raphy for directional and position-finding purposes would almost
entirely neutralize any such work if it were attempted, on account
of the size of the target. (See also CAMOUFLAGE.)
///. Forms of Attack.
The effects of bombing are moral and material. There is no
doubt that the moral effect is far greater than the material
particularly in thickly populated districts where self-control, as a
general rule, will be found lacking in the population to a greater
degree than amongst armed forces in the field. No result decisive
to a campaign has been brought about by a raid of any kind of
itself alone. This fact will probably be true of aircraft bombing
operations, provided that a country has taken suitable precautions
in peace against the chance of an overwhelming attack at the
very outbreak of war.
Written evidence was found during the war of the nervous appre-
hension reigning in a certain German town after the British special
raiding force known as the " Independent Force, R.A.F.," had been
operating for a comparatively short time. One of the inhabitants
described a night of terror in which Allied aeroplanes had come in
the early night and dropped their bombs and gone away. No sooner
had the inhabitants come out of their shelters to go to bed than they
were again summoned under cover, and the bomb dropping was
repeated. Again they went to bed, and again they had to take
cover the performance continuing in this manner for some three
or four hours. As a matter of fact one solitary Allied aeroplane paid
a single visit to the town that night; the rest of the raid was purely
imaginary, and the result of demoralization! Over another large town
six long air raids took place during eight nights. One effect was that
the clothing output from that district was temporarily reduced by
80% a serious matter for the army, as a large proportion of the
force was depending on the district for its clothing.
Bombing operations over disciplined forces in the field consti-
tute on the whole a form of annoyance rather than a potential
danger, provided that store and ammunition dep&ts are so designed
as to be separated from each other, and subdivided within them-
selves, in such a way that a fire arising in one section may be prop-
erly isolated and prevented from spreading to its neighbours. Inter-
ference with movements of troops and stores by rail can be, and has
been, caused by low-flying bombing machines.
Airship Attack. Airships form targets of great size, and, if
fiDed with inflammable gas as were those of the Central Em-
pires during the war are objects of considerable danger to their
crews. If and when a suitable non-inflammable gas is discovered
which can be produced cheaply for commercial purposes, the
airship will become a serious factor in air-defence considerations.
It possesses greater endurance, radius of action, carrying capacity,
accommodation, and facilities for observation than " heavier-
than-air " machines. Meteorological conditions, however, will
always militate more against the free use of airships than of
aeroplanes, which possess higher powers of manoeuvre and
performance.
During the war bombing operations by airships were not
intentionally undertaken by the Germans over land targets by
day, but ships at sea were frequently made the objects of such
attention between dusk and dawn. Airships intending to attack
land objectives in the British Is. used to leave their sheds by
day, and make their landfall . while still over the North Sea.
There they would wait until it was dark enough to cross the
coastline without prospect of serious interference, and make
for their various objectives as a rule more or less independently,
but sometimes in pairs. The return journeys were made in-
dependently.
It has been held that at night it is hardly necessary to attack
with more than one airship at a time, but there is no doubt
whatever that simultaneous attacks by two or more airships on
the same course add enormously to the difficulties of the defence.
The German raid on London during the night of Sept. 23-4
1916 affords a notable instance of airships setting out to attack in
pairs, but failing to carry out their intention. L3I and L$2 sailed
on the task in company and reached Dungeness together. Thence
LSI, commanded by a bold and skilful pilot, set her course straight
across London at high speed, and eventually won through. Her
consort hesitated, and was lost.
LSI passed over Purley and Croydon, and dropped a very brilliant
flare as she turned on a northerly course. This undoubtedly had
the effect of distracting the ground defences from herself; for she
was scarcely seen as she passed over the metropolis, and bombed
it heavily without damage to herself. She reached home in safety.
L32 waited near Dungeness for about 40 minutes, and then flew
north over Tunbridge Wells, instead of following LSI. She avoided
London, and dropped her bombs between Westerham and Ocken-
ham. Near Billericay she was destroyed by fire.
Although there would appear to be much to commend such a
course, " fleet " movements of airships in formation with the
intention of bombing were not carried out by the Germans.
However, it does not necessarily follow that a big attack of
airships, either by themselves or convoyed by aeroplanes, will
not form part of an extensive bombing operation in the future.
The arrival of such an aerial flotilla over a capital city at the
very outset of a war would do much to spread despondency and
alarm; and if such a fleet succeeded in getting away unscathed,
the attack might suffice to overturn all government in the state
attacked.
Aeroplane and Seaplane Attack. Bombing aeroplanes ' by
reason of their speed, difficulty of destruction from the ground,
and comparative ease of handling in unfavourable weather, form
the most serious factor in air attack.
The first aeroplane raid on London by day took place about noon
on Nov. 28 1916. This was carried out by a two-seater machine
carrying about half a dozen light bombs and flying at a high al-
titude. It was a courageous effort. Engine trouble brought the
pilot to the ground on French territory, where he was cap-
tured with his observer. London was covered with clouds of dust
which prevented all but a very few from ever seeing the machine.
The success of the effort made it all the more surprising that it
was never repeated; subsequent attacks in daylight were all made
by machines flying together in considerable numbers and not singly.
The most notable was that which took place on July 7 1917.
Before Sept. 1917, only a single attack on London was made
by aeroplane by night. In that particular case (May 6-7 1917) the
attack was made by a solitary machine which dropped most of its
bombs on Hackney Marshes.
With these two exceptions, aeroplane and seaplane raids on Eng-
land by day and night were limited practically to coastwise towns
and shipping at anchor till the beginning of Sept. 1917, when
aeroplane attacks on London by night were commenced seriously.
These seem to have been made at first by machines in groups of
three to five in number, but at the end of the same month, the
groups appear generally to have split up on reaching the English
coast, each machine taking its own line independently from that
time onwards.
Machine-gun fire from low-flying aeroplanes and seaplanes will
be encountered wherever targets present themselves: troops in
action, in camp, or on the march, transport in movement, troops
crowded on shipboard. But here again the principal effect will be
moral rather than material.
Where ships lie at anchor in open roadsteads, or in harbours
which offer a direct line of approach from the sea of moderate length,
seaplanes will find targets vulnerable by the marine torpedo. The
launching of the torpedo involves a close approach by the torpedo-
carrying machine to the surface of the sea, and complete occupa-
tion for the crew of the machine. These facts render it necessary
that such machines be escorted by one or more fighting machines,
whose duty it is to protect them from attacks by air and if possible
from fire from the shore and ships. Various methods of active pro-
tection suggest themselves the destruction of the machine, harass-
ing its aim, or deflecting the torpedo during the launching process.
Photography of the ground for intelligence purposes forms a
highly important feature in aircraft work. With good lenses, pho-
tographic machines can do their work at immense heights, thus
rendering their detection by the defence a matter of considerable
difficulty.
Aeroplanes on hostile patrol constitute an armed guard whose
duty it is to seek for enemy machines. Such patrols form targets
for air defence formations when they are within range and the air
forces proper are not at hand to take up their challenge.
Friendly machines acting as auxiliaries to ground operations
especially artillery machines observing the results of gun fire are
'.The paragraphs which follow are applicable also in the main to
seaplanes. Nevertheless the typical differences between the two
classes are not without importance from the point of view of the
preparations against attack by one or the other. The principal
difference is that seaplanes require no landing ground or special
arrangements for landing on ships. They can also take in their fuel
from ships. On the other hand they find difficulty in " taking off "
in rough water. Their powers of manoeuvre are, however, com-
paratively limited. They come chiefly into the consideration of coastal
air defence, owing to the necessity they are under of landing on
water. But amphibious machines are certain developments of the
near future, and wide canals such as that between Bruges and
Zeebrugge have served as landing places and enabled seaplanes to
operate from a point inland and safe from interference from the sea.
Page:EB1922 - Volume 30.djvu/124
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90
AIR DEFENCE