the Senate is, in most states, a lieutenant-governor, whom the people have directly elected. Bills may originate in either house, but in about half of the states money bills must originate in the House of Representatives—a survival of British custom which has here, where both houses equally represent the people, no functional value. Both houses do most of their work by committees, much after the fashion (to be presently described) of the Federal Congress, and it is in these committees that the form of bills is usually settled and their fate decided. Sometimes, when a committee is taking evidence on an important question, reporters are present, and the proceedings receive comment in the newspapers; but in general the proceedings of committees and even debates in the houses are imperfectly reported and excite no great public interest. In all the states except one, viz. North Carolina, bills passed by the two houses must be submitted to the state governor for his approval. Should he return it to the legislature disapproved, it is lost unless repassed “over his veto” by a majority usually of two-thirds, but sometimes larger, in each house. A good governor is apt to use his veto freely—indeed, a frequent exercise of the power is deemed in many states to be a sort of test of the governor's judgment and courage.
Subjects of state legislation may be classified under three heads:—
1. Ordinary private law, including property, contracts, torts, family relations, offences, civil and criminal procedure.
2. Administrative law, including the regulation of urban and rural local government, state and local taxation and finance, education, public works, the liquor traffic, vaccination, adulteration, charities, asylums, prisons, the inspection of mines and factories, general laws relating to corporations, railways, labour questions.
3. Matters of a local or special nature, such as bills for chartering and incorporating gas, water, canal, tramway, railway or telephone companies, or for conferring franchises in the nature of monopolies or special privileges upon such companies, or for altering their constitutions, as also for incorporating cities or minor communities and regulating their affairs. Although there usually exist general laws under which corporations or companies (including railway and electric car companies) can be formed, laws which in some states and for some purposes confer a greater freedom of incorporation than the general law allows in the United Kingdom, there is nevertheless a noticeable tendency to come to the legislature for special purposes of this kind.
As respects class 1, there is not much change in the law from year to year. The legal profession does not like to see the ordinary and established rules disturbed. Sometimes the laws belonging to this class are codified, or rather consolidated, and then usually by a special committee of competent lawyers whose work is passed en bloc by the legislature.
As respects class 2, a good many measures are passed, particularly in matters affecting labour, and for the protection of any sections of the population which may be deemed to need protection.
It is, however, in class 3 that the legislatures show most activity, much of it pernicious, because (prompted by persons seeking to serve private interests which are often opposed to the interests of the whole community. The great “public service” corporations have, in particular, frequently succeeded in obtaining franchises of large pecuniary value without making any adequate payment therefor. A peculiarly notable form of this special or private bill legislation is that of dealing by special statutes with the governmental forms and details of management of municipalities; and the control exercised by the state legislatures over city governments is not only a most important branch of legislative business, but at the same time a means of power to scheming politicians and of enrichment to greedy ones. This has led in some states to the grant of power to cities to frame their own charters. Speaking generally, it is chiefly in the sphere of special or private legislation that state legislatures have shown their weak side, and incurred, in many states, the distrust of the people.
The members of these bodies belong for the most part, though by no means entirely, and least so in the agricultural states, to the class of professional politicians. They are seldom persons of shining ability or high standing in their communities. Except as a stepping-stone to a seat in Congress or a high executive post, the place is not one which excites the ambition of aspiring men. The least respected legislatures are those of the richest and most populous states, such as New York and Pennsylvania, because in such states the opportunities offered to persons devoid of scruple are the largest.
The general decline in the quality of these bodies, and especially their proneness to pass ill-considered or pernicious bills at the instance of private promotors, has led to the restriction in recent years of their powers by the insertion in the state constitutions of many provisions forbidding the enactment of certain classes of measures, and regulating the procedure to be adopted in the passing, either of statutes generally or of particular kinds of statutes. Even these provisions, however, are frequently evaded.
§ 6. At the head of every state government stands an official called the governor, who is the descendant and representative The State Executive. of the governor of colonial times. Under the earlier constitutions of most of the original thirteen states he was chosen by the legislature, but he is now everywhere directly elected by the people, and by the same suffrage as the legislature. His term of office is four years in twenty-three states (including Pennsylvania and Illinois), three years in one state, two years in twenty, and one year in two (Massachusetts and Rhode Island). In a few states there are prohibitions on re-election.
It is the duty of the governor to see that the laws of the state are faithfully administered by all officials, and the judgments of the courts carried out. He has, in most states, the right of reprieving or pardoning offenders, but some recent constitutions place restrictions on this power. He is also commander of the militia or other armed forces of the state, which he can direct to repel invasion, or suppress insurrection or riot. He appoints some of the state officials, his nominations usually requiring the concurrence of the state senate; but his patronage is in most states not very large—in many it is indeed insignificant—because the offices of greatest importance are filled by direct popular election. He has also the almost mechanical function of representing the state for various formal purposes, such as demanding from other states the extradition of offenders, the issuing of writs for the election of members of the legislature and of members of the Federal House of Representatives, and the receiving of reports from various state officials or boards.
Not less important than his directly executive work is the influence which the governor exerts upon state legislation through his possession (in all the states but one) of a veto power. His right of recommending measures to the legislature (which does not formally include that of framing and presenting bills, but practically permits him to have a bill prepared and use all his influence on its behalf) is of greater value according to the extent to which he leads the public opinion of his state. The legislature need not regard his counsels, but if he is a strong man whom the people trust, it may fear him and comply with his demands. When a commercial crisis occurs much may depend on his initiative. Moreover, his veto is a thing to be reckoned with. It is seldom overridden by the prescribed majority, especially if the bill against which it is directed be one of a jobbing nature. And as the people look to him to kill bad measures, he is frequently able, if he be a man both strong and upright, to convey intimations to the legislature, or to those who are influential in it, that he will not approve of certain pending measures, or will approve of them only if passed in a form satisfactory to him. The use of this potential authority, which the possession of the veto power gives, has now become one of a governor's most important duties.
In New England, and in the greater states generally, the governorship is still a post of dignity, and affords an opportunity for a display of character and talents. During the War of Secession, when each governor was responsible for organizing troops from his state, much turned upon his energy, popularity and loyalty. And in recent years the danger of riots during strikes has, in some states, made it important to have a man of decision and fearlessness in the office which issues orders to the state militia. There has been of late years a revival in the case of some able governors of the old respect for, and deference to, the office.
In thirty-five states there is a lieutenant-governor, elected by popular vote. He is usually president of the state senate, is sometimes a member of some administrative boards, and steps into the governor's place should it become vacant.
Executive councils advising the governor, but not chosen by him, existed under the first constitutions of all the original thirteen states. In New York the council of appointment advised the governor only in regard to appointing officers; and
