. But the “Family Compact,” on which the French alliance depended, ceased to exist when Louis XVI. was deprived of power by his subjects. Of this conclusive evidence was given in 1791. Some English merchants had violated the shadowy claim of Spain to the whole west coast of America by founding a settlement at Nootka Sound. The Spanish government lodged a vigorous protest, but the French National Assembly refused to lend any assistance, and Floridablanca was forced to conclude a humiliating treaty and give up all hope of opposing the progress of Great Britain. This failure was attributed by the minister to the Revolution, Spain and the French Revolution. of which he became the uncompromising opponent, The reforms of Charles III.’s reign were abandoned and all liberal tendencies in Spain were suppressed. But Floridablanca was not content with suppressing liberalism in Spain; he was eager to avenge his disappointment by crushing the Revolution in France. He opened negotiations with the émigrés, urged the European powers to a crusade on behalf of legitimacy, and paraded the devotion of Charles IV. to the head of his family. This bellicose policy, however, brought him into collision with the queen, who feared that the outbreak of war would diminish the revenues which she squandered in self-indulgence. She had already removed from the ministry Campomanes and other supporters of Floridablanca, arid had compelled the latter to restrict himself to the single department of foreign affairs. Early in 1792 she completed her task by inducing Charles IV. to banish Floridablanca to Murcia, and his place was entrusted to the veteran Aranda, who speedily found that he held office only by favour of the queen, and that this had to be purchased by a disgraceful servility to her paramour, Emanuel Godoy. Spain withdrew from the projected coalition against France, and sought to maintain an attitude of neutrality, which alienated the other powers, while it failed to conciliate the Republic. The repressive measures of Floridablanca were withdrawn; society and the press regained their freedom; and no opposition was offered to the propaganda of French ideas. Aranda’s policy might have been successful if it had been adopted earlier, but the time for temporizing was now past, and it was necessary to choose one side or the other. In November 1792 the queen felt herself strong enough to carry out the scheme which she had been long maturing. Aranda was dismissed, Godoy.and the office of first minister was entrusted to Godoy, who had recently received the title of duke of Alcudia. Godoy, who was at once the queen’s lover and the personal favourite of the king, had no experience of the routine of office, and no settled policy. Fortunately for him, the course now to be pursued was decided for him. The execution of Louis XVI. (Jan. 21, 1793) made a profound impression in a country where loyalty was a superstition. Charles IV. was roused to demand vengeance for the insult to his family, and Spain became an enthusiastic member of the first coalition against France. The number of volunteers who offered their services rendered conscription unnecessary; and the southern provinces of France welcomed the Spaniards as deliverers. These advantages, however, were nullified by the shameful incompetence and carelessness of the government. The troops were left without supplies; no plan of combined action was imposed upon the commanders; and the two campaigns of 1793 and 1794 were one long catalogue of failures. Instead of reducing the southern provinces of France, the Spaniards were driven from the strong fortresses that guarded the Pyrenees, and the French advanced almost to the Ebro; and at the same time the British were utilizing the war to extend their colonial power and were establishing more firmly that maritime
