pared with about 60 in 1914. During the war daily feeding strengths
in all theatres reached approximately 5,400,000 men and 867,000
animals, and to meet these numbers the daily tonnage in foodstuffs
was 1 1 ,000 tons, and in forage 8,000 tons. To ensure this maintenance,
supplies were drawn from every quarter of the globe, a fact which
co.nbined with the effects of submarine warfare necessitated pro-
vision being made months ahead, so that a steady flow to the various
theatres of war should continue with the minimum of interruption.
Further, it was necessary to establish large bakeries, build frozen-
meat stores, or increase the existing accommodation for frozen meat,
and develop the local resources of each theatre to the fullest extent,
with the view of economizing shipping. The Army Service Corps
also undertook the manufacture of certain commodities, such as
pearl barley, sausages, beef stew, tibben, jam, ghi, and tinned
chicken; in addition to agricultural developments for the provision
of vegetables, potatoes, barley, maize and wheat. They also ar-
ranged bulk installations for petrol, and the necessary provision of
tinplating and case-boarding for canning and packing.
Army Ordnance Services. In 1910, and onwards till 1914, the ordnance services of the army were carried on by a staff of 251 officers and 2,341 other ranks, reenforced by some 4,300 civilian subordinates. The " other ranks " were formed in 9 companies of widely varying strengths, and in a number of small detachments distributed throughout the army. The holding of bulk supplies of ordnance stores and clothing was restricted to _ Woolwich and Pimlico respectively. To these two places were consigned the stores and clothing manufactured or supplied by the Government factories or the trade, and from them distribution was made to the local ordnance depots for issue to the troops. Reserves of warlike stores and clothing for one cavalry division, one cavalry brigade and 6 infantry divisions were held in ordnance charge at Woolwich, Pim- lico or elsewhere together with mobilization equipment for those units which, while non-existent in peace-time, would be required to place the Expeditionary Force on a complete war footing. As regards the organization of the ordnance services for war, this was almost exclusively confined to functions on the lines of communica- tion. The personnel allotted to the frontal area was limited to a deputy director (and a small staff) with Expeditionary Force headquarters, a deputy-assistant director with each division, and a warrant officer with each brigade. The director of ordnance serv- ices was to be on the staff of the I.G.C. lines of communication. The personnel for lines-of-communication duties was to be found by forming ordnance companies each with an establishment of 2 officers and 164 other ranks, additional officers being allotted ac- cording to the number of companies mobilized. When, in Aug. 1914, the Expeditionary Force embarked for France, 8 of these ordnance companies with 32 additional officers accompanied it to the bases, where were also dispatched the war reserves of stores and clothing. The rapid expansion of the army in the field, and the multiplication of various expeditionary forces in widely separated parts of the globe, not only called for great increases in ordnance personnel but also revolutionized the organization of the services in the field. The main alteration lay in the recognition of the necessity for extending the principle of an ordnance officer with a division to an ordnance organization with the headquarters of each corps and army. More- over, the immense use made of artillery throughout the campaign called into existence a number of mobile ordnance workshops, the main functions of which were to bridge the gap between the artillery front and the large workshops at the base. These field workshops, which were all mechanically propelled or drawn, were of three categories, light, medium and heavy, their nomenclature indicating the nature of the repairs to be undertaken, as also their relative degree of mobility. Though frequently " pooled " to meet any particular set of circumstances, they were organized on a scale of two light per three divisions, one medium per corps and one heavy per army. The value of these mobile shops will be the better ap- preciated when it is stated that but for them something like 45,000 guns and carriages would have had to be relegated some distance to the rear, if not to the base, for repair.
At the date of the Armistice there were in existence 60 of the light, 25 of the medium and 6 of the heavy variety. Other novel formations at the front included gun parks, railhead detachments, ammunition sections, and officers' clothirig depots, while there were added to the normal organizations on the lines of communication institutions such as schools of instruction in ammunition, ammunition repair factories and repair depots at the bases. The effect of this wide expansion of ordnance functions and of the magnitude of the opera- tions in the different theatres of war was to call for a very great in- crease in personnel, both officers and men. In the case of the former, employment was from the commencement offered to retired officers who, by taking over the work at home, released the active offi- cers for service abroad. As soon as it was seen that many more officers would be required, a scheme was set on foot to obtain " temporary " officers from suitable professions in civil life, and to train them in ordnance duties. As for the other ranks, large numbers of pensioned warrant and non-commissioned officers of the corps offered their services, the remainder required being obtained by direct enlist- ment. At the date of the Armistice 2,342 officers and 38,193 other ranks were doing duty with the ordnance services, in 144 companies and other formations. The majority of this personnel was serving
overseas; the balance were at the home depots, where they formed the nucleus of a mass of civilian labour, which reached a maximum of 48,000, nearly one-half being women.
Turning to the store side of the question, the original war re- serves were early exhausted, and it became necessary to evolve storage schemes in this country of far wider dimensions than were offered by the original depots at Woolwich and Pimlico. Each of these parent institutions set up subsidiary depots up and down the country, as far as possible devoting each to the storage of the class of article supplied by the trade of the particular locality. From these sub-depots supplies in bulk were sent overseas direct as ordered, thus materially reducing transport and double handling. Moreover, inspection hitherto carried out only at the respective headquarters was decentralized so as to enable inspection to take place either at these sub-depots or at contractors' works. In addition to these ex- pansions an entirely new depot of very large capacity was erected at Didcot and worked independently of Woolwich. A separate organization was called into existence to deal with the vast quantities of ammunition and explosives turned out by the national filling factories. A number of " dumps " were formed in various parts of the kingdom, and in addition an ordnance depot was attached to each factory and took over its daily output for dispatch as ordered. Some idea of the magnitude of the task imposed upon the ordnance services can be had when it is stated that the following quantities of the items named were dealt with: 6-inch (and larger) guns, 5,756; 6o-pounder guns (and under), 21,160; machine-guns, 230,000; gun-ammunition rounds, 2 17,000,000 ; small-arm-ammunition rounds, 9,150,000,000; blankets, 40,674,773; personal equipment sets, about 6,500,000; jackets, upwards of 27,000,000; trousers, 27,000,000 pairs; pantaloons, 8,000,000 pairs; boots, 40,000,000 pairs.
Labour. The density of armies i.e. the number of men to the acre in the area of active operations increased to a degree never imagined in previous wars; and this, with the long period of static warfare and the introduction of mechanical transport, by which alone it was possible to cope with the movement of the vast amount of ammunition, stores and supplies required, made road maintenance of paramount importance. The need for personnel to create and maintain the road communications became so acute that, in June 1915, labour battalions of navvies were formed. At first all the personnel was over military age, and 1 1 battalions attached to the Royal Engineers were formed; but these, together with the Army Service Corps companies which had gradually become necessary for work in the docks and stores, were all transferred en bloc to the La- bour Corps in 1917. In this year also the importation of coloured labour, including Chinese and S. African, was introduced. When the French railways became so congested as to be on the verge of a breakdown, this Labour Corps was augmented from every possible source, and a large number of companies of prisoners-of-war were affiliated with it. The basis of organization was the company of 500 men; the total personnel actually raised for labour purposes being approximately 900,000, including 95,000 Chinese. In addition to the requirements for the theatres of operations, smaller companies, known as Agricultural Companies, composed of unfit and over-age men, were formed to assist agriculture at home.
Expansion. No plan existed in 1914 for the expansion of the regular forces, beyond the automatic embodiment of the special reserve units. These were already included in the scheme for Home Defence, with the exception of certain extra-special reserve units which were earmarked for other service. The only step taken towards expansion during the mobilization period was to withdraw prior to embarkation 3 officers and 8 non- commissioned officers from each infantry unit of the Expedi- tionary Force. The next step was to call home regular units from overseas garrisons, relieving them by extra-special reserve units and territorial units who volunteered for the duty. These regular units on arrival from overseas were reorganized. The additional mounted brigades thus formed, with existing avail- able mounted troops, enabled the cavalry to be reorganized as a corps of 3 divisions, each of 4 cavalry brigades. The 5 addi- tional infantry divisions were completed as to other arms by the mobilization of artillery and engineer units existing at home surplus to the Expeditionary Force; but horse artillery and for- tress engineer companies had to be used in some instances to make good deficiencies.
Lord Kitchener, on assuming control as Secretary of State for War, at once grasped the need for immediate and immense expansion, but there remained no regular army basis on which to build, and three alternative courses presented themselves: (a) To expand the special reserve, which was partially regular owing to the inclusion of the regular depot establishments; (6) to use the Territorial Force organization, which provided a frame- work of 14 mounted brigades and 14 infantry divisions; (c) to
