and Nebraska have specially provided for incorporating assemblies of the Knights of Labour. Hardly any advantage, however, has been taken of these statutes. Some states have passed laws excepting trade unions from restrictions on combinations and conspiracies imposed by other statutes or the common law (e.g. New York), and especially from the operation of anti-trust laws (Michigan, Wisconsin, Nebraska, Montana, North Carolina and Texas). The Texas law, however, has been held unconstitutional. A number of states have passed laws, some of doubtful validity, prohibiting employers from making it a condition of employment that labourers should not belong to a union. Most states have adopted statutes legalizing union labels to indicate the products of members of trade unions.
By act of Congress, associations of the nature of labour organizations, having branches in several states or territories, may, on filing articles of association for record in Washington, become corporations. American legislation generally is friendly to trade unions. Their purposes are regarded as lawful by the courts, but if they use unlawful means for their accomplishments, a remedy will be applied. Injury to property, intimidation by threats, personal violence, or boycotts enforced by terrorism, are such unlawful means. The liberty of action thus secured to organizations of labour is equally the right of the employer. Therefore, a statute making it an offence for one to require those whom he employs to withdraw from a trade union is unconstitutional and void (see Reports of American Bar Association, xxi. 367, 372). The courts recognize that membership in trade unions is a species of property, of which no one can be deprived except through a formal procedure in conformity with the rules of the organization. Some of the States, notably New York, have a statute prohibiting trade unions from making any discrimination in connexion with their admission requirements on account of membership in the state militia or national guard.
Authorities.—Ely, The Labour Movement in America (New York, N.Y., 1886); M‘Neill, The Labour Movement (Boston, Mass., 1887); Powderly, Thirty Years of Labour (Columbus, O., 1889); Simonds, The Story of Manual Labour in all Lands and Ages (Chicago, 1886); Bliss, The New Encyclopaedia of Social Reform (New York, 1908); Aldrich, “The American Federation of Labour,” Economic Studies (August 1898); Wright, Industrial Evolution of the United States (Meadville, Pa., 1895); “Historical Sketch of the Knights of Labour,” Quart. Journ. of Economics (January 1887); “The Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers,” Quart. Journ. of Economics (July 1893 and November 1901); J. R. Commons, Trade Unionism and Labor Problems; Hollander and Barnett, Studies in American Trade Unionism; Barnett, A Trial Bibliography of American Trade Union Publications. (C. D. W.)
TRADE WINDS, the name given to the winds which blow
from the tropical belts of high pressure towards the equatorial
belt of low pressure, from the north-east in the northern hemisphere
and from the south-east in the southern. They are
exceedingly regular, especially over the oceans, where there
is no disturbing influence from the great land masses. They
receive their name from this feature, the term “trade” being
used in the otherwise obsolete sense of “direction” or “course”
(cf. “tread”). The area of their greatest influence may be
taken to extend from about 3° to 35° N., and from the equator
to 28° S., though these belts are actually somewhat narrower
at any given season, as the whole system of surface winds over
the globe moves north and south following the sun. The westerly
winds prevalent in the belts respectively north of the northern
tropical belt of high pressure, and south of the southern, are
sometimes known as anti-trades, their direction being opposite
to that of the trade winds.
TRAFALGAR, BATTLE OF. The British victory over the
French off Cape Trafalgar, fought on the 21st of October 1805,
was a sequel of the breakdown of Napoleon's great scheme for
the invasion of the British Isles (See Napoleonic Campaigns:
Naval). When Villeneuve gave up in despair the attempt to
enter the Channel, he steered for Cadiz, and anchored in that
port on the 20th of August 1805. He found three British
ships of the line, under the command of Vice-Admiral Cuthbert
Collingwood, on the watch. Collingwood, resolved that the
allies should not drive him through the Straits of Gibraltar
without being compelled to follow, retired slowly, and at a
short distance ahead of the ships sent to pursue him. They,
not being willing to be drawn into the Mediterranean, gave up
the pursuit. The British officer then resumed his watch off
Cadiz. On the 22nd of August he was joined by Rear-Admiral
Sir Richard Bickerton with four ships of the line, and on the 30th
by Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder with 18. The allied fleet,
consisting of 29 sail of the line which had come with Villeneuve,
and five already at Cadiz, 34 in all, remained quiescent. The use
to be made of it, or the measures to be taken for its destruction,
were matters of urgent consideration to Napoleon and to the
British government. On the 14th of September Napoleon
gave orders that the French and Spanish ships at Cadiz should
put to sea at the first favourable opportunity, join seven Spanish
ships of the line then at Cartagena, go to Naples, and land the
soldiers they carried to reinforce his troops then in that kingdom,
and should fight a decisive action if they met a British
fleet of inferior numbers. Two Spanish ships of the line were to
be counted as equal to one French. Their final destination
was to be Toulon. On the 15th he decided that Villeneuve,
whose “excessive pusillanimity” rendered him incapable of
vigorous action, must be replaced by Admiral Rosily. Rosily
received his orders on the 17th and left for Cadiz. The British
government, determined to confine the allies to Cadiz, or beat
them if they came out, sent Nelson to take command and
prepared to despatch reinforcements. Nelson left Portsmouth
on the 15th of September, and reached Cadiz on the 28th,
bringing three ships of the line with him. He gave orders that
no salute should be fired for him lest the enemy should learn that
reinforcements had arrived. The bulk of the fleet—23 sail—was
kept well out at sea, and five ships of the line under Rear-Admiral
Louis were appointed to cruise close to Cadiz as an inshore
squadron. On the 5th of October Louis was sent to Gibraltar
to renew his provisions and water, and the watch was left to
two frigates. Between the 7th and the 13th of October Nelson
was joined by six ships of the line, making a total of 34. But
Admiral Calder, having been summoned home to stand a
court-martial, took his flagship with him on the 14th, and on
the 17th another line-of-battle ship had to be detached to renew
her stores. As Admiral Louis could not return before the
battle of the 21st, Nelson had at his disposal 27 ships of the line
in all. Napoleon's order of the 14th of September reached
Villeneuve on the 28th. He learnt also that Rosily was coming,
but not that he himself was to be superseded. On the 5th of
October he held a council of war of French and Spanish officers.
They decided that the condition of their ships did not justify
them in hoping for victory over the British fleet, but Napoleon's
orders were peremptory, and they agreed that a sortie must be
made. Easterly winds were needed to facilitate the sailing
of a large and awkward fleet from Cadiz, and till the 14th the
wind was hard from the west. Even when it fell the allies
lingered. On the 18th of October Villeneuve heard that Rosily
had reached Madrid, and of his own supersession. Stung by
the prospect of being disgraced before the fleet, he resolved to
go to sea before his successor could reach Cadiz.
The allies, aided by a light land breeze which blew from the east, though the wind at Sea was westerly, began to leave Cadiz Bay on the 19th. Their movements were at once known to the British look-out frigates, and were transmitted by signal to Nelson, who was cruising some thirty miles to the west. During the period of blockade he had instructed his captains as to how he meant to fight the approaching battle. The memorandum in which his instructions were embodied was dated the 9th of October. It was drawn up in view of the circumstances which did not arise—that the enemy would come to sea with a strong easterly wind which would give him the weather gage; that he might be reinforced to a strength of over 50 ships of the line from Brest, Rochefort and Cartagena; that the British fleet might be raised by reinforcements to 40 ships. But the governing principles of the memorandum were independent of such details. They were that the order of sailing in which the
