weather that prevailed. But the main reason for the failure is
traceable to the gradual improvement of the defences, which had
driven the airships higher and higher on each successive raid. On
this occasion none of them flew under 16,000 ft. while over the
land. At this height the difficulties of navigation are greatly
increased and the probability of successful bombing diminishes.
On the following night, Sept. 25, 10 aeroplanes attacked.
Of the three that approached London, one was turned off
by the barrage fire; the other two, coming in from the S., did
a little damage in Camberwell, Southwark, and Bermondsey,
where nine people were killed. The barrage fire at Dover was
particularly successful on this night, and the attack on that
place completely failed.
The attacks were continued on the 28th, when some 20
machines came over; the night was cloudy and a few only ap-
proached London; they were all kept off by the barrage fire.
The barrage was again singularly effective on the following
night, Sept. 29. Out of the 18 or 19 machines that came over
only four penetrated far enough to bomb London. Of the
remainder a large number were turned back by the fire put
up by the outer ring of London guns. The Dover guns again did
well, keeping off attack and bringing one of the enemy down
in flames. Thirty defending pilots went up on this night; none of
them found the enemy, although one was so close to a German
machine that the anti-aircraft guns had to stop firing on it.
On the next night, Sept. 30, the German pilots showed more
pluck; of 25 that attacked, eight got over London and bombed
places as far apart as Highgate, Edmonton and Woolwich.
Considering their numbers, they were singularly unlucky in the
results: six people were injured and the damage was under 8,000.
The last raid of the series on Oct. i was made by about 18
machines; a few penetrated the defences and dropped bombs.
One attacked Highbury, damaging a large number of houses;
another bombed Hyde Park and the neighbourhood. One bomb
fell into the Serpentine, killing most of the fish there. Only one
British pilot saw anything of the hostile machines.
During these raids a large proportion of the attackers had
been turned before reaching their target. The defences had
done fairly well, but they were still far from complete. The
outer ring of guns was not installed on the W. of London, and
it was plain that the German pilots were feeling round by the N.
for this gap.
The barrage fire was expensive in ammunition and there was a
doubt if the supply could be kept up. Doubts had even arisen
as to the use of the barrage one Cabinet minister describing it
as " self -bombardment." A few casualties from the gunfire were
inevitable until people realized that even the lightest cover would
protect them from the fragments of high-explosive shell. In
spite of casualties, however, it was plain that the public looked
upon the barrage fire as a comfort. It is significant that a
Christmas fund got up by the Star newspaper for the men working
at the guns had to be closed down from over-subscription.
Progress had already been made in night flying, on fast
machines, but the defending squadrons had not nearly reached
the necessary efficiency in machines or pilots.
The " Aprons," a new defence devised after the raid of
Sept. 5, were only beginning to be installed. These were
screens of wire that could be raised to 10,000 ft. by Caquot
balloons, and were designed to limit the range of heights in
which the defending pilots would have to seek the bombers.
The Central Control as organized in Sept. 1917 could give
no information to pilots when once they had been sent on
their patrols, but schemes to rectify this had already been
initiated. On the whole, although the attack at this time had
the best of it, there were reasonable hopes that this condition
would not last much longer.
The airship raid of the night Oct. 19-20 1917, which be-
came known in London as the " silent raid," has points of
special interest. The weather conditions were the dominating
feature both as regards the attack and the defence.
Eleven airships met on the evening of the 1 9th off the York-
shire coast for an attack on the industrial centres of the Midlands.
To avoid gunfire and aeroplane attack while over England,
the ships flew at an immense height, well over 16,000 ft. At
this altitude the efficiency of the crew is much impaired by
height sickness and the intense cold. Another and fatal condition
was produced by the weather. Near the ground the air was
misty and there was very little wind, but at the height of the
airships a strong gale was blowing from the N., and in this the
Zeppelins drifted blindly S., the navigators being prevented
by the ground mists from correcting their course. One airship
passed over London without recognizing it and dropped a few
heavy bombs; one of 50 kgm. fell in Piccadilly outside Swan &
Edgar's shop and caused some casualties. Owing to the peculiar
conditions of the night, sound carried very badly, and this ship
crossed London unheard. Eight other airships, in the course of
their southern drift, passed, without knowing it, within easy
reach of the metropolis.
Realizing that, on account of the ground mists, searchlights
would have no chance of lighting up a high Zeppelin, the defence
ordered them to remain covered unless an airship could be heard.
The London public were inclined to complain that the usual
display of lights and barrage fire was lacking. The lights,
had they been turned on, must have produced the worst results.
They could not light up the enemy, but they would be sufficient
to show the attackers where London was, and to enable them to
correct their course for drift. As it was, London was saved from
a combined attack and the raid ended in disaster to the attackers.
One airship only returned to Germany in the usual way;
six got back after flying over Holland or across the Allied lines.
The remaining four were destroyed during the following day
on French territory.
Aeroplane raiding was resumed during the moon period at the
end of October. An attempt on the 2gth failed on account of bad
weather; another on the 3ist was carried out by 24 machines.
Considering that a good many of them got over London, the
effect was small one woman killed and damage to the extent of
about 23,000.
The weather in Dec. 1917 was generally unfavourable for
long-distance raiding, and only three attempts were made on
London. The defences, showed steady improvement. Two
Gothas were brought down by anti-aircraft gunfire during a
raid in the early morning of Dec. 6 on which occasion the
Germans lost a third machine in the sea on the way home. On
the night of the i8th, improvements in the searchlight control
and the special training of the night-flying pilots began to make
themselves felt. Twenty-seven defending machines of the best
performance went up, and three combats took place.
As a result, one of the Gothas was so damaged that it fell into
the sea off Folkestone and was destroyed. On this night the new
" Giant " aeroplane came over London for the first time. It
dropped one 3oo-kgm. bomb in Lyall Street, near Eaton Square,
making a large crater but doing little serious damage. The
whole raid, however, cost London more than 300,000 in damage.
On Dec. 22 the last raid of the ye9r was frustrated by un-
favourable weather; one Gotha was forced by engine trouble to
descend near Margate, where it was destroyed by the crew.
. In the five aeroplane raids of the first quarter of 1918
there was a tendency to replace the smaller Gotha machines by
the new " Giants." A Gotha was destroyed by a defending
aeroplane on Jan. 28. During this raid a bomb dropped by a
Giant fell on a building in Long Acre that was being used as an
air-raid shelter, and 38 people were killed.
On the following night, Jan. 29, one of the Giant machines
was pursued half round London by four of the defending
scouts. The reason for its escape is curious. The British pi-
lots saw over their sights a machine they imagined to be of
Gotha size. The actual machine, being a Giant and very
much larger, was therefore a good deal farther off than they
thought, and they were firing at too long a range to be effective.
The crew of the Giant became panic-stricken and were within
an ace of landing when the British machines drew off.
Three Giants, unaccompanied by any smaller machines,
attacked on Feb. 16; the only one that penetrated to Lon-
Page:EB1922 - Volume 30.djvu/133
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AIR RAIDS
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