devoted himself to watching the British in and about New York City. It was in every way fitting, however, that he who had been the mainspring of the war from the beginning, and had borne far more than his share of its burdens and discouragements, should end it with the campaign of Yorktown, conceived by himself, and the surrender of Cornwallis (October 1781). Although peace was not concluded until September 1783, there was no more important fighting. Washington retained his commission until the 23rd of December 1783, when, in a memorable scene, he returned it to Congress, then in session at Annapolis, Md., and retired to Mount Vernon. His expenses during the war, including secret service money, aggregated about $64,000; in addition he expended a considerable amount from his private fortune, for which he made no claim to reimbursement.
By this time the popular canonization of Washington had fairly begun. He occupied a position in American public life and in the American political system which no man could possibly hold again. He may be said to have become a political element quite apart from the Union, or the states, or the people of either. In a country in which newspapers had at best only a local circulation, and where communication was still slow and difficult, the knowledge that Washington favoured anything superseded, with very many men, both argument and the necessity of information. His constant correspondence with the governors of the states gave him a quasi-paternal attitude towards government in general. On relinquishing his command, for example, he was able to do what no other man could have done with either propriety or safety: he addressed a circular letter to the governors, pointing but changes in the existing form of government which he believed to be necessary, and urging “an indissoluble union of the states under one federal head,” “a regard to public justice,” the adoption of a suitable military establishment for a time of peace, and the making of “those mutual concessions which are requisite to the general prosperity.” His refusal to accept a salary, either as commander-in-chief or as president, might have been taken as affectation or impertinence in any one else; it seemed natural and proper enough in the case of Washington, but it was his peculiar privilege. It is even possible that he might have had a crown, had he been willing to accept it. The army, at the end of the war, was justly dissatisfied with its treatment. The officers were called to meet at Newburgh, and it was the avowed purpose of the leaders of the movement to march the army westward, appropriate vacant public lands as part compensation for arrears of pay, leave Congress to negotiate for peace without an army, and “mock at their calamity and laugh when their fear cometh.” Less publicly avowed was the purpose to make their commander-in-chief king, if he could be persuaded to aid in establishing a monarchy. Washington put a summary stop to the whole proceeding. A letter written to him by Colonel Lewis Nicola, on behalf of this coterie, detailed the weakness of a republican form of government as they had experienced it, their desire for “mixed government,” with him at its head, and their belief that “the title of king” would be objectionable to but few and of material advantage to the country. His reply was peremptory and indignant. In plain terms he stated his abhorrence of the proposal; he was at a loss to conceive what part of his conduct could have encouraged their address; they could not have found “a person to whom their schemes were more disagreeable”; and he charged them, “if you have any regard for yourself or posterity, or respect for me, to banish these thoughts from your mind, and never communicate, as from yourself or any one else, a sentiment of the like nature.” His influence, and his alone, secured the quiet disbanding of the discontented army. That influence was as powerful after he had retired to Mount Vernon as before the resignation of his command. The Society of the Cincinnati, an organization composed of officers of the late war, chose him as its first president; but he insisted that the Society should abandon its plan of hereditary membership, and change other features of the organization against which there had been public clamour. When the legislature of Virginia gave him 150 shares of stock in companies formed for the improvement of the Potomac and James rivers, and he was unable to refuse them lest his action should be misinterpreted, he extricated himself by giving them to educational institutions. His voluminous correspondence shows his continued concern for a standing army and the immediate possession of the western military posts, and his interest in the development of the western territory. From public men in all parts of the country he received such a store of suggestions as came to no other man, digested it, and was enabled by means of it to speak with what seemed infallible wisdom. In the midst of a burden of letter writing, the minute details in his diaries of tree-planting and rotation of crops, and his increasing reading on the political side of history, he found time to entertain a stream of visitors from all parts of the United States and from abroad. Among these, in March 1785, were the commissioners from Virginia and Maryland, who met at Alexandria (q.v.) to form a commercial code for Chesapeake Bay and the Potomac, and made an opportunity to visit Mount Vernon. From that moment the current of events, leading into the Annapolis Convention (see Annapolis, Md.) of 1786 and the Federal Convention of the following year, shows Washington's close supervision at every point.
When the Federal Convention met at Philadelphia in May 1787 to frame the present constitution, Washington was present as a delegate from Virginia, though much against his will; and a unanimous vote at once made him the presiding officer. Naturally, therefore, he did not participate in debate; and he seems to have spoken but once, and then to favour an amendment reducing from 40,000 to 30,000 the minimum population required as a basis of representation in the House. The mere suggestion, coming from him, was sufficient, and the change was at once agreed to. He approved the constitution which was decided upon, believing, as he said, “that it was the best constitution which could be obtained at that epoch, and that this or a dissolution awaits our choice, and is the only alternative.” As president of the convention he signed the constitution, and kept the papers of the convention until the adoption of the new government, when they were deposited in the Department of State. All his vast influence was given to secure the ratification of the new instrument, and his influence was probably decisive. When enough states had ratified to assure the success of the new government, and the time came to elect a president, there was no hesitation. The office of president had been “cut to fit the measure of George Washington,” and no one thought of any other person in connexion with it. The unanimous vote of the electors made him the first president of the United States; their unanimous vote elected him for a second time in 1792-1793; and even after he had positively refused to serve for a third term, two electors voted for him in 1796-1797. The public events of his presidency are given, elsewhere (see United States, § History). While the success of the new government was the work of many men and many causes, one cannot resist the conviction that the factor of chief importance was the existence, at the head of the executive department, of such a character as Washington. It was he who gave to official intercourse formal dignity and distinction. It was he who secured for the president the power of removal from office without the intervention of the Senate. His support of Hamilton's financial plans not only insured a speedy restoration of public credit, but also, and even more important, gave the new government constitutional ground on which to stand; while his firmness in dealing with the “Whisky Insurrection” taught a much-needed and wholesome lesson of respect for the Federal power. His official visits to New England in 1789, to Rhode Island in 1790 and to the South in 1791 enabled him to test public opinion at the same time that they increased popular interest in the national government. Himself not a political partisan, he held the two natural parties apart, and prevented party contest, until the government had become too firmly established to be shaken by them. Perhaps the final result would not in any case have failed, even had “blood and iron” been necessary to bring it about; but the quiet attainment of the result was due to the personality of Washington, as well as to the political sense of the American people.
