Batum at this time was in the hands of the Turks, and the Allies were still shut out from the Black Sea.
External difficulties were the active and veiled hostility of neighbouring states. Between Erivan and Turkey was the traditional hatred of Armenian and Turk, now inflamed to the desperation of a life-and-death struggle. Between Erivan and Azerbaijan was the standing enmity of Armenian and Moslem, given definite point by the massacre of Armenians at Baku some 15 years earlier, and of Moslems by Armenians during the months following the declaration of Armenian independence. There was also the acute question of territory in dispute, accompanied by incessant border fighting. Between Erivan and Georgia trouble, at the moment, was chiefly upon opposing territorial claims. Another hostile external influence was, a little later, exerted by Gen. Denikin and his supporters, who aimed at destroying the independence of the Caucasian republics and reuniting them to a resurrected Russia.
Internal difficulties, apart from poverty and questions of the supply of food, clothing, munitions and medical stores, were caused, also, by the absence of administrative experience among Armenian leaders and the sinister influence wielded by the Dashnakists. This Armenian secret revolutionary society held an extreme socialism; it was thus to a large extent in sympathy with the Bolsheviks of Russia. At the same time it stood for an aggressive military policy by the Erivan Republic and the extension of territory at the expense of adjoining states.
British Expedition to Baku. Operations which might have had far-reaching results for Erivan and other Caucasian states led to the occupation of Baku in the republic of Azerbaijan, on July 28 1918, by a small British force. It had come from Mesopotamia through Persia, and thence up the Caspian Sea a hazardous expedition intended to prevent, if possible, the despatch of German or Turkish detachments from Caucasia into Central Asia, and to open communications with the Cau- casian republics. It had relied upon receiving local Armenian support at Baku, but this hope failed owing to the extreme war- weariness of the Armenian population. The Turkish troops which had already entered Azerbaijan received reinforcements early in September, and then attacked the town and compelled the British force to reembark on Sept. 15.
Armistice of Mudros. The Armistice of Mudros, signed on Oct. 30 1918, ended hostilities between the Allied Powers and Turkey. Better days seemed now to be in sight for the Armenian race. Turkey was crushed, the Young Turk Government had fallen into disrepute, the chief leaders were in flight, and it was the avowed purpose of the Allies to free the subject races of the Ottoman Empire from Turkish rule. The Armistice con- tained conditions that speedily relieved the position for Armenians. The Straits were opened, Allied warships reached Caucasian ports and Allied and American relief work was begun. Trans-Caucasia was to be evacuated by Turkish troops, an Allied garrison placed in Batum and elsewhere if necessary, and Armenian prisoners-of-war and interned Armenians released forthwith. Another clause provided for Allied occupation, in whole or part, of the six Armenian vilayets of Asia Minor in case of disturbances arising.
War Between Georgia and Erivan, 1919. The collapse of Germany and the Armistice of Nov. n 1918, marking the com- plete victory of the Western Powers, seemed to promise the eventual creation of an Armenian state containing a majority of the race. But with Turkish occupation ended the Caucasian republics fell out more seriously among themselves. In spite of Allied efforts to prevent hostilities war broke out between Georgia and Erivan in Jan. 1919; fighting also continued between the Armenians of Karabagh and Moslems of Azerbaijan. At this time, too, the intrigues attending Gen. Denikin's movement went far to embroiling the republics. These unfortunate strug- gles did not, however, last long, nor were military operations undertaken on a serious scale, but the old causes of enmity remained, increased now between Georgia and Erivan by disputes regarding use of the Batum-Erivan railway, and the customs dues levied by Georgia on goods for Erivan.
Paris Peace Conference. On Jan. 19 1919 the Peace Conference at Paris began its deliberations, from which, when Eastern problems could be reached, it was hoped that a satisfactory settlement of Armenian affairs might emerge. Each of the Caucasian republics was permitted a delegation to lay its claims before the Conference. Meanwhile the Supreme Council, acting as an executive body, despatched an Allied High Commis- sioner to Erivan to compose, if possible, the urgent differences between the rival republics.
Armenians of Erivan had agreed to join Armenians of Turkey in seeking the creation of a single Armenian state; the Armenian delegation at Paris therefore represented the whole Armenian race. The claim advanced by the delegation was, in brief, that to Erivan should be added the eastern districts of Asia Minor in which a considerable Armenian population had existed prior to 1914, and that these districts should include Cilicia as being the " Lesser Armenia " of mediaeval history.
But this comparatively moderate proposal bristled with difficulties, and traversed principles to which the Conference professed adherence. Ancient and mediaeval history offered feeble arguments for the recovery of territory from a race which could show effective occupation for the past 400 years. Nor did any juggling with ethnological figures assist the Armenian case, for the plain fact remained that in no vilayet of Asia Minor, even before the massacres and deportations, was there an Armenian majority over Moslems. The principle of self- determination by inhabitants would therefore, if applied, de- stroy Armenian claims.
The Armenian case stands, indeed, on firmer ground than doubtful historical sanctions and self-determination by a mosaic of local populations. Based on justice and high ex- pediency it becomes a cause which no amount of theory can set aside.
Stated plainly the case for Armenia put forward by the delegation was that by race, language, faith, old history, serv- ices in the Allied interest, and barbarous treatment at the hand of the Ottoman Government over a long period, the Arme- nian people had shown themselves entitled to separate existence as an independent nation. And further, owing to their numbers having been artificially reduced by calculated and systematic massacre, justice required that their dead should be taken into account against the principle of self-determination within any Turkish territory to be allotted to an Armenian state. Expediency lay in the prospect that by the erection of an effective Greater Armenia a definite settlement of the Armenian problem would follow a problem likely, otherwise, to remain insoluble. And yet more, that an Armenian state, extending from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, would, with Allied aid, soon become a stable, self-reliant, civilized power in the midst of one of the chief danger-zones of the world.
The chief difficulty confronting the Armenian proposal was that the state to be created could not at first stand alone. It would require large financial and military support to set it on its feet and to maintain it during the earlier years of its existence it was doubtful even if it could police its own territory at the outset. These difficulties were to be overcome, it was hoped, by placing the proposed state in the charge of a mandatory Power.
Throughout the year 1919 and the earlier half of 1920 the prospect of finding a Power who would undertake the onerous and costly task of mandatory grew less and less favourable. It had been hoped that America would accept the responsibility. The American people had shown much sympathy with the Armenian cause; politically America was disinterested and stood outside the jealousies of European powers; her prestige was great; her resources unimpaired; to the Armenian people she would have been their first choice as mandatory power. But the American Senate rejected the. offer, fearing entanglement in Old World affairs. Great Britain, France, Italy, each felt unable to undertake the position war had left them more or less exhausted; and their peoples would not incur the certainty of additional outlay of blood and resources. The Supreme Council
