the Atlantic; and, throughout the war, the knowledge that at any moment a vast fleet of transports might appear off any one of the ports on their enormous seaboard prevented the Confederates, notwithstanding that the garrisons were reduced to a most dangerous extent, from massing their full strength for a decisive effort.
The power of striking like “a bolt from the blue” is of the very greatest value in war. Surprise was the foundation of almost all the grand strategical combinations of the past, as it will be of those to come. The first thought and the last of the great general is to outwit his adversary, and to strike Amphibious power. where he is least expected. And the measures he adopts to accomplish his purpose are not easily divined. What soldier in Europe anticipated Marlborough's march to the Danube and Blenheim field? What other brain besides Napoleon's dreamt of the passage of the Alps before Marengo? Was there a single general of Prussia before Jena who foresaw that the French would march north from the Bavarian frontier, uncovering the roads to the Rhine, and risking utter destruction in case of defeat? Who believed, in the early June of 1815, that an army 130,000 strong would dare to invade a country defended by two armies that mustered together over 200,000 unbeaten soldiers? To what Federal soldier did it occur, on the morning of Chancellorsville, that Lee, confronted by 90,000 Northerners, would detach the half of his own small force of 50,000 to attack his enemy in flank and rear? The very course which appeared to ordinary minds so beset by difficulties and dangers as to be outside the pale of practical strategy has, over and over again, been that which led to decisive victory; and if there is one lesson more valuable than another as regards national defence, it is that preparation cannot be too careful or precautions overdone. Overwhelming numbers, adequately trained, commanded and equipped, are the only means of ensuring absolute security. But a numerical preponderance, either by land or sea, over all possible hostile combinations, is unattainable, and in default the only sound policy is to take timely and ample precautions against all enterprises which are even remotely possible. There is nothing more to be dreaded in war than the combined labours of a thoroughly well-trained general staff, except the intellect and audacity of a great strategist. The ordinary mind, even if it does Importance of strategy. not shrink from great danger, sees no way of surmounting great difficulties; and any operation which involves both vast dangers and vast difficulties it scoffs at as chimerical. The heaven-born strategist, on the other hand, “takes no counsel of his fears.” Knowing that success is seldom to be won without incurring risks, he is always greatly daring; and by the skill with which he overcomes all obstacles, and even uses them, as Hannibal and Napoleon did the Alps, and as some great captain of the future may use the sea, to further his purpose and surprise his adversary, he shows his superiority to the common herd. It is repeated ad nauseam that in consequence of the vastly improved means of transmitting information, surprise on a large scale is no longer to be feared. It is to be remembered, however, that the means of concentrating troops and ships are far speedier than of old; that false information can be far more readily distributed; and also, that if there is one thing more certain than another, it is that the great strategist, surprise being still the most deadly of all weapons, will devote the whole force of his intellect to the problem of bringing it about.
Nor is it to be disguised that amphibious power is a far more terrible weapon than even in the days when it crushed Napoleon. Commerce has increased by leaps and bounds, and it is no longer confined within territorial limits. The arteries vital to the existence of civilized communities stretch over every ocean. States which in 1800 rated their maritime traffic at a few hundred thousand pounds sterling, value it now at many millions. Others, whose flags, fifty years ago, were almost unknown on the high seas, possess to-day great fleets of merchantmen; and those who fifty years ago were self-dependent, rely in great part, for the maintenance of their prosperity, on their intercourse with distant continents. There is no great power, and few small ones, to whom the loss of its sea-borne trade would be other than a most deadly blow; and there is no great power that is not far more vulnerable than when Great Britain, single-handed, held her own against a European coalition. Colonies, commercial ports, dockyards, coaling-stations are so many hostages to fortune. Year by year they become more numerous. Year by year, as commercial rivalry grows more acute, they become more intimately bound up with the prosperity and prestige of their mother-countries. And to what end? To exist as pledges of peace, auspicia melioris aevi, or to fall an easy prey to the power that is supreme at sea and can strike hard on land?
Even the baldest and briefest discussion of the vast subject of war would be incomplete without some reference to the relative merits of professional and unprofessional Value of unprofessional troops. soldiers. Voluntary service still holds its ground in the Anglo-Saxon states; and both the United Kingdom and America will have to a great extent to rely, in case of conflicts which tax all their resources, on troops who have neither the practice nor the discipline of their standing armies. What will be the value of these amateurs when pitied against regulars? Putting the question of moral aside, as leading us too far afield, it is clear that the individual amateur must depend upon his training. If, like the majority of the Boers, he is a good shot, a good scout, a good skirmisher and, if mounted, a good horseman and horse master, he is undeniably a most useful soldier. But whether amateurs en masse, that is, when organized into battalions and brigades, are thoroughly trustworthy, depends on the quality of their officers. With good officers, and a certain amount of previous training, there is no reason why bodies of infantry, artillery or mounted infantry, composed entirely of unprofessional soldiers, should not do excellent service in the field. Where they are likely to fail is in discipline; and it would appear that at the beginning of a campaign they are more liable to panic, less resolute in attack, less enduring under heavy losses and great hardships, and much slower in manœuvre than the professionals. To a certain extent this is inevitable; and it has a most important bearing on the value of the citizen soldier, for the beginning of a campaign is a most critical phase. In short, troops who are only half-trained or have been hastily raised may be a positive danger to the army to which they belong; and the shelter of stout earthworks is the only place for them. Yet the presence of a certain number of experienced fighting men in the ranks may make all the difference; and, in any case, it is probable that battalions composed of unprofessional soldiers, the free citizens of a free and prosperous state, are little if at all inferior, as fighting units, to battalions composed of conscripts. But it is to be understood that the men possess the qualifications referred to above, that the officers are accustomed to command and have a good practical knowledge of their duties in the field. A mob, however patriotic, carrying small-bore rifles is no more likely to hold its own to-day against well-led regulars than did the mob carrying pikes and flint-locks in the past. A small body of resolute civilians, well armed and skilful marksmen, might easily on their own ground defeat the same number of trained soldiers, especially if the latter were badly led. But in a war of masses, the power of combination, of rapid and orderly movement, and of tactical manœuvring is bound to tell. (G. F. R. H.)
Literature.—On the general principles of War, see C. v. Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (Eng. trans. On War, new ed. 1906); C. v. B(inder)-K(rieglstein), Geist und Staff im Kriege (1895); Ardant du Picq, Études sur le combat; W. Bagehot, Physics and Politics; G. le Bon, Psychologie des foules and Psychologie de l'éducation; F. N. Maude, War and the World's Life (1907): Berndt, Zahl im Kriege (statistical tables); Biottot, Les Grands Inspirés—Jeanne d'Arc; C. W. C. Oman, Art of War; M. Jahns, Gesch. der Kriegswissenschaften; v. der Goltz, Volk in Waffen (Eng. trans., Nation in Arms); A. T. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power on History; C. E. Callwell, Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance; P.H. Colomb, Naval Warfare; Stewart Murray, Future Peace of the Anglo-Saxons; H. Spenser Wilkinson, The Brain of an Army, War and Policy, &c.; and works mentioned in the bibliography to the article Army.
