1911 model had a carriage which when in position opened into two,
allowing of important changes of target without moving the gun.
This was a great advantage in view of the broken nature of the
ground on the Italian front. Guns were drawn by animals, but at
the time of the Armistice there were two regiments with guns on
motor carriages. The mountain artillery and mule batteries were
both supplied with light dismountable guns carried on mules. At
the beginning of the war the mountain batteries, served by numerous
men and animals and abundantly equipped, were armed with the
modern 65-mm. gun and employed in the Alpine districts, generally
remaining in position; while the mule batteries, much less complex
than the others, were armed with the rigid yo-mm. gun, and used in
the plains or in hilly country, accompanying the infantry. Gradually,
however, these batteries were equipped with the 65-mm. gun and
the difference between the two kinds of batteries disappeared. In
1918 they had become of the same type. When Italy entered into
the war there were 60 mountain batteries of 4 guns, and 20 batteries
on mules of 4 guns. On Oct. I 1917 there were 90 mountain batteries
of 4 guns and 80 batteries on mules of 4 guns. On Oct. I 1918 there
were 170 batteries of the single type.
At the beginning of the war the heavy artillery was so scarce that it could not be assigned to any army corps, but was scattered, some- times in single batteries, along the more important sectors of the front. It was armed with the 149 A howitzer, deformation pattern, with animal transport. Later on it was furnished with !O5-mm. guns, also drawn by animals, and with 102- and iO5-mm. guns drawn by motors. This innovation together with an increase in the num- ber of 149-mm. howitzers made it possible, at the end of 1917, to allot to each army corps a mixed group of 149 A howitzers and of iO5-mm. guns (two groups of three batteries) drawn by animals. All the groups drawn by motor and some of the others were left at the disposal of the supreme command. Towards the end of the war a group of three batteries of 149-mm. howitzers was assigned to each infantry division. The heavy field artillery consisted, on May 24 1914, of 30 batteries of 4 guns; on Oct. I 1917, of 200 batteries of 4 guns; on Oct. I 1918, of 280 batteries of 4 guns.
At the outbreak of the war the siege train was absolutely insuffi- cient, both in quantity and quality. This state of affairs was im- proved by transporting to the front the majority of the guns mostly of ancient pattern belonging to fortresses, and by placing big orders with home factories. Thus the number of guns was increased and the obsolete batteries were replaced. At the same time the batteries were supplied with motor tractors. From the beginning of 1917 a well-supplied park of tractors was formed. After Caporetto, where a great portion of the old material was lost, the guns were replaced by modern guns made in Italy and in the Allied countries, and new complete permanent groups of guns of the same type were formed, while previously these groups were variable. The principal types of siege artillery in use at the end of the war were guns of 381, I55> I5 2 > 149 an d 120 mm. ; howitzers of 305 and 152 mm. ; mortars of 260 and 210 mm. Besides these, smaller calibres of antiquated patterns were used as fortress artillery. At the outbreak of the war the siege artillery consisted of 40 batteries; on Oct. I 1917, of 750 batteries; on Oct. I 1918, of 830 batteries. The siege batteries of big and medium calibres had from 2 to 6 guns each ; those of small calibre had 8. On Oct. I 1918 the total number of big- and medium-calibre guns was 2,550.
There were no anti-aircraft guns at the beginning of the war, and for some time field and mountain guns were adapted for use as anti- aircraft artillery. Later, batteries of 75-mm. guns mounted on motor-cars were formed, and the defence against enemy raids was organized. The anti-aircraft artillery consisted of 100 guns on v Oct. I 1917, and 130 on Oct. I 1918.
Trench mortars (bombardes) were a creation of the war, their orig- inal object being to destroy wire entanglements by their curved trajectory and heavy bursting charge, and they proved most suc- cessful at the battle of Gorizia in 1916, after which their number and efficiency were greatly increased. During the retreat of Caporetto the bombardiers had to abandon, for lack of transport, nearly all their mortars and they were, therefore, temporarily grouped in a division which fought with the infantry; but as new material became available their battalions were reorganized. The principal mortars used were the 58 A, 58 B, 240 C, 240 L and 240 LA, formed into bat- teries or groups. On Oct. I 1917 the batteries numbered 200 and as many autonomous sections; each consisted of 6 to 12 mortars.
To sum up, the Italian artillery was enormously strengthened, from the beginning of the war onward, in number and quality of guns and by the formation of new specialties. Its organization was also improved. The campaign was entered into with a little more than 500 batteries, that is, less than one battery for each infantry battalion. On Oct. I 1917, there were nearly 2,000 batteries, or 2j batteries per infantry battalion. During the retreat of Caporetto 3,100 guns and 1,700 bomb-mortars were lost (something over 1,000 batteries). Nevertheless, on Oct. I 1918 the army had more than 2,000 batteries.
The corps of engineers also was increased in numbers and trans- formed during the war. The sappers at the outbreak of hostilities were formed into companies; each infantry division had one com- pany with a pontoon section and a telephone section. Later on battalions of sappers were formed of 3 companies each (one of which
with pontoon section), and a battalion was assigned to each infantry division, other units doing telephone service. On May 24 1915 there were 42 companies, on Oct. I 1917, 72 battalions (223 companies), on Oct. I 1918, 78 battalions (234 companies).
During the war the following special corps were formed: tel- pherists; motorists detailed to the numerous drilling-machines used on the front, for digging caves, trenches and ways of communication in the rocky districts; gas specialists, whose chief duty was to ex- amine and make experiments on the use of gas and the means of protection against it; flame-throwers, or detachments furnished with heavy flame-ejectors of position.
One may say that the aeronautical service, especially as regards aviation, was created during the war, at the beginning of which the army had only 24 squadrons of aeroplanes with about 60 machines fit only for observation purposes. Later on, thanks to the enormous increment of the home industry, the number of the machines was increased, and different groups for raids, chasing and observation were formed. In 1918 there were 51 groups with 1,400 machines. The balloon parks increased from ip to 39. Airships varied as to type; but their number was always limited to six.
The medical service consisted originally of only 800 medical officers of the permanent army. Numerous officers of the reserve were drafted and new officers commissioned so that the total number reached 9,100. Field and other hospitals allotted to the fighting units increased from 300 to 500, to which should be added those of the Red Cross and of the Knights of Malta, as well as the up-to-date surgical and other establishments scattered along the front. Trains fitted for the transport of sick and wounded were increased from 36 to 74. Medical establishments within the country rose from 75 to 1,500 and the number of beds from 90,000 to 400,000.
Motor transport was enormously developed during the war, in consequence not only of the ever-increasing requirement of the war operations but also of the deficiency of animals. Motor traction was used for artillery, camp kitchens, pontoon equipment, etc. On Oct. I 1918 the officers numbered 3,000, men 130,000.
Losses. The first preliminary calculations of the losses suffered by the Italian army during the World War made immediately after the Armistice gave the following results in round figures: Dead, 460,000, of which number 330,000 died on the battlefield or in conse- quence of wounds, 85,000 died of sickness, 45,000 died while pris- oners; wounded, 900,000 and sick, 2,400,000, of whom 2,430,000 had resumed service, 300,000 were under treatment and expected to recover, 570,000 were invalided and permanently unfit for service.
The severest losses were sustained in 1917. The other years fol- lowed in this order: 1916, 1915 and 1918. The number of dead given corresponds to 1-27% of Italy's total population in Jan. 1915 (36,000,000). Subsequent more accurate calculations proved that the actual losses had been underestimated. Senator Giorgio Mortara in his Prospettive economiche, published in 1921, quotes the following figures :
Killed on the battlefield 3l7,o
Died in hospital of wounds 5 1 ' 000
Died in hospital of sickness 106,000
Prisoners who died of wounds 10,000
Prisoners who died of sickness 80,000
Total
564,000
This gives a percentage of dead to population of 1-56.
If one adds to the above total 25,000 released sick prisoners who died during the period of demobilization, and 62,000 who died of disease during the same period, the number of deaths rises to 651,000.
A revision and control of data dealing with losses was in 1921 being attended to, but the partial results already then known led to the belief that the first set of figures given was far inferior to the reality, and that even those given by Senator Mortara would have to be increased rather than diminished.
Demobilization. On the cessation of hostilities the army began the reduction of its forces to something approaching pre-war strength. Demobilization could not be immediate or rapid owing to the necessity of keeping sufficient troops on the Armistice line and in foreign territories; of haying many troops under arms in the country to repress the disorders likely to occur after such a war; of regulating the discharge of troops in accordance with means of transport avail- able, taking into account also the probability of emigration on the part of some of the men discharged and the possibility of employ- ment at home for others. It was also advisable to keep numerous units in the redeemed territories to employ them in urgent works of reconstruction. These and other considerations imposed a gradual demobilization of men as well as of animals and material. Demo- bilization involved not only a reduction but also a transformation inasmuch as the army had to be organized on lines different from those of 1914 and in accordance with the lessons of the war.
The older classes of reservists were discharged first. The men were given an insurance policy, a parcel of mufti clothes or a corresponding sum of money and their fare to return to their residence in Italy or abroad. Officers were discharged after the men of their class. Medical officers especially were kept in the army to attend on wounded and sick men and prisoners returning from internment. By the end of June 1919, 14 classes had been discharged as follows:
