be found only the duke's cavalry screen and some horse artillery still in position. Can we wonder that he gave vent to his anger Napoleon's pursuit of Wellington and declared that Ney had ruined France? This was the fatal mistake of the campaign, and Fortune turned now against her former favourite. Although the smouldering fires of his old energy flamed out once more and Napoleon began a rapid pursuit of the cavalry screen, which crumpled up and decamped as he advanced, yet all his efforts were powerless to entangle the Anglo-Dutch rearguard to such an extent that Wellington must turn back to its assistance. The pursuit, too, was carried out in the midst of a tropical thunderstorm which broke at the roar of the opening cannonade, and very considerably retarded the French pursuit. It was not until the light was failing that Napoleon reached the heights of Rossomme opposite to Wellington's position and, by a masterly reconnaissance in force, compelled the duke to disclose the presence of practically the whole Anglo-Dutch army. The French halted, somewhat loosened by pursuit, between Rossomme and Genappe and spent a wretched night in the sodden fields.
During the night Wellington received the reassuring news that Blücher would bring two corps certainly, and possibly four, to Waterloo, and determined to accept battle. Napoleon's plan being to penetrate between the allies and then defeat them successively, the left was really the threatened flank of the Anglo-Dutch army. Yet so far was Wellington from divining Napoleon's object that he stationed 17,000 men (including Colville's British division) at Hal and Tubize, 8 m. away to his right, to repel the turning movement that he groundlessly anticipated and to form a rallying point for his right in case his centre was broken. By deliberately depriving himself of this detachment, on June 18, the duke ran a very grave risk. With the 67,600 men whom he had in hand, however, he took up a truly admirable “Wellingtonian” position astride the Nivelles-Brussels and Charleroi-Brussels roads which meet at June 18. Mt S. Jean. He used a low ridge to screen his main defensive position, exposing comparatively few troops in front of the crest. Of his 156 guns, 78 belonged to the British artillery; but of his 67,600 men only 29,800 were British or King's German Legion troops, whereas all Napoleon's were Frenchmen and veterans. Wellington occupied Hougoumont in strength, chiefly with detachments of the British Guards; and he also placed a garrison of the K.G.L. in La Haye Sainte, the tactical key of the allied position. Both these farms were strengthened; but, still nervous about his right flank, the duke occupied Hougoumont in much greater force than La Haye Sainte, and massed the bulk of his troops on his right. The main position was very skilfully taken up, and care was taken to distribute the troops so that the indifferent and immature were closely supported by those who were “better disciplined and more accustomed to war.” Owing to a misconception, one Dutch-Belgian brigade formed up in front of the ridge. Full arrangements were made for Blücher's co-operation through General Müffling, the Prussian attaché on the duke's staff. The duke was to stand fast to receive the attack, whilst the Prussians should close round Napoleon's exposed right and support Wellington's left. The Prussians were thus the real general reserve, and it was Wellington's task to receive Napoleon's attack and prepare him for the decisive counter-stroke.
Blücher loyally kept his promise to his ally; but the execution left much to be desired. He did not start his corps on their westward march until a considerable time after dawn, and then, owing to bad staff work, the rear corps of all (Bülow) was selected to lead the march. This unnecessary delay was aggravated further by a fire that broke out in Wavre and delayed the march. In spite of his hurts the old marshal was in the saddle.
Meanwhile Napoleon formed his army for the attack on Wellington's position. The wet state of the ground (largely composed of corn-fields) and the scattered bivouacs of the French army prevented the attack from being made at 6 a.m. as Napoleon had desired. It was therefore put off first of all until 9 a.m., and later until 11.30, to permit the sodden ground to dry sufficiently for the mounted arms to manœuvre freely and give time to the French army to close up. During the night the emperor had received a report from Marshal Grouchy, dated Gembloux, 10 p.m., 17th, which stated that the Prussians v/ere retiring in two columns towards Wavre and Peiwez. Grouchy added that if he found that the bulk of the Prussians were moving on Wavre he would follow them and separate them from Wellington. But a glance at the map shows that this was impossible. By following the Prussians Grouchy, who had taken up a position outside the Prussian left flank, would inevitably drive the allies together. It was 10 a.m. when the emperor answered this letter, and he directed the marshal to march for Wavre, thus approaching the French army and entering the zone of the main operations. The underlying idea of manœuvring in two wings and a reserve should be kept in mind when considering this letter. Its meaning will then clearly be, that Grouchy was to endeavour to place his force on the inner Prussian flank and hold them back from Waterloo. But this is just what the despatch does not state verbally and precisely, and accordingly Grouchy, like Ney on the 16th and 17th, misread it.
The French army proceeded to form up in an imposing array some 1300 yards from Wellington's position, and if some misgivings as to the result filled the minds of men like Soult, Reille and Foy, who had had previous experience of Wellington in the field, none at any rate dwelt in Napoleon's mind. The lateness of the hour at which the attack was delivered, and the emperor's determination to break Wellington's centre instead of outflanking the Anglo-Dutch left and further separating the allies, deprived him of whatever chance he still possessed of beating Wellington before Blücher could intervene. Napoleon drew up his army of 74,000 men and 246 guns in three lines, fully in view of the allies. In the first line were the corps of Reille and D'Erlon, who were destined to attack the allied line and prepare it for the final assault. In the second line were Kellermann's cuirassiers, the incomplete corps of Lobau, the squadrons of Domon and Subervie, and Milhaud's cuirassiers. In the third line was the Guard. It was an imposing array of veteran troops, and when their emperor rode along the lines they received him with extraordinary enthusiasm.
The battle of Waterloo may be divided into five phases. About 11.30 the first phase opened with an attack by one of Reille's divisions on Hougoumont. This was a mere Waterloo: first phase. side-issue, destined to draw Wellington's attention to his right, and in this it failed. About noon, however, a battery of 80 French guns unlimbered on the long spur to the S.E. of La Haye Sainte, to prepare the duke's centre for the main attack. Here the form of the ground so skilfully chosen sheltered the defence in some degree from the tempest of iron that now beat against the position. After 1 p.m., and just before he gave orders for Ney to lead the main attack, the emperor scanned the battlefield, and on his right front he saw a dense dark cloud emerging from the woods at Chapelle Saint Lambert. It was soon discovered that this was Bülow's corps marching to Wellington's assistance. A letter was now awaiting despatch to Grouchy, and to it was added a postscript that the battle was raging with Wellington, that Bülow's corps had been sighted by the emperor, and that the marshal was to hasten to the field and crush Bülow. This order at least was precise and clear, but it was sent 12 hours too late, and when Grouchy received it he was unable to carry it out. To neutralize Bülow when necessity arose, the emperor now detached Lobau together with the squadrons of Domon and Subervie. The French general, however, hardly drew out far enough from the French right; otherwise the magnificent resolution he displayed and the admirable obstinacy with which his troops fought against ever-increasing odds are worthy of all praise. Thus as early as 1.30 p.m. the Prussian intervention deranged the symmetry of Napoleon's battle-array.
It did not occur to the emperor that it would be wise to break off the fight now and seek a more favourable opportunity of beating the allies in detail. He was still determined to play the game out to the bitter end, and involve Wellington and Bülow's corps in a common ruin.
