engagement, however, Sir Harry Burrard landed, and took over the command. Burrard was in turn superseded by Sir Hew Dalrymple, and the campaign ended with the convention of Cintra, which provided for the evacuation of Portugal by the French, but gave Junot’s troops a free return to France. So great was the public displeasure in England at the escape of the enemy that a court of inquiry was held. After the battle of Corunna, Wellesley, who had in the meantime resumed his duties as Irish secretary, returned to the Peninsula as chief in
command. He drove the French out of Oporto by a singularly bold and fortunate attack, and then prepared to march against Madrid by the valley of the Tagus. He had the support of a Spanish army under General Cuesta; but his movements were delayed by the neglect of the Spanish government, and Soult was able to collect a large force for the purpose of falling upon the English line of communication. Wellesley, unconscious of Soult’s presence in force on his flank, advanced against Madrid,
and defeated his immediate opponent. King Joseph, at Talavera de la Reina (q.v.) on the 27th-28th of July. The victory of Talavera, however, brought prestige but nothing else. Within the next few days Soult’s approach on the line of communication was discovered, and Wellesley, disgusted with his Spanish allies,
had no choice but to withdraw into Portugal and there stand upon the defensive.
A peerage, with the title of Viscount Wellington and Baron Douro, was conferred upon him for Talavera. He was also made marshal-general of the Portuguese army and a Spanish captain general. But his conduct after the battle was sharply criticized in England, and its negative results were used as a weapon against the ministry. Even on the defensive, Wellington’s task was exceedingly difficult. Austria having made peace. Napoleon was at liberty to throw heavy forces into the Peninsula. Wellington, foreseeing that Portugal would now be invaded by a very powerful army, began the fortification of the celebrated lines of Torres Vedras (see Fortification). The English army wintered about Almeida. As summer approached Wellington’s anticipations were realized. Massena moved against Portugal with an army of 70,000 men. Wellington, unable to save Ciudad Rodrigo, retreated down the valley of the Mondego, devastating the country, and at length halted at Busaco and gave battle. The French attack was repelled, but other roads were open to the invader, and Wellington continued his retreat. Massena followed, but was checked completely in front of the lines. He sought in vain for an unprotected point. It was with the utmost difficulty that he could keep his army from starving. At length, when the country was exhausted, he fell back to Santarem, where, Wellington being still too weak to attack, he maintained himself during the winter. But in the spring of 1811 Wellington received reinforcements and moved forward. Massena retreated, devastating the country to check the pursuit, but on several occasions his rearguard was deeply engaged, and such were the sufferings of his army, both in the invasion and in the retreat, that the French, when they re-entered Spain, had lost 30,000 men. Public opinion- in England, lately so hostile, now became confident, and Wellington, whose rewards for Talavera had been opposed in both Houses, began to gain extraordinary popularity.
In the meantime Soult, who was besieging Cadiz, had moved to support Massena. But after capturing Badajoz, Soult learnt that Massena was in retreat, and also that his own forces at Cadiz had been beaten. He in consequence returned to the south. Wellington, freed from pressure on this side, and believing Massena to be thoroughly disabled, considered that the time had come for an advance into Spain. The fortresses of Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz barred the roads. Almeida was besieged, and Wellington was preparing to attack Badajoz when Massena again took the field, and marched to the relief of Almeida. The battle of Fuentes d'Onoro followed, in which Wellington was only able to extricate the army from a dangerous predicament which “if Boney had been there” would have been a disaster. The garrison of Almeida too escaped, after blowing up part of the fortress. In the south, in spite of the hard-won victory of Albuera, the English attack on Badajoz had to be given up. The same misfortune attended a fresh stroke against Ciudad Rodrigo, and at the end of a campaign in which he had used all his skill and care to compensate for inferior numbers, he withdrew behind the Coa. He had meanwhile been given the local rank of general and had also received the Portuguese title of Conde de Vimeiro.
Wellington had from the first seen that, whatever number of men Napoleon might send against him, it was impossible, owing to the poverty of the country, that any great mass of troops could long be held together, and that the French, used to “making war support war,” would fare worse in such conditions than his own troops with their organized supply service. It was so at the end of 1811. Soult had to move southwards to live, and the English were again more than a match for the enemy in front of them. Wellington resumed the offensive, and on the 19th of January 1812 Ciudad Rodrigo was taken by storm. Again, suddenly altering the centre of gravity, Wellington invested Badajoz in the middle of March. It was necessary at whatever cost to anticipate the arrival of Soult with a relieving army, and on the 6th of April Wellington ordered the assault. The fearful slaughter which took place before the British were masters of the defences caused Wellington to be charged with indifference to loss, but a postponement of the attack would merely have resulted in more battles against Soult. Of all generals Wellington was the last to waste a single trained man, and the sight of the breaches of Badajoz after the storm for a moment unnerved even his iron sternness.
The advance from Ciudad Rodrigo into Spain was now begun. Marmont, who had succeeded Massena, fell back to the Douro, but there turned upon his assailant, and, by superior swiftness, threatened to cut the English off from Portugal. Wellington retreated as far as Salamanca (q.v.), and there extricated himself from his peril by a most brilliant victory (July 22). The French fell back on Burgos. Instead of immediately following them, Wellington thought it wise to advance upon the Spanish capital. King Joseph retired, and the English entered Madrid in triumph. The political effect was great, but the delay gave the French northern army time to rally. “The vigorous following of a beaten enemy was not a prominent characteristic of Lord Wellington’s warfare,” as Napier says. Burgos offered an obstinate defence. Moreover, Soult, raising the siege of Cadiz, and gathering other forces to his own, pressed on towards Madrid. Wellington was compelled once more to retire into Portugal. The effect of the campaign was, however, that the southern provinces were finally cleared of the invader. During this retreat he announced in general orders that the demoralization and misconduct of the British army surpassed anything that he had ever witnessed. Such wholesale criticism was. bitterly resented, but indeed throughout his career Wellington, cold and punctilious, never secured to himself the affections of officers and men as Marlborough or Napoleon did. He subjugated his army and gave it brilliant victories, but he inspired few disciples except the members of his own staff. To the end of his life his relations with the principal generals who served under him were by no means intimate.
Wellington had been made an earl after the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, and the Spanish government created him duke of Ciudad Rodrigo about the same time. For Salamanca his reward was a marquessate, and a grant of £100,000 for the purchase of an estate. He was also made Duque da Victoria by the Portuguese regency, and before the opening of the campaign of 1813, which was to crown his work, he was given both the Garter and the Golden Fleece.
He was now invested with the supreme command of the Spanish armies. He visited Cadiz in December 1812, and offered counsels of moderation to the democratic assembly, which were not followed. During the succeeding months he was occupied with plans and preparations, and at length, in May 1813, the hour for his final and victorious advance arrived. The Russian disasters had compelled Napoleon to withdraw some of his best troops from the Peninsula. Against a weakened and discouraged adversary Wellington took the field with greatly increased
